scholarly journals Analysis of Pure Consciousness as a Correlated Extended Informative Perspective

Author(s):  
Владимир Семёнов ◽  
Vladimir Semenov

Introduction. In this paper, an attempt is made to study the Husserlian philosophy of knowledge in order to identify, on the basis of our own reflections, not just the true fundamental core of pure consciousness, but the dynamic existence within the framework of that stratum to which we fall upon accomplishing the phenomenological reduction. The methodological basis for this work is the position of the phenomenological theory of pure consciousness from "Ideas for Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. Book One. A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology" by E. Husserl. According to Husserl, our usual everyday experience may be subject to reduction up to the discovery of a layer of pure, a priori cognitive processes. The very same a priori knowledge can be found in I. Kant’s "Critique of Pure Reason", in particular from his reflections on transcendental aesthetics and foundations of pure reason. Results. Having analyzed the hidden possibilities of pure consciousness, the author declares that, even in such a phenomenological layer, where any volitional arbitrariness is excluded, there is a structure, or, in other words, a kind of intellectualization, shaped by time. Conclusion. The author believes that a half-hearted view of consciousness as merely an intentional being leads to a negative simplification of the subject of knowledge. A new, expanded model of phenomenal-existential consciousness, proposed in this work, showed that the decomposition of the basic attributes of pure consciousness has an expanded cognitive perspective of such phenomena-things that are not understood by simple and one-sided Husserlian intention, but, on the contrary, they reveal even more complex phenomena.

Author(s):  
Vladimir Semenov

The subject of the research is the dynamics of noesis of pure consciousness and the rules of formal logic. The goal was to establish the foundations for the synthesis of pure consciousness and ordinary reason. The methodological basis was the theory of pure consciousness postulated by E. Husserl in his "Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book one. A general introduction to pure phenomenology". The research also featured I. Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", in particular his reflections on the "foundations of pure reason" and the formal logic of Aristotle. Results. If we split the emerging experience of pure consciousness into interoceptive and exteroceptive, it means that the pure contemplation of things is not as pure as E. Husserl believed it to be, since the reason with its invariable logical operations is always added to the noesis procedure. This leads us to a less idealized understanding of phenomenology as a philosophical trend, even though Husserl’s work used classical laws of "contemplative intuition". The results can be applied in the field of epistemology and the theory of phenomenological knowledge. Findings. The subject of knowledge, even after the phenomenological reduction is completed, is still connected with rational activity. Such a vision of the phenomenological layer could eliminate the very possibility of the appearance of "pure entities" since we do not completely abandon our everyday "natural setting". However, we believe that in order to encounter anything at all in the "epoch" state, it is necessary to continue to keep in touch with reason, since otherwise there is a risk of falling into somnambulism. Reason, although it enters the layer of pure knowledge, does not lose its formal logical abilities. Logical laws are connected with the operation of noesis, thereby creating a general experience of things of an interoceptive or exteroceptive nature.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-32
Author(s):  
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales

This article explains in ten points the concepts of substance, change and matter that appear in the transcendental Analytics of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as categories and schemes, as well as how they function in the Analogies of Experience. It aims to demonstrate how the category in general, and that of substance in particular, are, in their transcendental ideality, a strategy of the subject to order and objectify the phenomenal world. It establishes that change is also necessary a priori, that both change (accident) and persistence (substance), as well as all appearances, are finite and limited. This would lead to the affirmation that only matter, transcendental matter, is entirely persistent; however, transcendental matter is not a sensible object and therefore those sensible objects that relatively persist in time-space are the only empirical reality of the substance. Finally, matter is made up of forces, and given that there is nothing simple in matter, it can be inferred that empirical substance is nothing other than a field of forces. Recebido / Received: 14.6.2019.Aprovado / Approved: 1.8.2019.


Author(s):  
Robert Audi

Abstract Kant influentially distinguished analytic from synthetic a priori propositions, and he took certain propositions in the latter category to be of immense philosophical importance. His distinction between the analytic and the synthetic has been accepted by many and attacked by others; but despite its importance, a number of discussions of it since at least W. V. Quine’s have paid insufficient attention to some of the passages in which Kant draws the distinction. This paper seeks to clarify what appear to be three distinct conceptions of the analytic (and implicitly of the synthetic) that are presented in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and in some other Kantian texts. The conceptions are important in themselves, and their differences are significant even if they are extensionally equivalent. The paper is also aimed at showing how the proposed understanding of these conceptions—and especially the one that has received insufficient attention from philosophers—may bear on how we should conceive the synthetic a priori, in and beyond Kant’s own writings.


