scholarly journals The ethics of narrative art: Philosophy in schools, compassion and learning from stories

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura D'Olimpio ◽  
Andrew Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Philosophy For Children ◽  
Fictional World ◽  
Narrative Art ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Philosophical Dialogue ◽  
Art Philosophy ◽  
Student Questions

Following neo-Aristotelians Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, we claim that humans are story-telling animals who learn from the stories of diverse others. Moral agents use rational emotions, such as compassion, which is our focus here, to imaginatively reconstruct others’ thoughts, feelings and goals. In turn, this imaginative reconstruction plays a crucial role in deliberating and discerning how to act. A body of literature has developed in support of the role narrative artworks (i.e. novels and films) can play in allowing us the opportunity to engage imaginatively and sympathetically with diverse characters and scenarios in a safe protected space that is created by the fictional world. By practising what Nussbaum calls a ‘loving attitude’, her version of ethical attention, we can form virtuous habits that lead to phronesis (practical wisdom). In this paper, and taking compassion as an illustrative focus, we examine the ways that students’ moral education might usefully develop from engaging with narrative artworks through Philosophy for Children (P4C), where philosophy is a praxis, conducted in a classroom setting using a Community of Inquiry (CoI). We argue that narrative artworks provide useful stimulus material to engage students, generate student questions, and motivate philosophical dialogue and the formation of good habits, which, in turn, supports the argument for philosophy to be taught in schools.

scholarly journals Exploring the connections between Philosophy for Children and character education: Some implications for moral education?

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Peterson ◽  
Brendan Bentley
Keyword(s):  
Character Education ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Critical Reflection ◽  
Values Education ◽  
Philosophy For Children ◽  
Potential Relationship ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Made In

In this paper we are interested in the connections between Philosophy for Children and character education. In sketching these connections we suggest some areas where the relationship is potentially fruitful, particularly in light of research which suggests that in practice schools and teachers often adopt and mix different approaches to values education. We outline some implications of drawing connections between the two fields for moral education. The arguments made in this article are done so in the hope of encouraging further critical reflection on the potential relationship between Philosophy for Children and character education.

Love’s Folly: Love and Knowledge in 1 Corinthians

2017 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-16
Author(s):  
Susan Grove Eastman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
1 Corinthians ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
In Christ

Tracing the language of love through 1 Corinthians, this article argues that Paul calls the Corinthians into an attentive communion with one another, in which mutual love will shape their practical wisdom. Paul’s goal is not the establishment of communal regulations, but rather the formation of moral agents through interpersonal bonds of love in Christ.

scholarly journals atrever-se a uma escrita infantil: a infância como abrigo e refúgio

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 01-30
Author(s):  
Walter Omar Kohan ◽  
Magda Costa Carvalho
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Philosophy For Children ◽  
Moving Force ◽  
Education Philosophy ◽  
Creative Force ◽  
Object Of Study ◽  
Adult Writing ◽  
Present Text

The present text is a childlike exercise in writing. In responding to an invitation to write an adult, academic text, we the authors found that the presence of a child's standpoint acted to change the expressions that were to be elucidated, and that the project that adult writing represents was suspended by the creative force of childhood. "Philosophy for children" became "children for philosophy"; "moral education" became "the end (of) morality" and "conceptions of childhood" became the "childhood of conceptions." As such our text is divided into different sections, in each of which we explore the implications of allowing ourselves to be transformed in our practice by recognition of the child’s voice; the problematization of conventional educational programmatics for one, and the opening of new pedagogical pathways, which recognize childhood as a moving force of thinking, as opposed to an object of study and manipulation. To this end, we engage several interlocutors from different fields--literature, philosophy, education, "philosophy for children", and from chronological children themselves. We conclude by proposing, based on an encounter with the work of H. Cisoux and J. Derrida, that we think about the relations between deconstruction and childhood in such a way that our affirmation of childhood leads to a transformation of the text itself—not only in its content but in its form. As such, we present the reader with a fundamentally childlike text. 

MORAL VALUES IN EDUCATION

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandeep Kaur
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Opportunities To Learn ◽  
Great Role ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Critical Attention

Schools have long been seen as institutions for preparing children for life, both academically and as moral agents in society. In order to become capable, moral citizens, children need to be provided with opportunities to learn moral values. However, little is known about how teachers enact social and moral values programs in the classroom. The aim of this article is to investigate the the moral education of the child with a critical attention paid to the allocation of responsibility. The paper tried to answer the question: ‘Who gives the child his moral education, is it a collective responsibility or the sole responsibility of an institution’? The answer is that It’s not only teachers in schools that can impart moral education to the children, but that the parents also play a great role in making the children aware of the importance of leading life ethically

Dostoevsky and Education through Punishment

2018 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 463-486
Author(s):  
Chris Barker
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Moral Reform ◽  
Crime And Punishment ◽  
Legal Punishment ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Education Theory ◽  
Hard Treatment ◽  
Point Of Departure

