Massive Modularity

Author(s):  
Richard Samuels

The objective of the article is to discuss the evolution, hypothesis, and some the more prominent arguments for massive modularity (MM). MM is the hypothesis that the human mind is largely or entirely composed from a great many modules. Modules are functionally characterizable cognitive mechanisms that tend to possess several features, which include domain-specificity, informationally encapsulation, innateness, inaccessibility, shallow outputs, and mandatory operation. The final thesis that comprises MM mentions that modules are found not merely at the periphery of the mind but also in the central regions responsible for such higher cognitive capacities as reasoning and decision-making. The central cognition depends on a great many functional modules that are not themselves composable into larger more inclusive systems. One of the families of arguments for MM focuses on a range of problems that are familiar from the history of cognitive science such as problems that concern the computational tractability of cognitive processes. The arguments may vary considerably in detail but they share a common format. First, they proceed from the assumption that cognitive processes are classical computational ones. Second, given the assumption that cognitive processes are computational ones, intractability arguments seek to undermine non-modular accounts of cognition by establishing the intractability thesis.

2013 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 301-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY KUVICH ◽  
LEONID PERLOVSKY

Successes of information and cognitive science brought a growing understanding that mind is based on intelligent cognitive processes, which are not limited by language and logic only. A nice overview can be found in the excellent work of Jeff Hawkins "On Intelligence." This view is that thought is a set of informational processes in the brain, and such processes have the same rationale as any other systematic informational processes. Their specifics are determined by the ways of how brain stores, structures and process this information. Systematic approach allows representing them in a diagrammatic form that can be formalized and programmed. Semiotic approach allows for the universal representation of such diagrams. In our approach, logic is just a way of synthesis of such structures, which is a small but clearly visible top of the iceberg. However, most of the efforts were traditionally put into logics without paying much attention to the rest of the mechanisms that make the entire thought system working autonomously. Dynamic fuzzy logic is reviewed and its connections with semiotics are established. Dynamic fuzzy logic extends fuzzy logic in the direction of logic-processes, which include processes of fuzzification and defuzzification as parts of logic. This extension of fuzzy logic is inspired by processes in the brain-mind. The paper reviews basic cognitive mechanisms, including instinctual drives, emotional and conceptual mechanisms, perception, cognition, language, a model of interaction between language and cognition upon the new semiotic models. The model of interacting cognition and language is organized in an approximate hierarchy of mental representations from sensory percepts at the "bottom" to objects, contexts, situations, abstract concepts-representations, and to the most general representations at the "top" of mental hierarchy. Knowledge instinct and emotions are driving feedbacks for these representations. Interactions of bottom-up and top-down processes in such hierarchical semiotic representation are essential for modeling cognition. Dynamic fuzzy logic is analyzed as a fundamental mechanism of these processes. In this paper we are trying to formalize cognitive processes of the human mind using approaches above, and provide interfaces that could allow for their practical realization in software and hardware. Future research directions are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkady Zgonnikov ◽  
David Abbink ◽  
Gustav Markkula

Laboratory studies of abstract, highly controlled tasks point towards noisy evidence accumulation as a key mechanism governing decision making. Yet it is unclear whether the cognitive processes implicated in simple, isolated decisions in the lab are as paramount to decisions that are ingrained in more complex behaviors, such as driving. Here we aim to address the gap between modern cognitive models of decision making and studies of naturalistic decision making in drivers, which so far have provided only limited insight into the underlying cognitive processes. We investigate drivers' decision making during unprotected left turns, and model the cognitive process driving these decisions. Our model builds on the classical drift-diffusion model, and emphasizes, first, the drift rate linked to the relevant perceptual quantities dynamically sampled from the environment, and, second, collapsing decision boundaries reflecting the dynamic constraints imposed on the decision maker’s response by the environment. We show that the model explains the observed decision outcomes and response times, as well as substantial individual differences in those. Through cross-validation, we demonstrate that the model not only explains the data, but also generalizes to out-of-sample conditions, effectively providing a way to predict human drivers’ behavior in real time. Our results reveal the cognitive mechanisms of gap acceptance decisions in human drivers, and exemplify how simple cognitive process models can help us to understand human behavior in complex real-world tasks.


Author(s):  
Xenia Naidenova

This chapter offers a view on the history of developing the concepts of knowledge and human reasoning both in mathematics and psychology. Mathematicians create the formal theories of correct thinking; psychologists study the cognitive mechanisms that underpin knowledge construction and thinking as the most important functions of human existence. They study how the human mind works. The progress in understanding human knowledge and thinking will be undoubtedly related to combining the efforts of scientists in these different disciplines. Believing that it is impossible to study independently the problems of knowledge and human reasoning we strive to cover in this chapter the central ideas of knowledge and logical inference that have been manifested in the works of outstanding thinkers and scientists of past time. These ideas reveal all the difficulties and obstacles on the way to comprehending the human mental processes.


