The Stream of Consciousness: XIII. Bodily Self-Awareness and Aron Gurwitsch's Margin

1997 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

According to William James, bodily self-awareness (bodily feeling) is pervasive throughout the stream of consciousness; such awareness is included in each and every pulse of mentality that makes up the stream of consciousness. This installment of the present series of articles begins to consider the role that bodily self-awareness plays in the very structure of the basic durational components of James's stream. The focus here is on an account of this role that the prominent phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch preferred. Gurwitsch held that pervasive bodily self-awareness belongs to the margin of consciousness; such bodily self-awareness occurs in the form of distinct acts of awareness possessing a separate content from that of the central thematic process which also characterizes every pulse of consciousness. The present article discusses Gurwitsch's account in order to set up a contrast, which will be drawn explicitly in the next installment, with James's more phenomeno-logically integrated conception of pervasive bodily self-awareness.

1998 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

By examining work published in this Journal, I bring present-day issues to bear on my ongoing exploration of William James's stream of consciousness. How do knowledgeable psychological scientists demonstrate or acknowledge the relevance to their own work of their illustrious predecessor's introspectively grounded theses and arguments? In installments number XV, XVI, and XVII of the present series, I consider in units of five the initial fifteen volumes of Imagination, Cognition and Personality—the final five of these volumes in the present article. I inquire here into what specifically it was that each of five particular teams of psychologists who published in this Journal from 1991 to 1996 explicitly drew from James; and I address the corresponding topic from James's perspective insofar as space allows. Thus, the topics of the present article turn out to be these: 1) two kinds of self-awareness, 2) consciousness as impulsive in its very nature, 3) how the self is comprised, 4) the scope of psychology, and 5) possible selves.


1997 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

The present installment in this series of articles continues in consideration of the role that bodily self-awareness plays in the very structure of the basic durational components constituting William James's stream of consciousness. The focus here is dual, on both the prominent phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch's account of this role and on James's account. Critically addressed is Gurwitsch's claim concerning the awareness of the behaviors involved in the process of perceiving. Such awareness is proposed to be typically marginal, in the sense of having a distinct and separate content within each component of the stream. Addressed too is James's account of pervasive bodily self-awareness as integrated within each state, or pulse, of consciousness although varying in attentiveness. Such awareness is always part of, at least, the fringe of every pulse of consciousness, which is not to be confused with Gurwitsch's margin. The present article explains how the awareness of bodily feelings is crucial to James's account of personal identity.


1996 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

Consciousness and self-awareness—how are they mutually related? This contribution to the present series of articles begins to consider replies to this question from the Jamesian perspective of The Principles. First, several relevant senses of consciousness are made explicit. Then, I give attention to James's notion of personal consciousness: How do the basic durational components of a stream of consciousness “cohere” to form a stream, given that, on James's mind—body dualism, they do not have a spatial location? Continuities of content among the components of a single stream is supposed to be the unifying factor; James held bodily feelings are an intrinsic feature of every component of a stream. The diachronic unity of consciousness rests heavily on a kind of self-awareness. Also addressed here are inner awareness, or the immediate awareness that one can have of one's mental-occurrence instances, and whether remembering past experiences requires that one had not only inner awareness of them when they occurred, but self-awareness as well.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Acerbi

ArgumentThis article is the sequel to an article published in the previous issue of Science in Context that dealt with homeomeric lines (Acerbi 2010). The present article deals with foundational issues in Greek mathematics. It considers two key characters in the study of mathematical homeomery, namely, Apollonius and Geminus, and analyzes in detail their approaches to foundational themes as they are attested in ancient sources. The main historiographical result of this paper is to show that there was a well-established mathematical field of discourse in “foundations of mathematics,” a fact that is by no means obvious. The paper argues that the authors involved in this field of discourse set up a variety of philosophical, scholarly, and mathematical tools that they used in developing their investigations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 205395172110135
Author(s):  
Florian Jaton

