On first-order sentences without finite models

2004 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Djordjević
Keyword(s):  
Binary Relation ◽  
Function Symbol ◽  
Complete Theory ◽  
Order Property ◽  
Unary Function ◽  
First Order ◽  
Finite Models

We will mainly be concerned with a result which refutes a stronger variant of a conjecture of Macpherson about finitely axiomatizable ω-categorical theories. Then we prove a result which implies that the ω-categorical stable pseudoplanes of Hrushovski do not have the finite submodel property.Let's call a consistent first-order sentence without finite models an axiom of infinity. Can we somehow describe the axioms of infinity? Two standard examples are:ϕ1: A first-order sentence which expresses that a binary relation < on a nonempty universe is transitive and irreflexive and that for every x there is y such that x < y.ϕ2: A first-order sentence which expresses that there is a unique x such that, (0) for every y, s(y) ≠ x (where s is a unary function symbol),and, for every x, if x does not satisfy (0) then there is a unique y such that s(y) = x.Every complete theory T such that ϕ1 ϵ T has the strict order property (as defined in [10]), since the formula x < y will have the strict order property for T. Let's say that if Ψ is an axiom of infinity and every complete theory T with Ψ ϵ T has the strict order property, then Ψ has the strict order property.Every complete theory T such that ϕ2 ϵ T is not ω-categorical. This is the case because a complete theory T without finite models is ω-categorical if and only if, for every 0 < n < ω, there are only finitely many formulas in the variables x1,…,xn, up to equivalence, in any model of T.

scholarly journals Completeness of two theories on ordered abelian groups and embedding relations

1980 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 33-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichi Komori
Keyword(s):  
Binary Relation ◽  
Abelian Groups ◽  
Function Symbol ◽  
Binary Function ◽  
Relation Symbol ◽  
Unary Function ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Unary Relation ◽  
Binary Relation Symbol

The first order language ℒ that we consider has two nullary function symbols 0, 1, a unary function symbol –, a binary function symbol +, a unary relation symbol 0 <, and the binary relation symbol = (equality). Let ℒ′ be the language obtained from ℒ, by adding, for each integer n > 0, the unary relation symbol n| (read “n divides”).

Theories with finitely many models

1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Natural Number ◽  
Complete Theory ◽  
Elementary Equivalence ◽  
First Order ◽  
Finite Models ◽  
Simple Observation ◽  
Finite Structure ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Complete Theories

If L is a first order language and n is a natural number, then Ln is the set of formulas which only make use of the variables x1,…,xn. While every finite structure is determined up to isomorphism by its theory in L, the same is no longer true in Ln. This simple observation is the source of a number of intriguing questions. For example, Poizat [2] has asked whether a complete theory in Ln which has at least two nonisomorphic finite models must necessarily also have an infinite one. The purpose of this paper is to present some counterexamples to this conjecture.Theorem. For each n ≤ 3 there are complete theories in L2n−2andL2n−1having exactly n + 1 models.In our notation and definitions, we follow Poizat [2]. To test structures for elementary equivalence in Ln, we shall use the modified Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games of Immerman [1]. For convenience, we repeat his definition here.Suppose that L is a purely relational language, each of the relations having arity at most n. Let and ℬ be two structures for L. Define the Ln game on and ℬ as follows. There are two players, I and II, and there are n pairs of counters a1, b1, …, an, bn. On each move, player I picks up any of the counters and places it on an element of the appropriate structure.

Finite variable logic, stability and finite models

2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 837-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Djordjević
Keyword(s):  
Stability Theory ◽  
Usual Sense ◽  
Saturated Model ◽  
Order Property ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
First Order ◽  
Finite Models ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Finite Variable Logic ◽  
Variable Logic

We will study complete Ln-theories and their models, where Ln is the set of first order formulas in which at most n distinct variables occur. Here, by a complete Ln-theory we mean a theory such that for every Ln-sentence, it or its negation is implied by the theory. Hence, a complete Ln-theory need not necessarily be complete in the usual sense. Our approach is to transfer concepts and methods from stability theory, such as the order property and counting types, to the context of Ln-theories. So, in one sense, we will develop some rudimentary stability theory for a particular class of (possibly) incomplete theories. To make the ‘stability theoretic’ arguments work, we need to assume that models of the complete Ln-theory T which we consider can be amalgamated in certain ways. If this condition is satisfied and T has infinite models then there will exist models of T which are sufficiently saturated with respect to Ln. This allows us to use some counting types arguments from stability theory. If, moreover, we impose some finiteness conditions on the number of Ln-types and the length of Ln-definable orders then a sufficiently saturated model of T will be ω-categorical and ω-stable. Using the theory of ω-categorical and ω-stable structures we derive that T has arbitrarily large finite models.A different approach to combining stability theory with finite model theory is made by Hyttinen in [9] and [10].

