scholarly journals The Original Living Tree

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asher Honickman
Keyword(s):  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Deep Roots ◽  
Living Tree ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tradition

One of the main arguments in Canada in favour of the “living tree” doctrine is that it has deep roots in our constitutional tradition. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, the living tree is “one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation.” The argument goes something like this: beginning with the famous “Persons case” of 1929 (Edwards v. Canada(Attorney General)), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recognized the Constitution to be a living tree, capable of evolving to meet new social and economic realities, and this method of constitutional interpretation has remained fundamental to Canada’s constitutional order ever since.

Beguiled By Metaphors: The “Living Tree” and Originalist Constitutional Interpretation in Canada

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley W. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Original Intent ◽  
Living Tree ◽  
New Family ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Meaningful Engagement ◽  
The Moment

Constitutional interpretation in Canada is dominated by the metaphor of the “living tree”. Living tree constitutional interpretation is usually defined in terms of its incompatibility with what is understood in Canada to be the central commitment of originalist interpretation: that the constitution is, in some sense, “frozen at the moment of adoption. But the tenets of originalism that are used as a definitional contrast are not widely held by originalist constitutional scholars today, and are in fact expressly rejected in the new originalist theories that have been developed principally (but not exclusively) in the United States over the past 20 years. There has not been a meaningful engagement in Canada with contemporary schools of originalist interpretation. The originalism rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985 (and periodically reaffirmed thereafter), is not the new originalism, and a rejection of this new family of interpretive theories does not necessarily follow from the fact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s rejection of original intent originalism. Unfortunately, the Canadian courts have continued to affirm living tree constitutional doctrine and denounce originalism without providing much of an account of what they are accepting or rejecting. This paper is a prefatory study to an engagement with new originalist scholarship. I attempt a statement of the current commitments in Canadian living constitutional doctrine (pausing to engage with theoretical arguments that have been made in its defence) and, in passing, note the Supreme Court’s attitudes towards originalism. My purpose is to determine what the central commitments of living tree constitutional doctrine are, as a preliminary step towards a later study to determine the extent to which Canadian doctrine is truly incompatible with orginalist interpretation. I explore what I observe to be the four central commitments to living tree constitutionalism in Canada: (1) the doctrine of progressive interpretation; (2) the use of a purposive methodology in progressive interpretation; (3) the absence of any necessary role for the original intent or meaning of framers in interpreting the constitution; and (4) the presence of other constraints on judicial interpretation.

De facto and de jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme Court of Canada

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Ryan Beaton
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Nations ◽  
Short Story ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Shed Light

This paper offers a short story of Crown sovereignty at the Supreme Court Canada in order to shed light on questions the Court has raised about the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty over territory claimed by First Nations. In skeletal form, the story is simple. The Crown — first Imperial British and later Canadian federal and provincial — asserted sovereignty over what is now Canadian territory, and Canadian courts (and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) accepted those assertions without question. Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has lately qualified Crown sovereignty in striking ways, perhaps most notably in speaking of “de facto Crown sovereignty” in reasons released in 2004.The purpose behind this qualification, in line with the Court’s Aboriginal rights and title cases since Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), seems to be to encourage the Crown to negotiate modern treaties and settle outstandingAboriginal rights and title claims in order to perfect or legitimate Crown sovereignty. As Crown negotiations with First Nations stalled, however, the Court proceeded to develop its own framework for the procedural legitimation of Crown sovereignty, i.e. a framework of procedural safeguards designed to weed out “bad” exercises of Crown sovereignty from legitimate ones.

scholarly journals CURRENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES LITIGATION: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT COMMONWEALTH DECISIONS

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Service Commission ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Right Of Access

The Privy Council judgments in James v Attorney General [2010] UKPC 23 and Graham v Police Service Commission [2011] UKPC 46 have advanced the constitutional damages jurisprudence not only in Trinidad and Tobago but also the Commonwealth since Attorney General v Ramanoop [2005] 2 WLR 1324 (PC). In their recent decision in Seepersad v Attorney General [2012] UKPC 4, their Lordships answered two crucial questions hitherto not contested in South Africa or any other Commonwealth court relating to a right to a constitutional remedy and a constitutional right to damages. They held that constitutional damages were the appropriate relief as against those cases where constitutional relief were sought in non-constitutional circumstances. The Supreme Court of Canada has equally contributed to the subject by holding in Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc [2010] 3 SCR 585 (SCC) that a claimant for Charter damages does not have to obtain judicial review before seeking such relief. This article argues that, while TeleZone has restored the citizen’s right of access to the courts by removing unnecessary procedural obstacles to Charter damages claim, the Privy Council has, through Seepersad, once more laid down principles which South African and other Commonwealth courts may freely refer to if and when similar issues arise in constitutional damages litigation in their jurisdictions.

Prejudice, Moral Progress, and Not Being on the Wrong Side of History

2020 ◽  
pp. 127-153
Author(s):  
Linda C. McClain
Keyword(s):  
White Supremacy ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Majority Opinion ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
Wrong Side ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter argues that evaluating the arguments the parties made in Loving v. Virginia (1967), the iconic case in which the Supreme Court struck down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law, aids in understanding puzzles about bigotry. Virginia attempted a modern, sociological defense of its racist law. Loving illustrates the role of generational moral progress in constitutional interpretation: laws justified by appeals to nature, God’s plan for the races, and children’s well-being were repudiated as rooted in racial prejudice, intolerance, and white supremacy. The chapter then considers Loving’s crucial (but contested) role in constitutional challenges to bars on same-sex marriage, first analyzing the successful challenge to Virginia’s defense of marriage law. It then analyzes the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry; the dissenters argued Loving was inapt. The chapter concludes by discussing the role of moral progress and new insight in constitutional interpretation.