AbstractIn an important 1984 paper, “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment,” Jean Hampton argues that the practice of inflicting painful criminal punishments is justified only if punishment is morally educative. Hampton's suggestion forms the point of departure for this article on Dostoevsky'sCrime and Punishment. I show that Dostoevsky agrees with Hampton that punishment should aim at moral reform; however, Dostoevsky presents no evidence that self-punishment or legal punishment reliably cultivates respect for law, legal authority, oneself, or others as moral agents. Instead, Dostoevsky's post-Siberian writings are highly critical of Russian criminal justice, and emphasize that moral education comes through dialogue, reflection, and criticism. This highly individualized treatment may be experienced as painful, but it does not have to result from, and it may even be impeded by, legal “hard treatment.”

scholarly journals philosophical discussions with children: an opportunity for experiencing open-mindedness

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Johanna Hawken
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Thinking Skills ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Philosophy For Children ◽  
Thinking Skill ◽  
Philosophical Dialogue ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Disposition ◽  
Ethical Disposition

Children develop and experience numerous thinking skills in the course of a philosophical dialogue, which is the didactic medium for the practice of philosophy with children, since its birth. One of them plays a paramount role in the possibility of true dialogue, as it relies on the meeting of minds: open-mindedness. Furthermore, this concept is omnipresent in the literature about philosophy for children (Lipman, 2003: 172-179 ; Tozzi, 2001, 2002) and thus, requires an exploration and a precis analysis, which is the aim of his article. More precisely, there are three objectives: define the nature and characteristics of open-mindedness, analyse its emergence in philosophical discussions and, moreover, studying its role in the practice of philosophy. Our research (lead in University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) has shown that certain indicators present in the children’s discourse manifest the occurrence of open-mindedness: reformulation of one another’s words, complementarity of statements, explication of each other’s ideas, establishment of nuances, disagreement on terms and critical thinking. These cognitive acts reveal an intellectual relation between children, so much so as open-mindedness can be defined as a two-dimensional attitude, both as a cognitive disposition enabling the understanding of someone else’s idea and an ethical disposition enabling the acceptance of alterity. Moreover, it signals an ethical posture: the capacity to take embrace the words of others, without necessarily agreeing, the ability to take into account an alternative view on the world. The research hypothesis, that is the result of seven years research in the French town of Romainville (East of Paris) is, therefore, the following: philosophical discussions constitute an opportunity for children to experience open-mindedness as a crucial thinking skill and ethical posture.

scholarly journals A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)

AI & Society ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejo José G. Sison ◽  
Dulce M. Redín
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Philosophical Anthropology ◽  
Voluntary Action ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Artificial Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Case ◽  
Aristotelian Ethics ◽  
Context Dependent

AbstractWe examine Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) critique of the need for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs) and its rebuttal by Formosa and Ryan (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) set against a neo-Aristotelian ethical background. Neither Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) essay nor Formosa and Ryan’s (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) is explicitly framed within the teachings of a specific ethical school. The former appeals to the lack of “both empirical and intuitive support” (Van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019, p. 721) for AMAs, and the latter opts for “argumentative breadth over depth”, meaning to provide “the essential groundwork for making an all things considered judgment regarding the moral case for building AMAs” (Formosa and Ryan 2019, pp. 1–2). Although this strategy may benefit their acceptability, it may also detract from their ethical rootedness, coherence, and persuasiveness, characteristics often associated with consolidated ethical traditions. Neo-Aristotelian ethics, backed by a distinctive philosophical anthropology and worldview, is summoned to fill this gap as a standard to test these two opposing claims. It provides a substantive account of moral agency through the theory of voluntary action; it explains how voluntary action is tied to intelligent and autonomous human life; and it distinguishes machine operations from voluntary actions through the categories of poiesis and praxis respectively. This standpoint reveals that while Van Wynsberghe and Robbins may be right in rejecting the need for AMAs, there are deeper, more fundamental reasons. In addition, despite disagreeing with Formosa and Ryan’s defense of AMAs, their call for a more nuanced and context-dependent approach, similar to neo-Aristotelian practical wisdom, becomes expedient.

scholarly journals Envisioning the Experience of Others: Moral Imagination, Practical Wisdom and the Scope of Empathy

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-159
Author(s):  
Natalie M. Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Moral Imagination ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Philosophy For Children ◽  
Educational Initiatives ◽  
To Receive

The concept of empathy has gained appeal in many educational initiatives in recent years, notably in the charitable sector, yet conceptual confusions endure and the challenges associated with educating for empathy tend not to receive the attention they deserve. This article strives to help clarify the concept of empathy for educative purposes by examining one such challenge—conceived as "narrow empathetic scope"—drawing on central ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue theory. The article explores the ways in which moral imagination, as a precursor to empathy, may be uniquely able to assist with the cultivation of practical wisdom in children since it enables them to visualize contexts they have not yet encountered and broaden the moral lens through which they approach and assess their lived experience. The article will also present the Philosophy for Children model as an effective pedagogical method for cultivating the virtue of empathy through morally imaginative dialogue.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document