An Example of a Complete First-Order Theory with All Models Algorithmically Trivial but Without Locally Finite Models

1982 ◽  
Vol 5 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 313-318
Author(s):  
Paweł Urzyczyn
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
Complete Theory ◽  
Prime Model ◽  
Program Schema ◽  
Locally Finite ◽  
First Order ◽  
Finite Models ◽  
First Order Theory

We show an example of a first-order complete theory T, with no locally finite models and such that every program schema, total over a model of T, is strongly equivalent in that model to a loop-free schema. For this purpose we consider the notion of an algorithmically prime model, what enables us to formulate an analogue to Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem.

Metaontology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uriah Kriegel
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Order Property ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Approximation

Brentano’s theory of judgment serves as a springboard for his conception of reality, indeed for his ontology. It does so, indirectly, by inspiring a very specific metaontology. To a first approximation, ontology is concerned with what exists, metaontology with what it means to say that something exists. So understood, metaontology has been dominated by three views: (i) existence as a substantive first-order property that some things have and some do not, (ii) existence as a formal first-order property that everything has, and (iii) existence as a second-order property of existents’ distinctive properties. Brentano offers a fourth and completely different approach to existence talk, however, one which falls naturally out of his theory of judgment. The purpose of this chapter is to present and motivate Brentano’s approach.

On the elementary equivalence of automorphism groups of Boolean algebras; downward Skolem Löwenheim theorems and compactness of related quantifiers

1980 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matatyahu Rubin ◽  
Saharon Shelah
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Automorphism Groups ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Boolean Algebras ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Elementary Equivalence ◽  
First Order ◽  
Finite Models ◽  
Countably Compact

AbstractTheorem 1. (◊ℵ1,) If B is an infinite Boolean algebra (BA), then there is B1, such that ∣ Aut (B1) ≤∣B1∣ = ℵ1 and 〈B1, Aut (B1)〉 ≡ 〈B, Aut(B)〉.Theorem 2. (◊ℵ1) There is a countably compact logic stronger than first-order logic even on finite models.This partially answers a question of H. Friedman. These theorems appear in §§1 and 2.Theorem 3. (a) (◊ℵ1) If B is an atomic ℵ-saturated infinite BA, Ψ Є Lω1ω and 〈B, Aut (B)〉 ⊨Ψ then there is B1, Such that ∣Aut(B1)∣ ≤ ∣B1∣ =ℵ1, and 〈B1, Aut(B1)〉⊨Ψ. In particular if B is 1-homogeneous so is B1. (b) (a) holds for B = P(ω) even if we assume only CH.

Properties of Classes of Random Graphs

1994 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neal Brand ◽  
Steve Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Random Graphs ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Order Property ◽  
First Order ◽  
New Class ◽  
Vertex Transitive ◽  
Vertex Transitive Graphs ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Transitive Graphs

In [11] it is shown that the theory of almost all graphs is first-order complete. Furthermore, in [3] a collection of first-order axioms are given from which any first-order property or its negation can be deduced. Here we show that almost all Steinhaus graphs satisfy the axioms of almost all graphs and conclude that a first-order property is true for almost all graphs if and only if it is true for almost all Steinhaus graphs. We also show that certain classes of subgraphs of vertex transitive graphs are first-order complete. Finally, we give a new class of higher-order axioms from which it follows that large subgraphs of specified type exist in almost all graphs.

A reduction class containing formulas with one monadic predicate and one binary function symbol

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-49
Author(s):  
Charles E. Hughes
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Conjunctive Normal Form ◽  
Function Symbol ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Binary Function ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Reduction Class ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

AbstractA new reduction class is presented for the satisfiability problem for well-formed formulas of the first-order predicate calculus. The members of this class are closed prenex formulas of the form ∀x∀yC. The matrix C is in conjunctive normal form and has no disjuncts with more than three literals, in fact all but one conjunct is unary. Furthermore C contains but one predicate symbol, that being unary, and one function symbol which symbol is binary.

The Predicate of Existence

2019 ◽  
pp. 14-37
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau
Keyword(s):  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Order Property ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Existential Quantifier ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
David Kaplan ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions ◽  
Nathan Salmon

Kant famously declared that existence is not a (real) predicate. This famous dictum has been seen as echoed in the doctrine of the founders of modern logic, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, that existence isn’t a first-order property possessed by individuals, but rather a second-order property expressed by the existential quantifier. Russell in 1905 combined this doctrine with his new theory of descriptions and declared the paradox of nonexistence to be resolved without resorting to his earlier distinction between existence and being. In recent years, however, logicians and philosophers like Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, and Nathan Salmon have argued that there is no defensible reason to deny that existence is a property of individuals. Kant’s dictum has also been re-evaluated, the result being that the paradox of nonexistence has not, after all, disappeared. Yet it’s not clear how exactly Kripke et al. propose to resolve the paradox.

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