Author(s):  
Yiftach Fehige

Summary Thomas Nagel has proposed a highly speculative metaphysical theory to account for the cosmological significance that he claims the human mind to have. Nagel argues that the mind cannot be fully explained by Darwinian evolutionary theory, nor should theological accounts be accepted. What he proposes instead is an explanation in terms of cosmological non-purposive teleological principles. Our universe awakens to itself in each and every individual consciousness. What comes to light in a pronounced manner when consciousness arises, are the mental aspects of the stuff that the universe is made of. These mental aspects are always concurrently present with the physical aspects of the basic elements that constitute the universe. This paper situates Nagel’s cosmology in the context of discussions of the relationship between modern science and Christian theology. It focuses on the history of modern science’s efforts to locate the origins of humanity. The aim of the paper is to present a qualified “Lutheran” reading of Nagel’s theory of the cosmological significance of the human mind. This will unearth strong reasons to think that Nagel’s cosmology is less secular than it claims to be.


Author(s):  
S. Ryskulbek ◽  
O. Mamyrbayev ◽  
A. Turganbayeva

Temperament is a set of innate tendencies of the mind associated with the processes of perception, analysis and decision-making. The purpose of this article is to predict the psychotype of individuals based on chat stories and follow the Keirsi model, according to which the psycho type is classified as a craftsman, guardian, idealist and mind. The proposed methodology uses a version of LIWC, a dictionary of words, to analyze the context of words and uses supervised learning using KNN, SVM, and Random Forest algorithms to train the classifier. The average accuracy obtained was 88.37% for artisan temperament, 86.92% for caregivers, 55.61% for idealists, and 69.09% for rationality. When using the binary classifier, the average accuracy was 90.93% for artisan temperament, 88.98% for caregivers, 51.98% for idealism, and 71.42% for rationality.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regan M. Gallagher ◽  
Thomas Suddendorf ◽  
Derek H. Arnold

AbstractPerceptual judgements are, by nature, a product of both sensation and the cognitive processes responsible for interpreting and reporting subjective experiences. Changed perceptual judgements may thus result from changes in how the world appears (perception), or subsequent interpretation (cognition). This ambiguity has led to persistent debates about how to interpret changes in decision-making, and if cognition can change how the world looks, or sounds, or feels. Here we introduce an approach that can help resolve these ambiguities. In three motion-direction experiments, we measured perceptual judgements and subjective confidence. Sensory encoding changes (i.e. the motion-direction aftereffect) impacted each measure equally, as the perceptual evidence informing both responses had changed. However, decision changes dissociated from reports of subjective uncertainty when non-perceptual effects changed decision-making. Our findings show that subjective confidence can provide important information about the cause of aftereffects, and can help inform us about the organisation of the mind.


Author(s):  
Martin Breul

Summary Being one of most influential anthropologists of contemporary times, Michael Tomasello and his groundbreaking evolutionary approach to a natural history of human beings are still to be received by theological anthropology. This article aims at evaluating the prospects and limitations of Tomasello’s natural history of human ontogeny from a philosophical and theological perspective. The major advantages of Tomasello’s approach are a new conceptual perspective on the mind-brain problem and a possible detranscendentalization of the human mind which leads to an intersubjectively grounded anthropology. At the same time, evolutionary anthropology struggles with the binding force of moral obligations and the human ability to interpret one’s existence and the world in a religious way. This article thus offers a first theological inventory of Tomasello’s account of evolutionary anthropology which praises its prospects and detects its limitations.


Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West ◽  
Maggie E. Toplak

Because the operationalization of rational thinking comes from the heuristics and biases tradition, this chapter explicates the logic of heuristics and biases tasks in terms of contemporary theories of the functional architecture of the human mind. A tripartite model of the mind is described that is based on current dual-process theories. With this model as a framework, it is easy to see that the concept of rationality and the concept of intelligence are two different things. Rationality is actually a more encompassing mental construct than is intelligence. Thus, as measures of rationality, the tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, while tapping intelligence in part, actually encompass more cognitive processes and knowledge than are assessed by IQ tests.


Dialogue ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 103-108
Author(s):  
D. D. Todd

Lehrer's “reason for writing this book is that the philosophy of Thomas Reid is widely unread, while the combination of soundness and creativity of his work is unexcelled.” The book contributes to the ongoing Reid revival. Chapter 1 presents an overview of Reid's life and works and the last, Chapter 15, gives Lehrer's appraisal of Reid's philosophy. Chapter 2, “Beyond Impressions and Ideas,” outlines Reid's “refutation of what he called the Ideal System” of impressions and ideas that dominated philosophy from Descartes through Hume, and summarizes Reid's theory of the mind. The remaining chapters conduct the reader through the three books Reid published during his lifetime. There are three chapters covering the Inquiry of the Human Mind (1764), five on the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), a chapter comparing Reid on conception and evidence in the Inquiry and the Essays, and three chapters on Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788). The index is helpful despite occasional references to a page number larger than the number of pages. The bibliography is generally good, although, oddly, Lehrer lists the inaccessible 1937 Latin edition of Reid's important Philosophical Orations and not the English translation published by the Philosophy Research Archives in 1977 and republished by the Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series early in 1989. The text is remarkably free of typographical errors, but on p. 130 Putnam's 1973 article, “Meaning and Reference,” is said to have been published in 1983.


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