Der Einheitliche Aufsichtsmechanismus bei der Europäischen Zentralbank (Single Supervisory Mechanism)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erol Gören

At least since the onset of the economic and financial crisis in 2007, grave deficits of the institutional supervisory structure of the European Union have been revealed. Despite the global interdependence of the financial markets, it was characterized by a material and procedural supervision usually ending at the respective borders of the member states that reached its limits with respect to transnational cases in particular. The result of numerous reform discussions was the implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which, at the same time, constitutes the key element of the European Banking Union. This dissertation particularly analyses the implementation act underlying the SSM, its organisation and its functions and competences, while at the same time offering a synopsis of the structure of European financial supervision.

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 781-789
Author(s):  
Oliver BARTLETT

This contribution will draw on the literature that has accumulated on how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has responded to the European Banking Union, which was established in similar crisis circumstances that now face the European Union (EU) in the age of COVID-19, to illustrate the legal issues on which the CJEU’s input will be particularly important in the shaping of any future European Health Union. This contribution will highlight three legal issues in particular: the interpretation of EU Treaty provisions in the health field; the scope of EU competence; and the powers of EU institutions and agencies. This contribution will argue that the CJEU case law to date on health issues is encouraging with respect to competence and agencies, but more cautious with respect to the Treaty’s health provisions.


Author(s):  
N. Arbatova

The focal point of the article is the future of the European Union that has been challenged by the deepest systemic crisis in its history. The world economic and financial crisis became merely a catalyst for those problems that had existed earlier and had not been addressed properly by the EU leadership. The author argues that the EU crisis can be overcome only by new common efforts of its member-states and new integrationist projects.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina Ciani ◽  
Francesca Gagliardi ◽  
Samuele Riccarelli ◽  
Gianni Betti

The main scope of the paper is to adopt a fuzzy sets approach for the measurement of multidimensional poverty over a period of eight years, from 2007 to 2015, which takes into account the effect of the 2008 economic and financial crisis. In particular, the focus is on the financial dimension of poverty, and its effects on citizens in the EU Mediterranean Area. The empirical analysis, based on the European Union—Statistics on Income and Living Conditions survey (EU-SILC), covers eight Mediterranean Countries.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Alexander Spence

<p>The rationales for the creation of the European Banking Union (“EBU”), what its objectives are and the main pillars of support for such a scheme, are worthy of investigation.  This article means to critically discuss the various elements of the EBU and determine whether the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, the main pillars underpinning the structure, are robust enough to avert another debt crisis in Europe. At the EBU’s heart lies the Single Rulebook (“SR”), which aims to counter the risk of fragmentation and nationalist tendencies. This inward looking trend became apparent in the recent financial crises, and contributed greatly to them. In an effort to avoid repeating the divisive and disjointed mistakes of the past, the SR is instead looking to provide unity and harmonisation across all participating member states. </p>


Author(s):  
Igor Jašurek

Cohesion policy is the major investment vehicle and the most reforming EU budgetary chapter. Its landmark reforms mark key integration processes in the European Union. The present policy paper provides reflections of the dynamics of the main development trends in cohesion policy as determined by global phenomena, namely the economic and financial crisis and the current COVID-19 pandemic. They severely hit the entire EU, inevitably also affecting cohesion policy. The article shows that governance and the mission of cohesion policy has been adjusted to their aftermaths. Reforms introduced new measures and reinforced policy’s centralized European profile. Thus, evolution of cohesion policy is an illustration of its transformation from the merely redistributive tool with limited budgetary resources into the full-fledged development policy aimed at safeguarding that EU’s visions and goals will be pursued. The paper concludes that a new architecture poses the major challenge for cohesion policy after 2020 as its responsibilities and ever tightening governance continues while its budgets shrinks.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-216
Author(s):  
Matteo De Poli ◽  
Pierre de Gioia Carabellese

With the birth of the Single Supervisory Mechanism came the emergence of a new regime of supervision of the banking industry in the Eurozone. The allocation of enforcement powers between the European Central Bank and the National Competent Authorities is the corollary of the unified supervision, which reverberates from the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and it is ultimately the main theme of this contribution. More specifically, the architecture of the enforcement, principally shaped by the SSM and its principles and rules, is assessed and analysed in this paper against the background of the general theory of enforcement, as developed in the legal literature. The enforcement discourse in the European Union banking sector is debated alongside its interaction with the related aspects of the regulation and supervision and the way these three notions have been integrated and codified in the European Union after the 2011 sovereign debt crisis.


Author(s):  
Yener Altunbaş ◽  
Salvatore Polizzi ◽  
Enzo Scannella ◽  
John Thornton

AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk disclosure practices of European banks. The onset of BU and the associated rules are considered as an exogenous shock that provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the effects of the new supervisory arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. A Difference-in-Differences approach is adopted, building evidence from the disclosure practices of systemically important banks supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other banks supervised by national regulators over the period 2012–2017. The main findings are that bank risk disclosure increased overall following BU but there was a weakening of disclosure by SSM-supervised banks relative to banks supervised by national authorities. We also find that the overall positive effect of the BU on bank disclosure is stronger for less profitable banks and in the most troubled economies of the Eurozone (GIPSI countries), while the negative effect on centrally supervised banks is stronger if bank CEOs act also as chairmen (CEO duality). We interpret these findings in light of the fact that the new institutional arrangements for bank supervision under which the ECB relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act gives rise to inefficiencies with respect to the speed and completeness of the information flow between SSM supervised banks and the ECB, which are reflected in bank disclosure practices.


2020 ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Pery Bazoti

The European Banking Union embarked as a highly ambitious project of the European Union as a response to the signifi cant fl aws and weaknesses in the original architecture of the European Monetary Union that became apparent during the economic crisis. However, the establishment of a single European banking system has stumbled upon the creation of a common deposit insurance scheme that could safeguard depositors and create a more stable fi nancial framework in the euro area. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) was fi rstly introduced by the European Commission in 2015. As a bold proposal that comprises wide risk mutualization among the euro area member states, it has spurred a vivid discussion in the European public speech and many proposals have been made since then altering its original planning in an effort to tackle the moral hazard concerns that have risen. The present article, after discussing the reasons that keep obstructing EDIS, presents these suggestions that move around, primarily, the role of the national deposit guarantee schemes. However, as highlighted in the article, before moving to any alterations on the structure and role of a proposed common deposit insurance scheme, signifi cant risk minimization on behalf of the national banking systems, must precede by limiting the sovereign exposures of banks and the size of the Non-Performing Loans. Such steps of risk minimization are critical for addressing concerns and the political unwillingness demonstrated by several European countries in moving forward towards deeper integration.


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