2005 ◽  
pp. 97-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Sharpe

This inquiry is situated at the intersection of two enigmas. The first is the enigma of the status of Kant's practice of critique, which has been the subject of heated debate since shortly after the publication of the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. The second enigma is that of Foucault's apparent later 'turn' to Kant, and the label of 'critique', to describe his own theoretical practice. I argue that Kant's practice of 'critique' should be read, after Foucault, as a distinctly modern practice in the care of the self, governed by Kant's famous rubric of the 'primacy of practical reason'. In this way, too, Foucault's later interest in Kant - one which in fact takes up a line present in his work from his complementary thesis on Kant's Anthropology - is cast into distinct relief. Against Habermas and others, I propose that this interest does not represent any 'break' or 'turn' in Foucault's work. In line with Foucault's repeated denials that he was interested after 1976 in a 'return to the ancients', I argue that Foucault's writings on critique represent instead both a deepening theoretical self-consciousness, and part of his project to forge an ethics adequate to the historical present.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Michał Wendland

The article concerns some of the most important elements of I. Kant’s epistemology and its connections with earlier epistemological ideas, namely rationalism and empiricism. The history of dispute between rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz) and empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) is hereby shortly presented while Kant’s own philosophical achievements are suggested to be both alternative and synthesis of these. The main core of this paper is summary of basis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; some most important categories are described: apriorism, synthetic and analytical judgements, knowledge a priori and a posteriori, main ideas of transcendental esthetics (two forms of pure intuition: time and space), main ideas of transcendental logic (forms of judgement and twelve categories). Also the meaning of Kant’s „copernican revolution” is presented as a turning point for classical German philosophy as well as for whole modern epistemology.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Balanovskiy Valentin

The author attempts to answer a question of whether the fact that Immanuel Kant’s theory of experience most likely has a conceptual nature decreases an importance of Kant’s ideas for contemporary philosophy, because if experience is conceptual by nature, then certain problems with the search for means to verify experiential knowledge arise. In particular, two approaches are proposed. According to the first approach, the exceptional conceptuality of Kant’s theory of experience may be a consequence of absence of some important chains in arguments contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, which could clarify a question of how the conceptual apparatus of the subject corresponds to the reality. The author puts a hypothesis that the missing chains are not a mistake, but Kant’s deliberate silence caused by the lack of accurate scientific information that could not have been available to humankind in Enlightenment epoch. According to the second approach even if Kant’s theory of experience is exclusively conceptual by nature, this cannot automatically lead to a conclusion that it is unsuitable for obtaining reliable knowledge about reality, since transcendental idealism has powerful internal tools for verifying data in the process of cognition. The central position among them is occupied by transcendental reflection.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Mugerauer

For those who are interested, the study of Kant's relevant writings is facilitated here, especially that of the ´Critique of Pure Reason´. Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy and criticism of reason has left a lasting mark on modern thinking. The author gives an overview of Kant´s criticism. The focus is on Kant's philosophical treatment of the subject of God and his criticism of affirmative rational theology. If one wants to understand Kant, the God theme is of outstanding importance. Moreover, it is gaining increased philosophical interest nowadays. The author concludes with an outlook on the philosophical theologies in German idealism.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-497
Author(s):  
David Hyder

Abstract The theory of space-time developed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his (1786) Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is connected to Leonhard Euler’s proof of invariance under Galilean transformations in the “On Motion in General” of the latter’s 1736 Analytical Mechanics. It is argued that Kant, by using the Principle of Relativity that is the output of Euler’s proof as an input to his own proof of the kinematic parallelogram law, makes essential use of absolute simultaneity. This is why, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, he observes that “our theory of time explains as much a priori knowledge as the general theory of motion displays.” (KrV, B 67) In conclusion, it is shown that the same proof-method, under a different definition of simultaneity, leads to the parallelogram law of the “Kinematic Part” of Einstein’s 1905 “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”.


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