scholarly journals the Effect of Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Disclosure of Internal Control Material Weaknesses With a Field Study

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 1-64
Author(s):  
هدیر متولی رشاد
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Field Study ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Control Material ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Material Weaknesses

The Effects of Corporate Governance on CEO Compensation

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-191
Author(s):  
Myoung Gi Lee ◽  
Jin San Kim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Labor Union ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

The purpose of this study is to find the effects of corporate governance on executive compensation using the sample of Korean manufacturing firms listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX) from 2005 to 2012. In order to do that, this study extends empirical models of Core et al. (1999), Fahlenbrach (2009), Giroud and Mueller (2011), and finds the following results. First, internal corporate governance negatively affects executive compensation, implying that a good corporate governance can prevent outrageous compensation to top executives with poor performance. On the other hand, the interactions between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms have mixed results. While the first interaction has little impact on executive compensation, the second interaction among three different mechanisms has a positive and statistically significant impact. These results imply that while internal corporate governance and product market competition works against executive compensation, labor union may be in the same boat with managers in terms of compensation. Unlike most previous studies based on one-dimensional approach, this study investigates interactions among various corporate governance mechanisms. Overall results have a few important economic and social implications. Because internal corporate governance works as an effective mechanism, policymakers should find ways to make internal control mechanisms as independent as possible.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance And Earnings Management: A Survey Of Literature

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chi-keung Man ◽  
Brossa Wong
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Diagnostic System ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Corporate governance can reduce or even eliminate the extent of earnings management. Normally, an institutional environment that provides better legal protection can control managers self-interest to a certain extent. Takeover force can exert market pressure on managers to do the best for shareholders. Prior studies have investigated different corporate governance mechanisms that can have negative relationships with earnings management. Board independence can enhance certain monitoring behaviors in managers, including the misappropriation of assets. Female directors can develop trust leadership, which requires managers to share information, and are more likely to be risk-averse to frauds and opportunistic earnings management. An audit committee can oversee the internal control for financial reporting and the quality of financial information. Directors with financial expertise can provide incremental control effects on earnings management, especially in firms with weak corporate governance. This paper contributes to corporate governance by providing detailed reviews of different corporate governance mechanisms, reviewing the latest findings on classification shifting, and summarizing earnings management measures, including a new diagnostic system. In the future, this new diagnostic system may be investigated in different contexts.

The Role of Peer Events in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Data Breaches

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musaib Ashraf
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Control Material ◽  
Data Breaches ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Cyber Risk

Economic theory suggests that negative peer events can result in market-wide spillovers which help unaffected firms take real actions to enhance corporate governance. Motivated by the SEC’s concern about cybersecurity, I study the role of peer events in corporate governance using the setting of data breaches. While controlling for firm-specific time-varying unobservable characteristics, I find that peer data breaches are associated with a reduction in future internal control material weaknesses for non-breached firms. The association is robust to a changes analysis and varies cross-sectionally with breach, firm, and board characteristics. Inferences remain consistent when studying IT-related material weaknesses only. Finally, non-breached firms are more likely to have a cybersecurity expert on the top management team after a peer breach. My findings have important implications for mandatory disclosure regulation in general and, in particular, suggest that regulators can help reduce market-wide exposure to cyber risk by facilitating disclosure of cyber incidents.

Do corporate governance mechanisms and internal control systems matter in reducing mortality rates?

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 744-760 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Owusu Afriyie ◽  
Yusheng Kong ◽  
Patrick Obeng Danso ◽  
Abdul‐Aziz Ibn Musah ◽  
Michael Owusu Akomeah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Control Systems ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Mortality Rates ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

scholarly journals Is corporate governance of private equity targets more effective for risk mitigation?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimiro Marini ◽  
Massimo Caratelli ◽  
Gian Paolo Stella ◽  
Ilaria Barbaraci
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Risk Mitigation ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Active Monitoring ◽  
Industry Expert ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

AbstractPrivate equity is a source of finance and a governance device characterised by active monitoring through sponsors that intervene in targets’ corporate governance. As sponsors are skilled and motivated acquirors, we investigated whether corporate governance mechanisms mitigate leveraged targets’ risk of financial distress differently compared to non-acquired companies through the lenses of agency theory and resource-based theories. We found that targets and non-acquired companies are not significantly different in terms of corporate governance features, but sponsors are skilled enough to choose corporate governance members to mitigate risk more, especially when boards are smaller, have busier industry expert directors, and mandate execution to more managers. These results can be useful to targets, targets’ investors and lenders, and policymakers.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIRTUAL-NETWORK PARADIGM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE ENTERPRISES OF THE FUEL AND ENERGY COMPLEX

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (8) ◽  
pp. 58-62
Author(s):  
Kamila Zagidullina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Functional Approach ◽  
Process Approach ◽  
Virtual Network ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Theoretical Substantiation ◽  
Energy Complex ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Market Transformation

The relevance is increasing due to the need for a theoretical substantiation of the directions and mechanism of further market transformation of the fuel and energy complex, taking into account the dependence of the processes and results of its economic development on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. Key words:economics, fuel and energy complex, corporate governance, functional approach, process approach, virtual-network paradigm, mechanism

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