This theoretical paper considers the morality of machine learning algorithms and systems in the light of the biases that ground their correctness. It begins by presenting biases not as a priori negative entities but as contingent external referents—often gathered in benchmarked repositories called ground-truth datasets—that define what needs to be learned and allow for performance measures. I then argue that ground-truth datasets and their concomitant practices—that fundamentally involve establishing biases to enable learning procedures—can be described by their respective morality, here defined as the more or less accounted experience of hesitation when faced with what pragmatist philosopher William James called “genuine options”—that is, choices to be made in the heat of the moment that engage different possible futures. I then stress three constitutive dimensions of this pragmatist morality, as far as ground-truthing practices are concerned: (I) the definition of the problem to be solved (problematization), (II) the identification of the data to be collected and set up (databasing), and (III) the qualification of the targets to be learned (labeling). I finally suggest that this three-dimensional conceptual space can be used to map machine learning algorithmic projects in terms of the morality of their respective and constitutive ground-truthing practices. Such techno-moral graphs may, in turn, serve as equipment for greater governance of machine learning algorithms and systems.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Eldred

There is a critique of capitalist market economy that consists in claiming not only that capitalist social relations are uncaring and alienating, nor only exploitative of the working class, but that the process of capitalist economy as a whole is a way of living, today globalized, that has gotten out of hand. Its essential nature is unmasked as a senseless circular movement that, besides ruthlessly exploiting natural resources, demeans human being itself and alienates it from the historical alternative of a purportedly authentic mode of human being rooted in collective, solidaric subjectivity. The present article offers an alternative hermeneutic cast for understanding capitalism as the gainful game that can serve as philosophical orientation in fighting for a free and fair social interplay in which the powers and abilities of free individuals are appropriately and reciprocally estimated and esteemed. This requires, first and foremost, seeing through the fetishisms inherent in the valorization of reified value that the mature Marx identified in his critiques of political economy as the essential nature of capitalism. Such critical insight is necessary for orientation also in today’s predicament of the ever more encroaching and ensnaring cyberworld.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adil M. Jamil

This study examines the phases of human consciousness revealed in the poetry of indigenous people in the light of some prominent psychologists and philosophers mainly Bucke, Schleiermacher, William James, Hegel, and Moores. Bucke and Schleiermacher cited three forms of consciousness: Animal or Brutish Self-awareness, Sensual or Self-Consciousness, and Cosmic Consciousness. While examining the poetry of indigenous people, Palestinians and Native Americans, we find out that the majority moves within the confines of the Sensual or Self-Consciousness in their reaction to the brutish consciousness of the oppressors who deny their unalienable rights for life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Unlike others, Mahmoud Darwish, the Palestinian, and Joy Harjo, the Native American, attempt to transcend the sensual consciousness and adopt a broader universal vision or cosmic consciousness; however, their peaceful vision is often shattered by bitter realities and frustrated by the inhuman conduct of their oppressors. In their verses, the particular or the sensual is not completely overlooked or concealed. It is always there, yet alleviated by a universal vision held by the two poets


Author(s):  
Jane Hu

The term ‘stream of consciousness’ was first coined by psychologist William James in The Principles of Psychology in 1893, when he describes it thusly: "consciousness as an uninterrupted ‘flow’: ‘a ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let’s call it the stream of thought, consciousness, or subjective life" (243). The term quickly came to mean a narrative mode that seeks to give the written equivalent of a character’s thought processes, and is sometimes described in terms of an ‘interior monologue’. As such, it differs from the ‘dramatic monologue’ or ‘soliloquy’ where the speaker addresses the audience or an implied receiver. Stream of consciousness style is often identified by fictional techniques such as lack of punctuation, long and sometimes agrammatical sentences, and a series of unrelated impressions. Stream of consciousness technique tries to represent a character’s general mental state before it is condensed, organized, or edited down into narrative coherence or sense. While stream of consciousness is often read as an avant-garde technique, its aims were to get closer to the ‘reality’ of human thought processes. As a narrative technique, stream of consciousness maintains affiliations with other modernist art forms, such as the visual art of German expressionism, Cubism, and modernist film.


1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

As in the preceding article of the present series, I continue to examine William James's thought in The Principles of Psychology regarding what he there called “ejective consciousness.” James held that, in certain altered states, and perhaps at other times as well, mental occurrences may take place that are not components of the individual's original stream of consciousness. Usually if not always, such “split-off” occurrences comprise a second stream, which, according to James, is no less conscious and personal than the original stream is. However, the components of the second stream must be distinguished from nonconscious mental occurrences. Whereas James argues at some length against the existence of the nonconscious mental, of which there cannot be any inner awareness by definition, James does countenance the unusual presence of a second stream of consciousness, of which the first stream can have knowledge only inferentially, and vice versa. Both streams include inner awareness of their own basic durational components.


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