Cognitive Mechanisms in Decision-Making in Patients With Mild Alzheimer Disease

Author(s):  
Jose Ramón Alameda-Bailén ◽  
María Pilar Salguero-Alcañiz ◽  
Ana Merchán-Clavellino ◽  
Susana Paíno-Quesada
2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 846-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Estela Bicho ◽  
Wolfram Erlhagen ◽  
Luis Louro ◽  
Eliana Costa e Silva

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkady Zgonnikov ◽  
David Abbink ◽  
Gustav Markkula

Laboratory studies of abstract, highly controlled tasks point towards noisy evidence accumulation as a key mechanism governing decision making. Yet it is unclear whether the cognitive processes implicated in simple, isolated decisions in the lab are as paramount to decisions that are ingrained in more complex behaviors, such as driving. Here we aim to address the gap between modern cognitive models of decision making and studies of naturalistic decision making in drivers, which so far have provided only limited insight into the underlying cognitive processes. We investigate drivers' decision making during unprotected left turns, and model the cognitive process driving these decisions. Our model builds on the classical drift-diffusion model, and emphasizes, first, the drift rate linked to the relevant perceptual quantities dynamically sampled from the environment, and, second, collapsing decision boundaries reflecting the dynamic constraints imposed on the decision maker’s response by the environment. We show that the model explains the observed decision outcomes and response times, as well as substantial individual differences in those. Through cross-validation, we demonstrate that the model not only explains the data, but also generalizes to out-of-sample conditions, effectively providing a way to predict human drivers’ behavior in real time. Our results reveal the cognitive mechanisms of gap acceptance decisions in human drivers, and exemplify how simple cognitive process models can help us to understand human behavior in complex real-world tasks.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark K Ho ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman ◽  
Michael L. Littman ◽  
Joseph L. Austerweil

Theory of mind enables an observer to interpret others' behavior in terms of unobservable beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings, and expectations about the world. This also empowers the person whose behavior is being observed: By intelligently modifying her actions, she can influence the mental representations that an observer ascribes to her, and by extension, what the observer comes to believe about the world. That is, she can engage in intentionally communicative demonstrations. Here, we develop a computational account of generating and interpreting communicative demonstrations by explicitly distinguishing between two interacting types of planning. Typically, instrumental planning aims to control states of the physical environment, whereas belief-directed planning aims to influence an observer's mental representations. Our framework (1) extends existing formal models of pragmatics and pedagogy to the setting of value-guided decision-making, (2) captures how people modify their intentional behavior to show what they know about the reward or causal structure of an environment, and (3) helps explain data on infant and child imitation in terms of literal versus pragmatic interpretation of adult demonstrators' actions. Additionally, our analysis of belief-directed intentionality and mentalizing sheds light on the socio-cognitive mechanisms that underlie distinctly human forms of communication, culture, and sociality.


Solid Earth ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 1469-1488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina G. Wilson ◽  
Clare E. Bond ◽  
Thomas F. Shipley

Abstract. In the geosciences, recent attention has been paid to the influence of uncertainty on expert decision-making. When making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, people tend to employ heuristics (rules of thumb) based on experience, relying on their prior knowledge and beliefs to intuitively guide choice. Over 50 years of decision-making research in cognitive psychology demonstrates that heuristics can lead to less-than-optimal decisions, collectively referred to as biases. For example, the availability bias occurs when people make judgments based on what is most dominant or accessible in memory; geoscientists who have spent the past several months studying strike-slip faults will have this terrain most readily available in their mind when interpreting new seismic data. Given the important social and commercial implications of many geoscience decisions, there is a need to develop effective interventions for removing or mitigating decision bias. In this paper, we outline the key insights from decision-making research about how to reduce bias and review the literature on debiasing strategies. First, we define an optimal decision, since improving decision-making requires having a standard to work towards. Next, we discuss the cognitive mechanisms underlying decision biases and describe three biases that have been shown to influence geoscientists' decision-making (availability bias, framing bias, anchoring bias). Finally, we review existing debiasing strategies that have applicability in the geosciences, with special attention given to strategies that make use of information technology and artificial intelligence (AI). We present two case studies illustrating different applications of intelligent systems for the debiasing of geoscientific decision-making, wherein debiased decision-making is an emergent property of the coordinated and integrated processing of human–AI collaborative teams.


