scholarly journals Executive compensation and firm performance: a non-linear relationship

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rijamampianina Rasoava
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Linear Relationship ◽  
South African ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Company Size ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
The Impact

In order to ensure profitability for shareholders, optimal contracting recommends the alignment between executive compensation and company performance. Large organizations have therefore adopted executives remuneration systems in order to induce positive market reaction and motivate executives. Complex compensation schemes are designed by Boards of Directors using strong pay-performance incentives that explain high levels of executive pay along with company size, demand for management skills and executive influence. However, the literature remains inconclusive on the pay-performance relationship owing to the various empirical methods used by researchers. Additionally, there has been little effort in the literature to compare methodologies on the pay-performance relationship. Using the dominant agency theory framework, the purpose of this study is to establish and examine the relationship between firm performance and executive pay. In addition, it intends to assess the characteristic of model specifications commonly adopted. To this aim, a quantitative analysis consisting of three complementary methods was performed on panel data from South African listed companies. The results of the main unrestricted first difference model indicate a strong non-linear relationship where the impact of current and previous firm performance on executive pay can be observed over 2 to 4-year period providing support to the optimal contracting theoretical perspective in the South African business context. In addition, CEO pay is more sensitive to firm performance as compared to Director pay. Lastly, although it affects executive pay levels, company size is not found to improve the pay-performance relationship.

scholarly journals How do executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence corporate performance? Evidence from Thailand tourism listed companies

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence Ferry ◽  
Guanming He ◽  
Chang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Pay Gap ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe authors investigate how executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence the performance of Thailand tourism listed companies.Design/methodology/approachThe authors manually collect data on the executives' and employees' remunerations for Thailand tourism listed companies and use the data for the authors’ OLS regression analysis. To check the robustness of the results to potential endogeneity issues, the authors employ the two-stage least-squares regression analysis and the impact threshold for a confounding variable approach.FindingsThe authors find that short-term executive compensation enhances firm performance, and that long-term executive compensation reduces the likelihood of unfavorable corporate performance. The authors also find that the gap in short-term pay between executives and employees has an inverted-U relation with firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis study suggests that higher executive pay relative to employee pay could encourage executives to work hard to improve corporate performance, but that too large a pay gap between executives and employees could impair employees' morale and harm firm performance.Practical implicationsIt is important for tourism companies to not only pay executives well but also avoid too large a pay gap between executives and employees.Social implicationsThis study implies the important role of compensation design in contributing to employee engagement and good performance for tourism firms.Originality/valueThis study sheds light on agency problems between executives and employees in tourism companies and provides new evidence and insights on compensation research in the tourism sector in emerging markets.

scholarly journals Exploring non-linear relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3, special issue) ◽  
pp. 257-274
Author(s):  
Neeraj Gupta ◽  
Tarun Agarwal ◽  
Bhagwan Jagwani
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Linear Relationship ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
Effect Estimation ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This study aims to examine the impact of foreign ownership on the performance of Indian firms. Additionally, it also analyses the non-linear relationship of foreign ownership with firm performance. A panel data approach has been used in this study. Specifically, the fixed effect estimation technique is used to examine the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance during the period 2009–2010 to 2018–2019. The foreign institutional shareholders and the foreign corporate bodies hold more shareholding than the foreign individual investors. The authors find that foreign institutional investors and foreign corporate bodies bear a positive relationship with the performance of Indian firms. Additionally, foreign ownership shows a non-linear relationship with firm performance. The results are robust across the various proxies of firm performance, and sub-samples based on foreign ownership

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

Board gender diversity: performance and risk of Brazilian firms

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Mastella ◽  
Daniel Vancin ◽  
Marcelo Perlin ◽  
Guilherme Kirch
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Study Approach ◽  
Female Presence ◽  
Board Gender Diversity ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to intend to check if female board representation affects performance and risk and to analyse the evolution of the demographic aspects of the presence of women on boards in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach The authors used a sample of 150 Brazilian publicly traded companies from 2010–2018, with different measures of firm performance, firm risk and women’s presence on the board. The study approach is based on a set of ordinary least squares, quantile and panel data regressions. Findings The presence of women on the board has a positive effect on all of our accounting and market performance measures. However, the result of the impact on risk is not conclusive. The study also found that the number of females on the board has a more significant effect at the lower levels of firm performance measured by return on equity, but at the higher levels when measured by Tobin’s Q. Regarding return on assets, the more significant effect happened on the extremes of the performance distribution. The study findings point that market investors place more value in female presence on the board than in director positions. Originality/value By estimating the impact of women’s presence on the boards of directors in firm performance and risk, this study aimed to verify this impact in different aspects of the company. In addition, the authors did so in a sample with many years, making it possible to evaluate the historical evolution of the feminine presence in the boards of administration as well as in the groups of directors, assisting Brazilian legislators with new evidence about the possible impacts of Draft Law 7179/2017.

scholarly journals Government Size and Corruption: A Non-linear Analysis in the Case of EMCCA

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Assoumou Ondo ◽  
Beau Jency Owono Ondo
Keyword(s):  
Linear Relationship ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Central Africa ◽  
Linear Analysis ◽  
Government Size ◽  
Economic Community ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This article analyzes the relationship between Government size and corruption. Unlike the works in the way which suppose a linear relationship between the two variables, we estimate a panel with change of the modes to characterize the impact of the size of the Central Government on corruption, in the countries of the economic community and monetary of Central Africa (EMCCA). The results show that there is a non-linear relationship between these two variables. Indeed, a strong involvement of the Government in economic activity results in a significant increase in corruption when the Government exceeds a size of 13.5508% of the GDP.

