scholarly journals A SAÚDE COMO BEM HUMANO BÁSICO EM FINNIS

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (58) ◽  
pp. 489
Author(s):  
Jean Carlos DIAS ◽  
Versalhes Enos Nunes FERREIRA

RESUMO Objetivo: O estudo objetiva compreender a lei natural e direitos naturais, baseado na aproximação entre direito e moral. Assim, objetiva perquirir sobre a teoria jusnaturalista de John Mitchell Finnis, a fim de aproximar o direito positivo e o direito natural com a condição basilar para o alcance do florescimento da sociedade e do próprio indivíduo. Metodologia:Para atingir os fins esperados, a metodologia utilizada será documental, utilizando-se o método dedutivo, com caráter bibliográfico. Para tanto, utilizou-se a revisão bibliográfica, adotando-se como marco teórico John Finnis, especialmente por intermédio da obra “Lei Natural e Direitos Naturais”. Resultados: Com alicerce na teoria jusnaturalista de Finnis, o artigo aborda a pesquisa científica, na medida em que aproximou-se o direito positivo e o jusnaturalismo, bem como demonstra que a saúde é um bem jurídico fundamental. Assim, apresenta como resultado o pensamento de Finnis, ao revelar os critérios utilizados por ele para a construção de sua lista de bens, que reside na compreensão de que os valores listados são perceptíveis, óbvios, manifestos, inquestionáveis e não precisam de demonstração, pois são objetivos; a mera observação da vida em sociedade é capaz de os identificar. Seus bens são a própria razão de qualquer ação moral ou racionalmente moral, além de outros critérios valorativos de cunho universal que alcançam culturas, instituições, ações e requisitos morais, enfim, um plexo de bens que permitam à pessoa sua realização no contexto coletivo, sem, contudo, hierarquizá-los. Por fim, ao resgatar a teoria defendida por John Finnis, resgata-se, por conseguinte, a importância que a saúde merece, pois é um integrante do bem básico da vida. Contribuições: A contribuição central do presente trabalho cinge-se em defender, argumentativamente, a possibilidade de entender a saúde como bem básico autônomo em Finnis, pois os bens básicos para ele têm um caráter pré-moral, prépolítico e pré-jurídico, ou seja, ainda não se transformaram em obrigações e, acreditase, sem a proteção do bem saúde seria praticamente impossível a uma sociedade alcançar o seu florescimento, que é propósito externado pelo filósofo em sua obra. Palavras-chave: Saúde; John Finnis; jusnaturalismo; direito e moral. ABSTRACT Objective: The study aims to understand natural law and natural rights, based on the approximation between law and morality. It aims to investigate John Mitchell Finnis' s jusnaturalist theory in order to bring positive law and natural law closer to the basic condition for achieving the flourishing of society and the individual himself. Methodology: To achieve the expected purpose the methodology used will be documentary, using the deductive method with bibliographic character. The bibliographic review was used adopting John Finnis as a theoretical framework, especially through the work “Natural Law and Natural Rights”. Results:Based on Finnis' s jusnaturalist theory, the article addresses scientific research as positive law and jusnaturalism approached, as well as demonstrating that health is a fundamental legal good. It presents Finnis's thinking as a result by revealing the criteria used by him for the construction of his list of goods, which lies in the understanding that the values listed are perceptible, obvious, manifest, unquestionable and do not need demonstration, as they are objective; the mere observation of life in society is capable of identifying them. Their assets are the very reason for any moral or rationally moral action, in addition to other universal valuation criteria that reach cultures, institutions, actions and moral requirements, in short, a plexus of assets that allow the person to perform it in the collective context, without , however, to rank them. Finally, when rescuing the theory defended by John Finnis, it is therefore rescued the importance that health deserves, as it is an integral part of the basic good of life. Contributions: The central contribution of this paper is to defend, arguably, the possibility of understanding health as a basic autonomous asset in Finnis, since the basic goods for him have a pre-moral, pre-political and pre-legal character, that is, they have not yet become obligations and, it is believed, without the protection of good health it would be practically impossible for a society to achieve its flourishing, which is a purpose expressed by the philosopher in his work. Keywords: Health; John Finnis; jusnaturalism; right and moral.

1971 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. O. Aihe

The rights of the individual in the society have been conceived as natural rights—which in the modern state have no more than a moral force. In the context of a modern state which asserts absolute powers within its borders, it appears idle to suggest as in the traditional natural law theories that there is anything like a law of nature existing independently of and overriding positive law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 435-461
Author(s):  
Carlos-I. Massini-Correas

En el presente artículo, escrito en homenaje a los 40 años de la aparición de la primera edición de Natural Law and Natural Rights de John Finnis, se estudian varias de las versiones elaboradas por el iusfilósofo australiano para analizar, explicitar, desarrollar y defender la noción de rule of law. Luego de este desarrollo, se efectúa una valoración de las aportaciones de Finnis en este punto, en especial las referidas al carácter principalmente ético de ese instituto, y a la maestría con la que ha sabido integrar la tradición clásico-realista del iusnaturalismo, los planteos metodológicos de la analytical jurisprudence y la reflexión contemporánea sobre la idea del gobierno limitado por el derecho.


