scholarly journals Pure Consciousness in the Context of Formal Logic

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-280
Author(s):  
Vladimir Semenov
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Natural Setting ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
General Introduction ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
Logical Operations ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Experience ◽  
Pure Knowledge

The subject of the research is the dynamics of noesis of pure consciousness and the rules of formal logic. The goal was to establish the foundations for the synthesis of pure consciousness and ordinary reason. The methodological basis was the theory of pure consciousness postulated by E. Husserl in his "Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book one. A general introduction to pure phenomenology". The research also featured I. Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", in particular his reflections on the "foundations of pure reason" and the formal logic of Aristotle. Results. If we split the emerging experience of pure consciousness into interoceptive and exteroceptive, it means that the pure contemplation of things is not as pure as E. Husserl believed it to be, since the reason with its invariable logical operations is always added to the noesis procedure. This leads us to a less idealized understanding of phenomenology as a philosophical trend, even though Husserl’s work used classical laws of "contemplative intuition". The results can be applied in the field of epistemology and the theory of phenomenological knowledge. Findings. The subject of knowledge, even after the phenomenological reduction is completed, is still connected with rational activity. Such a vision of the phenomenological layer could eliminate the very possibility of the appearance of "pure entities" since we do not completely abandon our everyday "natural setting". However, we believe that in order to encounter anything at all in the "epoch" state, it is necessary to continue to keep in touch with reason, since otherwise there is a risk of falling into somnambulism. Reason, although it enters the layer of pure knowledge, does not lose its formal logical abilities. Logical laws are connected with the operation of noesis, thereby creating a general experience of things of an interoceptive or exteroceptive nature.

scholarly journals Analysis of Pure Consciousness as a Correlated Extended Informative Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-79
Author(s):  
Владимир Семёнов ◽  
Vladimir Semenov
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Phenomenological Theory ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
General Introduction ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Philosophy Of Knowledge ◽  
Complex Phenomena

Introduction. In this paper, an attempt is made to study the Husserlian philosophy of knowledge in order to identify, on the basis of our own reflections, not just the true fundamental core of pure consciousness, but the dynamic existence within the framework of that stratum to which we fall upon accomplishing the phenomenological reduction. The methodological basis for this work is the position of the phenomenological theory of pure consciousness from "Ideas for Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. Book One. A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology" by E. Husserl. According to Husserl, our usual everyday experience may be subject to reduction up to the discovery of a layer of pure, a priori cognitive processes. The very same a priori knowledge can be found in I. Kant’s "Critique of Pure Reason", in particular from his reflections on transcendental aesthetics and foundations of pure reason. Results. Having analyzed the hidden possibilities of pure consciousness, the author declares that, even in such a phenomenological layer, where any volitional arbitrariness is excluded, there is a structure, or, in other words, a kind of intellectualization, shaped by time. Conclusion. The author believes that a half-hearted view of consciousness as merely an intentional being leads to a negative simplification of the subject of knowledge. A new, expanded model of phenomenal-existential consciousness, proposed in this work, showed that the decomposition of the basic attributes of pure consciousness has an expanded cognitive perspective of such phenomena-things that are not understood by simple and one-sided Husserlian intention, but, on the contrary, they reveal even more complex phenomena.

Towards a New Philosophy

Philosophy ◽  
1930 ◽  
Vol 5 (18) ◽  
pp. 159-174
Author(s):  
Ph. Kohnstamm
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Logical Theory ◽  
The Subject

There is perhaps no part of Kant’sCritique of Pure Reasonwhich has called forth such severe criticism as his deduction of the System of Categories in the Transcendental Analytic. I am not aware of even one among his many followers who holds to this part of Kant’s doctrine. And the reason for this disagreement is obvious. Kant’s deduction of his System of Categories is based on Formal Logic, the theory of syllogism, first laid down by Aristotle. Mediaeval scholars had changed some details and partly systematized the subject. Kant himself had added some finishing touches to produce his famous number of a dozen categories, but the gist of this logical theory was the same as that found in Aristotle’sOrganon.