Limiting Executive Compensation: The Case of CEOs Hired after the Imposition of 162(m)

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Balsam ◽  
David H. Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Internal Revenue ◽  
Compensation Package ◽  
Bonus Pay ◽  
Executive Officers

This study analyzes the effect of Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) on the compensation package of those chief executive officers (CEOs) hired after the imposition of this code section. Research documents that CEO compensation has increased dramatically since the imposition of section 162(m); yet, this research has not distinguished between the effects on the compensation of CEOs already in place when section 162(m) was imposed from those CEOs hired post-162(m) imposition. We focus our analysis on the compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of section 162(m), because when firms hire a new CEO, they have a better opportunity to redesign the executive pay package. Consequently, we posit that section 162(m) will have its greatest effect when the affected companies change CEOs. Our analysis provides evidence that the increase in salary normally associated with the hiring of a new CEO has been mitigated and there has been an increase in the sensitivity of firm performance to bonus pay for CEOs appointed after 1994 in affected firms.

New Directions in Corporate Governance and Finance: Implications for Business Ethics Research

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 673-694 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Verstegen Ryan ◽  
Ann K. Buchholtz ◽  
Robert W. Kolb
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Academic Fields ◽  
Board Processes ◽  
Ethics Research ◽  
New Directions ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT:Corporate governance and finance are dynamic academic fields that offer myriad opportunities for business ethics analysis. Within the corporate governance triad in recent years, shareholders have increased their power over boards of directors and executives through both regulation and movements to change corporate by-laws. The impact of board characteristics on firm performance has proven elusive, leading to questions concerning board processes and individual director beliefs and behaviors. At the same time, CEOs have lost considerable power, leaving many struggling to regain their control and maintain their compensation levels, while others adopt a stewardship approach to their posts. In the field of finance, the recent financial debacle has led to a reexamination of financial regulation and of the fundamental nature and purpose of the industry. All of these issues provide business ethicists fodder for investigation and analysis.

Does CEO duality give more influence over executive pay to the majority or minority shareholder? (A survey of Brazil)

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enoima Abraham ◽  
Gurcharan Singh
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholder ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Managerial Performance ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Conditional Effects ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to focus on comparing the influence of majority and minority shareholders on executive compensation under conditions of CEO duality, examining majority and minority shareholder influences by measuring their investment and return activity. The paper seeks to uncover how CEO duality changes the impact the two categories of shareholders have on executive compensation, especially in an emerging nation. Design/methodology/approach In total, 30 corporations out of the 70 corporations listed on the BM&F Bovespa (a Brazilian stock market) were used for the paper. Quarterly data were collected on the companies from the Datastream database. The paper conducted a moderated regression analysis on the data to determine the conditional effects of majority and minority holders’ investment and returns on executive compensation. Findings There are incentives for executives meeting majority shareholder objectives, but minority shareholders’ influences act as a disincentive for executives. Only the influence of blockholders by their returns is affected by the separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman. The effect is such that firms with a separation of the roles have their executives rewarded in line with increments to the returns made to blockholders, but firms that have the roles merged pay a high wage that is inconsistent with managerial performance. Finally, the majority of variation in executive pay levels can be attributed to individual company traits. Research limitations/implications The paper’s sample is biased to firm which had publicly available data on the total compensation payable to their top executives. Practical implications Advocates of minority shareholder rights may need to exercise patience with the implementation of more formalised governance structure, as they are not providing protection for minority shareholders within the period studied. Originality/value The paper provides empirical evidence within the Brazilian context of minority shareholder effects on executive compensation and the effect of CEO duality on the relationship.

The impact of public scrutiny on executive compensation

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-323
Author(s):  
Andrew Glen Carrothers
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Multivariate Regression Analysis ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Public Scrutiny ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to examine the impact of public scrutiny on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation at Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses the unique opportunity provided by the 2008 financial crisis and, in particular, government support and legislated compensation restrictions in the US Department of the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). It aggregates monetary and non-monetary executive compensation information from 2006 to 2012, with firm- and manager-level data. It presents univariate summary compensation results and uses multivariate regression analysis to isolate the impact of public scrutiny and legislated compensation restrictions on executive pay. Findings Overall, the results are consistent, with increased public scrutiny having a lasting impact on perks and temporary impact on wage and legislated compensation restrictions having a temporary impact on wage. Changes in specific perk items provide evidence on which perks firms perceive as excessive and which provide common value. Originality/value The paper contributes to the discussion of perks as excess by introducing a novel data set of perk compensation at S&P500 firms and by studying how firms choose to alter levels of specific perk items in response to increased public scrutiny and legislated compensation restrictions. The paper contributes to the literature on executive pay as there has been little inquiry into the impact of public scrutiny on compensation. Public scrutiny could be an important source of external governance if firms change behavior in response to explicit and implicit scrutiny costs.

scholarly journals Board of directors, capital structure, investment decisions and firm-performance: An empirical study of Nordic firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 377-390
Author(s):  
Shab Hundal ◽  
Anne Eskola
Keyword(s):  
Principal Component Analysis ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Corporate Finance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Principal Component ◽  
The Impact

Firms’ financing, boards of directors’ characteristics, investments, and firm-performance (financial and non-financial) occupy a pivotal place in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. The current study explores if causalities between the abovementioned four distinct albeit inter-related phenomena follow any pattern. The data comprising of 1240 firm-years belonging to Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark for the period of 2003 to 2018 have been analyzed by applying multivariate linear regression and principal component analysis. The findings show that the impact of boards of directors’ characteristics is stronger on capital structure, however, weaker on investments and financial performance. The major contribution of the article is creating a set orderly and sequential causalities between financing, boards of directors’ characteristics, investments, and firm-performance.

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