Same-Sex Relationships and Anglo-Canadian Choice of Law: An Argument for Universal Validity

1997 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 103-136
Author(s):  
Wendy A. Adams
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Choice Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face

SummaryThe distinction between formal and essential validity in Anglo-Canadian choice of law regarding marriage is an illogical bifurcation that unnecessarily invalidates same-sex relationships contracted in foreign jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reformulated certain rules of private international law, taking into account both the constitutional and sub-constitutional imperatives inherent in a federal setting and the need for order and fairness when co-ordinating diversity in the face of increasing globalization. Reform of the choice of law rules regarding the validity of foreign marriages should proceed accordingly with the result being that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. No principled reason exists to deny recognition to same-sex relationships validly contracted in other jurisdictions, nor to differentiate between the rights and obligations arising from the legal status of same-sex and different-sex relationships.

scholarly journals SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE SAME OLD CONSTITUTION*

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2005
Author(s):  
Ronalda Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Institution ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Political Debate ◽  
Same Sex Marriage ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Do So

The Reference re Same-Sex Marriage1 is not a major opinion on the rights of same-sex couples in Canada, but it is nonetheless an important and fascinating case. There are only a few lines that are about the “rights” of same-sex couples. Did the Supreme Court of Canada “duck” the issue? Was the Court carefully gauging how much or little political capital it had and making a political decision to say as little as possible on this topic? The Court certainly displayed strategic brilliance, but it did not do so in the name of avoiding the “political” hot topic of same-sex marriage. It is factually difficult to maintain the view that the Supreme Court of Canada is loath to enter into this political debate. It has been the lead social institution in Canada in terms of responding to the claims of gays and lesbians to equality in law,2 and it has never been shy of dealing with topics simply because they involve controversial political issues.3 Rather, the Court’s brilliance lies in its minimalist and almost weary tone. This approach had the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of those opposed to same-sex marriage: the same-sex advocates definitely win the constitutional race, but they do so because according to the Supreme Court, there is no provincial constitutional headwind that can stop them. In short, provinces can complain all they want about the federal position in favour of same-sex marriage, but the wedding will go on despite and over their objections to the ceremony.

Chieftaincy jurisdication and the muddle of constitutional interpretation in Ghana

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. K. P. Kludze
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Bar Association ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The Supreme Court of Ghana, in The Ghana Bar Association v. The Attorney General, has unanimously decided that, even under the 1992 Constitution, High Court and the Court of Appeal have no jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. Even if this decision itself is correct, it is nevertheless premised on highly questionable legal propositions and dicta which strike at the foundations of several otherwise settled principles and canons of construction.

scholarly journals L'étanchéité de l'A.A.N.B. est-elle menacée?

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 383-396
Author(s):  
Jean-Charles Bonenfant
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
German Federal Republic ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
British North America ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Distribution Of Powers ◽  
Canada Limited

In his opinion in John A. MacDonald, Railquip Enterprises Ltd and Vapor Canada Limited, Chief Justice Laskin commented that in the future it might be necessary to reconsider the 1937 Labour Conventions Decision which established the « watertight compartments » doctrine applicable to the implementation of treaties concluded by Canada. According to this doctrine as it was set forth by the Privy Council, the fact that Canada can enter into treaties with other countries does not mean that the Federal Parliament of Canada can legislate contrary to the distribution of powers provided for by sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act. In his article, Professor Bonenfant recalls the criticism which the Privy Council evoked, particularly that which appeared in the June, 1937, issue of The Canadian Bar Review. If the Supreme Court of Canada wishes to revise the decision of the Privy Council, it will not be hampered by the rule of stare decisis. But, Professor Bonenfant writes, whatever the judicial solution may be, it would probably be better to follow the example of other countries, particularly the example provided by article 32 of the Constitution of the German Federal Republic, and seek a political solution. In this domain as in others, if federalism has failed in Canada, he writes that it is perhaps because the interpretation of Canada's Constitution has been left to the intellectual virtuosity of the members of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court.

scholarly journals Commentary on Papers Delivered on the Supreme Court of Canada and the Law of Obligations

1969 ◽  
pp. 160
Author(s):  
D. C. McDonald
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Cost

The speaker noted that the Hon. Emmett Hall, for whom he was substituting, had had experience as trial judge, quality he considers desirable in the appellate courts. He then commented on some of the very early cases of the S.C.C., before proceeding to discussion of Dean Friaman's paper. The speaker discussed aspects in the development of the law relating to trespassers and occupier's liability. He was of the opinion that the S.C.C. was not as mechanistic in its approach to the law of tort as Dean Fridman thought it to be. In commenting on Dr. Beaudoin's presentation, Mr. Justice McDonald noted that the blame for the lack of weight given to French decisions in matters concerning the Quebec Civil Code droit de delits should not be attributed to the S.C.C. but to the Privy Council. In concluding, His Lordship observed that the process of applying for have to appeal to the S.C.C. deserves further study, since the present requirement that the Court dispose of applications for leave which are not accompanied by an oral submis sion increases the cost of appeal particularly for Western cases.

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