2010 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Fridberg ◽  
Sarah Queller ◽  
Woo-Young Ahn ◽  
Woojae Kim ◽  
Anthony J. Bishara ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 68-72
Author(s):  
Oleg Yerstein ◽  
Andrew R. Carr ◽  
Elvira Jimenez ◽  
Mario F. Mendez

Background: Neuropsychiatric symptoms can impact decision-making in patients with Alzheimer disease (AD). Methods: Using a simple decision-making task, a variant of the ultimatum game (UG) modified to control feelings of unfairness, this study investigated rejection responses among responders to unfair offers. The UG was administered to 11 patients with AD, 10 comparably demented patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), and 9 healthy controls (HC). The results were further compared with differences on the caregiver Neuropsychiatric Inventory (NPI). Results: Overall, patients with AD significantly rejected more total offers than did the patients with bvFTD and the HC ( P < .01). On the NPI, the only domain that was significantly worse among the patients with AD compared to the other groups was dysphoria/depression. Conclusions: These results suggest that early AD can be distinguished based on increased rejections of offers in decision-making, possibly consequent to a heightened sense of unfairness from dysphoria/depression.


Author(s):  
Jordi Vallverdú ◽  
Max Talanov

The purpose of this chapter is to delineate a naturalistic approach to consciousness. This bioinspired method does not try to emulate into a 1:1 scale real mechanisms but instead of it, we capture some basic brain mechanisms prone to be implemented into computational frameworks. Consequently, we adopt a functional view on consciousness, considering consciousness as one among other cognitive mechanisms useful for survival purposes in natural environments. Specifically, we wish to capture those mechanisms related to decision-making processes employed by brains in order to produce adaptive answer to the environment, because this is the main reason for the emergence and purpose of consciousness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-190
Author(s):  
Hector Qirko

Abstract Evolutionarily-minded scholars working on the most puzzling aspects of human cooperation-one-shot, anonymous interactions among non-kin where reputational information is not available-can be roughly divided into two camps. In the first, researchers argue for the existence of evolved capacities for genuinely altruistic human cooperation, and in their models emphasize the role of intergroup competition and selection, as well as group norms and markers of membership that reduce intragroup variability. Researchers in the second camp explain cooperation in terms of individual-level decision-making facilitated by evolved cognitive mechanisms associated with well-established self- and kin-maximization models, as well as by ‘misfires’ that may result from these mechanisms interacting with novel environments. This essay argues that the manner in which culture provides information that de-anonymizes intragroup strangers suggests that neither evolved capacities for genuine altruism nor widespread misfires are necessary to account for anonymous, one-shot cooperation.


Author(s):  
Richard Samuels

The objective of the article is to discuss the evolution, hypothesis, and some the more prominent arguments for massive modularity (MM). MM is the hypothesis that the human mind is largely or entirely composed from a great many modules. Modules are functionally characterizable cognitive mechanisms that tend to possess several features, which include domain-specificity, informationally encapsulation, innateness, inaccessibility, shallow outputs, and mandatory operation. The final thesis that comprises MM mentions that modules are found not merely at the periphery of the mind but also in the central regions responsible for such higher cognitive capacities as reasoning and decision-making. The central cognition depends on a great many functional modules that are not themselves composable into larger more inclusive systems. One of the families of arguments for MM focuses on a range of problems that are familiar from the history of cognitive science such as problems that concern the computational tractability of cognitive processes. The arguments may vary considerably in detail but they share a common format. First, they proceed from the assumption that cognitive processes are classical computational ones. Second, given the assumption that cognitive processes are computational ones, intractability arguments seek to undermine non-modular accounts of cognition by establishing the intractability thesis.


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