2020 ◽  
pp. 167-200
Author(s):  
Michael Pakaluk

A theory may properly be called a theory of natural law, if either it functions as such a theory is expected to function; or it has the expected content; or it is a plausible interpretation of a theory generally acknowledged to be in the tradition of natural law. It functions as such a theory if it supports appeals to natural law intended to ‘contextualize’ human law. It has the expected content, if it adverts to providential, natural teleology as the basis for a law given to us prior to convention. It would clearly be located in the tradition, and rightly accounted as such a theory, if it were a plausible interpretation of Aquinas’ Treatise on Law, which is the locus classicus for the philosophical treatment of natural law. But the ‘New Natural Law,’ first expounded in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) of John Finnis, meets none of these criteria. NLNR seems best construed, then, as a contribution to the «law and morality » debate, not a theory of natural law. It gives merely another ‘method of ethics’ along with the many others put forward in the 20th c. If so, the philosophical work needed for a persuasive, contemporary revival of natural law still remains to be done.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-69
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Den Uyl ◽  
Douglas B. Rasmussen

Whether or not Strauss's observation is historically accurate, it does suggest two sets of questions for philosophical examination. (1) Is Strauss correct to view natural duties and natural rights as the same type of ethical concept? Do they serve the same function? Do they work on the same level, and are they necessarily in competition with each other? (2) Does saying that the individual human being is the center of the moral world require that one reject the idea of a human end, or telos? Does accepting the ethical centrality of a human telos require that one reject ethical individualism? Are they mutually exclusive?


2020 ◽  
pp. 637-668
Author(s):  
Brian McCall

Natural Law and Natural Rights, de John Finnis ha tenido un impacto significativo en el campo de la filosofía del derecho, especialmente en algunos temas concretos. En alguna medida sus tesis recuperaron para el iusnaturalismo la relevancia que estos planteamientos tuvieron, al menos, durante cinco décadas. Sin embargo, dicha recuperación significó algo más que la clásica comprensión de una ley natural inclusiva de la ley positiva y de mayor espectro referencial que ésta. En el discurso académico y popular el enfoque de Finnis, sus colaboradores y discípulos constituye, de hecho, una «nueva» ley natural. En este artículo se analiza el origen y fundamento de la ley natural (la clásica y la «nueva»): en particular, el concepto de «bien» (tanto individual como común) que se asume en Natural Law and Natural Rights. La definición de este concepto y su papel en los preceptos primarios de la ley natural son fundamentales y determinantes de cara a la elaboración y desarrollo de los argumentos subsiguientes. La primera parte destaca la gran contribución del libro en el campo iusfilosófico: la defensa de la objetividad del bien. La segunda explora la comprensión de Finnis del concepto de bien y, en particular, las formas en que reinterpreta o se aparta de Tomás de Aquino y Aristóteles. La tercera parte describe cómo tales diferencias afectan a un ejercicio de comprensión del bien común.


2020 ◽  
pp. 611-635
Author(s):  
Sergio-Raúl Castaño

El objeto del presente artículo consiste, en primer término, en el análisis de la noción de bien común y de bien común político, tal como es presentada por John Finnis en Natural Law and Natural Rights. Para enseguida, en un segundo momento, contrastar dicha concepción con la sostenida por Tomás de Aquino y algunos destacados exégetas contemporáneos del pensamiento del Aquinate, hasta 1980. Queda abierto el debate científico-filosófico acerca de la validez sistemática, «en las cosas mismas» (Husserl), que quepa reconocer a una y a otra posición.


2020 ◽  
pp. 591-610
Author(s):  
Gerard Bradley

John Finnis since 1980 has published many important scholarly papers treating different aspects of religious liberty. These works include both philosophical and theological perspectives. Some of the best of this work has specifically addressed Dignitatis humane, the Second Vatican Council’s declaration of Religious Freedom. Perhaps surprisingly, then, Finnis says almost nothing explicitly about either the Council or about religious freedom in Natural Law and Natural Rights. I shall argue here that Finnis nonetheless identifies and cogently defends in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) the foundational components of a sound conception of religious liberty. Building upon these anchor points – drawing a line connecting the dots, if you will – one can bring this conception into clear view. Because it is constructed bottom up from deep philosophical foundations, this implicit account of religious liberty is critically justified, as well as robust. In this article I also build upon Finnis’s foundations, and show how putative divine revelations to humankind impact religious liberty and, then, describe the cultural formations conducive to making robust religious liberty practically available to the inquiring, deliberating, acting person.


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