scholarly journals 'Critique' as Technology of the Self

2005 ◽  
pp. 97-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Sharpe
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
The Self ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Care Of The Self ◽  
The Status ◽  
Heated Debate ◽  
The Subject

This inquiry is situated at the intersection of two enigmas. The first is the enigma of the status of Kant's practice of critique, which has been the subject of heated debate since shortly after the publication of the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. The second enigma is that of Foucault's apparent later 'turn' to Kant, and the label of 'critique', to describe his own theoretical practice. I argue that Kant's practice of 'critique' should be read, after Foucault, as a distinctly modern practice in the care of the self, governed by Kant's famous rubric of the 'primacy of practical reason'. In this way, too, Foucault's later interest in Kant - one which in fact takes up a line present in his work from his complementary thesis on Kant's Anthropology - is cast into distinct relief. Against Habermas and others, I propose that this interest does not represent any 'break' or 'turn' in Foucault's work. In line with Foucault's repeated denials that he was interested after 1976 in a 'return to the ancients', I argue that Foucault's writings on critique represent instead both a deepening theoretical self-consciousness, and part of his project to forge an ethics adequate to the historical present.

scholarly journals Some Remarks in Defense of Immanuel Kant's Theory of Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Balanovskiy Valentin
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Experiential Knowledge ◽  
Central Position ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Reliable Knowledge ◽  
Conceptual Nature

The author attempts to answer a question of whether the fact that Immanuel Kant’s theory of experience most likely has a conceptual nature decreases an importance of Kant’s ideas for contemporary philosophy, because if experience is conceptual by nature, then certain problems with the search for means to verify experiential knowledge arise. In particular, two approaches are proposed. According to the first approach, the exceptional conceptuality of Kant’s theory of experience may be a consequence of absence of some important chains in arguments contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, which could clarify a question of how the conceptual apparatus of the subject corresponds to the reality. The author puts a hypothesis that the missing chains are not a mistake, but Kant’s deliberate silence caused by the lack of accurate scientific information that could not have been available to humankind in Enlightenment epoch. According to the second approach even if Kant’s theory of experience is exclusively conceptual by nature, this cannot automatically lead to a conclusion that it is unsuitable for obtaining reliable knowledge about reality, since transcendental idealism has powerful internal tools for verifying data in the process of cognition. The central position among them is occupied by transcendental reflection.

Immanuel Kants transzendentaler Kritizismus und die Frage nach Gott

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Mugerauer
Keyword(s):  
German Idealism ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Rational Theology ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Modern Thinking

For those who are interested, the study of Kant's relevant writings is facilitated here, especially that of the ´Critique of Pure Reason´. Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy and criticism of reason has left a lasting mark on modern thinking. The author gives an overview of Kant´s criticism. The focus is on Kant's philosophical treatment of the subject of God and his criticism of affirmative rational theology. If one wants to understand Kant, the God theme is of outstanding importance. Moreover, it is gaining increased philosophical interest nowadays. The author concludes with an outlook on the philosophical theologies in German idealism.

scholarly journals Of empty thoughts and blind intuitions Kant's answer to McDowell

2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter Zöller
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Real ◽  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
Passive Data ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The Given ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell's neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden.2 The focus is on Kant's twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the "work of the subject."3 On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant's philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell's take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell's relapse into the Myth of the Given. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant's original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural-Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of pure reason (1781 and 1787). Section 7 addresses Kant's formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.

scholarly journals The Problem of the Relationship between Apperception, Self-Consciousness and Consciousness in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 24-53
Author(s):  
I. E. Andriianov
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Synthetic Activity ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Functional Roles ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Prime Task ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Relationship

