scholarly journals European Banking Union: a two-stroke reality

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-99
Author(s):  
Vitor Carlos Almeida da Silva

This paper focuses on the study concerning the European Banking Union’s conclusion. The European Banking Union was scheduled to come into existence in 2013, but it did not become a reality until 2014 when it implemented its first pillar: The Single Supervisory Mechanism. This European project appears, after the economic and financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the sovereign debt crises of 2010, as a fundamental complement to Economic and Monetary Union, since it is one of the blocks that allows its deepening, harmonising the supervision, resolution and protection of depositors in the Euro Zone. However, the third pillar, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, has not yet been implemented, contributing to the non completion and inefficiency of this European project in the face of a new financial crisis.This text seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the European Banking Union and its pillars. It is divided into three parts: the first part is a brief background on the motivations behind the creation of the Banking Union; the second part concerns the three pillars that constitute it; and the third and final part is a brief conclusion on the outcome of this European project.

Subject Euro-area governance. Significance In the EU, macroeconomic governance reform is focusing around the creation of a euro-area budget and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) -- the final pillar for the completion of the European Banking Union (EBU) which would provide stronger insurance coverage for member states. However, northern countries are reluctant to pay for crisis-prone ones in the south, so compromise on detail could take years while the initiatives will have limited scope in responding to crises. Impacts The ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism will continue to focus on ‘risk reduction’ measures, including the disposal of non-performing loans. The EU is unlikely to give Italian budget concessions perceived as acceptable by Rome, possibly hardening the position of Italy’s populists. If Manfred Weber’s candidacy to become European Commission president fails, Berlin will likely insist that it gets the ECB president post. The rise of migration flows in the Mediterranean and the lack of EU resolution on burden-sharing will worsen north-south relations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Pery Bazoti

The European Banking Union embarked as a highly ambitious project of the European Union as a response to the signifi cant fl aws and weaknesses in the original architecture of the European Monetary Union that became apparent during the economic crisis. However, the establishment of a single European banking system has stumbled upon the creation of a common deposit insurance scheme that could safeguard depositors and create a more stable fi nancial framework in the euro area. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) was fi rstly introduced by the European Commission in 2015. As a bold proposal that comprises wide risk mutualization among the euro area member states, it has spurred a vivid discussion in the European public speech and many proposals have been made since then altering its original planning in an effort to tackle the moral hazard concerns that have risen. The present article, after discussing the reasons that keep obstructing EDIS, presents these suggestions that move around, primarily, the role of the national deposit guarantee schemes. However, as highlighted in the article, before moving to any alterations on the structure and role of a proposed common deposit insurance scheme, signifi cant risk minimization on behalf of the national banking systems, must precede by limiting the sovereign exposures of banks and the size of the Non-Performing Loans. Such steps of risk minimization are critical for addressing concerns and the political unwillingness demonstrated by several European countries in moving forward towards deeper integration.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19(34) (1) ◽  
pp. 172-179
Author(s):  
Klaudia Zielińska

The aim of the article is to evaluate the process of building the third pillar of the banking union. The analysis of the problem required both subject literature studies and descriptive statistics. Time scope of the analysis covers the years 2012 until 2017. The relevant data used came from the European Central Bank and the European Banking Authority. The results of the study suggest that the creation of a European Deposit Guarantee Scheme is inevitable for further financial integration in the Eurozone but more detailed conditions need to be added to its implementation plan in order to have the scheme established. This stems from both the bad financial standing of some of the euro area banks and their dependency on the sovereign debt of their home and host countries. Studies also indicate low operational readiness of the national schemes, so a transition from re-insurance onto co-insurance phase will require increased efforts of both the Member States and the banks themselves.


Author(s):  
Kleftouri Nikoletta

Having a multiplicity of financial regulators, supervisors, and resolution authorities in Europe can weaken supervision, heighten legal uncertainty, and impede effective resolution. European officials recently agreed that further steps are needed to tackle the specific risks in particular within the euro area, where pooled monetary responsibilities had increased the possibility of cross-border spillover effects in the event of bank crises. As a result, they created a union aimed to centralize bank supervision, deposit insurance, and bank resolution. This chapter sets out two components of the European banking union: single supervision, and single deposit insurance. Single resolution is separately discussed in Chapter 8, where international and European bank resolution frameworks are examined. The chapter concludes that deeper reforms are needed, in conjunction with effective cooperation arrangements.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-229
Author(s):  
Anna-Lena Högenauer

The financial and eurozone crises highlighted the inadequacy of the original governance structures of the eurozone. In response, a range of reforms were launched, including the creation of a European banking union. In practice, some elements of the banking union were delayed by division among member states and the breakdown of the Franco-German motor, such as the question of the operationalization of the single resolution mechanism and fund or the deposit insurance scheme. In addition, eurozone governance—which would once have been regarded as a technocratic issue—became increasingly politicized. The aim of this article is to study the extent to which the banking union was scrutinized by parliament and to what degree this reflects material interests and ideas. For this purpose, it focuses on salience (i.e., how much attention the issue received) and polarization (i.e., the divergence of positions). The analysis of the resolutions and debates of the German Bundestag and French Assemblée Nationale, i.e., the parliaments of two key states in EU decision-making on banking union, finds that the German government was indeed closely scrutinized, whereas the French government was relatively unconstrained.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erol Gören

At least since the onset of the economic and financial crisis in 2007, grave deficits of the institutional supervisory structure of the European Union have been revealed. Despite the global interdependence of the financial markets, it was characterized by a material and procedural supervision usually ending at the respective borders of the member states that reached its limits with respect to transnational cases in particular. The result of numerous reform discussions was the implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which, at the same time, constitutes the key element of the European Banking Union. This dissertation particularly analyses the implementation act underlying the SSM, its organisation and its functions and competences, while at the same time offering a synopsis of the structure of European financial supervision.


Author(s):  
Małgorzata Zaleska

The article presents the main European policy makers implementing the reform of the banking sector in response to the contemporary global financial crisis. The institutional changes are assessed in the paper, including the establishment of the European banking union, modifications in the EU deposit insurance systems and considerable strengthening of the role of central banks, with special focus on the European Central Bank. Moreover, potential sources of another financial crisis are identified and further institutional changes in finance are proposed.


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