Kant does not provide clear-cut definitions of apperception, consciousness, and self-consciousness and everywhere uses these terms as synonyms, which creates the problem of the relationship between these faculties. The importance of this problem stems from the colossal significance of each of the above-mentioned faculties which are intimately connected with Kant’s formulation of the key tasks of transcendental philosophy. The prime task is to discover the categories of understanding and to prove the legitimacy of their use, a task that is further complicated by the difference between the editions of the Critique of Pure Reason in terms of the argumentation in the section on the deduction of categories and Kant’s concept of apperception. Accordingly, the author seeks to clarify the purpose of each of the above-mentioned faculties and to establish their inter-relationship. To this end the author analyses the functional roles of consciousness, self-consciousness and apperception in solving the main tasks of the first Critique. It turns out that consciousness is a reflexive cognitive capacity which provides access to representations in our soul and allows us to distinguish them and to connect them. Self-consciousness is the mode of the functioning of consciousness which makes it possible to study three objects of consciousness: internal and external representations of the subject, the synthetic activity of understanding and our soul. Apperception is the Latin synonym of the concept of Selbstbewußtsein and is aimed at studying the unity of our representations. Because Kant distinguishes multiple kinds of unity, there are different names for apperception. Kant uses the concept of Apperzeption as a synonym of self-consciousness because his concept of consciousness follows the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition.

scholarly journals Substance, change and matter in the Analogies of Experience of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-32
Author(s):  
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Phenomenal World ◽  
Empirical Reality ◽  
Time Space ◽  
The Subject

This article explains in ten points the concepts of substance, change and matter that appear in the transcendental Analytics of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as categories and schemes, as well as how they function in the Analogies of Experience. It aims to demonstrate how the category in general, and that of substance in particular, are, in their transcendental ideality, a strategy of the subject to order and objectify the phenomenal world. It establishes that change is also necessary a priori, that both change (accident) and persistence (substance), as well as all appearances, are finite and limited. This would lead to the affirmation that only matter, transcendental matter, is entirely persistent; however, transcendental matter is not a sensible object and therefore those sensible objects that relatively persist in time-space are the only empirical reality of the substance. Finally, matter is made up of forces, and given that there is nothing simple in matter, it can be inferred that empirical substance is nothing other than a field of forces. Recebido / Received: 14.6.2019.Aprovado / Approved: 1.8.2019.

The Message of Kant

Philosophy ◽  
1931 ◽  
Vol 6 (21) ◽  
pp. 43-55
Author(s):  
A. C. Ewing
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Small Space ◽  
Modern Thought ◽  
The Subject ◽  
First Time

It is very unfortunate that the philosopher who, as would be generally agreed, has had the greatest influence on modern thought is a writer whose style presents a particularly formidable barrier to the layman, or indeed to any reader tackling him for the first time; and this makes it all the more necessary that an effort should be made by those who have read and studied his works to communicate what they take to be the essential parts of his message. The present article is an attempt to fulfil a part of this function, i.e. to convey a few of the leading ideas of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, while leaving aside altogether his other writings. I hope Kantian scholars will forgive me if in the attempt to make some of Kant's ideas clear in a very small space to readers who have not specialized in the subject but are interested in philosophy I seem not to do justice to the complexity of his finer distinctions. Also I had better add that this article is simply an attempt to state Kant's doctrine; it is not intended as an expression of my own views, and refrains from criticism.

Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. Pippin
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
The Self ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
General Issue ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Recent Attention

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant refers often and with no apparent hesitation or sense of ambiguity to the mind (das Gemüt). He does so not only in his justly famous destruction of rationalist proofs of immaterialism, but throughout his own, positive, ‘transcendental’ account in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic. In the first edition of the Critique, he even proposed what he adventurously called a ‘transcendental psychology’ and, although this strange discipline seemed to disappear in the second edition, he left in that edition all his frequent references to forms ‘lying in the mind,’ and to the mind, or the self, or the subject of experience, or the ego, doing this or that. Curiously, though, despite an extensive secondary literature, there is in that literature relatively little discussion of what these expressions, in a proper, strictly Kantian sense, are supposed to refer to. There are two imaginative, extremely suggestive articles by Sellars, some hints at connections with eighteenth century psychology offered by Weldon, a tenebrous book by Heidemann, and some recent attention to the general issue of ‘Kant's theory of mind’ by Ameriks and Kitcher.

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