scholarly journals CURRENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES LITIGATION: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT COMMONWEALTH DECISIONS

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Service Commission ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Right Of Access

The Privy Council judgments in James v Attorney General [2010] UKPC 23 and Graham v Police Service Commission [2011] UKPC 46 have advanced the constitutional damages jurisprudence not only in Trinidad and Tobago but also the Commonwealth since Attorney General v Ramanoop [2005] 2 WLR 1324 (PC). In their recent decision in Seepersad v Attorney General [2012] UKPC 4, their Lordships answered two crucial questions hitherto not contested in South Africa or any other Commonwealth court relating to a right to a constitutional remedy and a constitutional right to damages. They held that constitutional damages were the appropriate relief as against those cases where constitutional relief were sought in non-constitutional circumstances. The Supreme Court of Canada has equally contributed to the subject by holding in Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc [2010] 3 SCR 585 (SCC) that a claimant for Charter damages does not have to obtain judicial review before seeking such relief. This article argues that, while TeleZone has restored the citizen’s right of access to the courts by removing unnecessary procedural obstacles to Charter damages claim, the Privy Council has, through Seepersad, once more laid down principles which South African and other Commonwealth courts may freely refer to if and when similar issues arise in constitutional damages litigation in their jurisdictions.

Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court

2021 ◽  
pp. 183-228
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Canadian History ◽  
British North America ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter assesses the emergence of judicial review in Canada. Canadian judicial review emerged as a direct result of federalism and separation of powers umpiring by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), which was Canada’s highest court from the adoption of the British North America Act in 1867 until Canada ended appeals to the JCPC in 1949. There was also, as Ran Hirschl would argue, an element of elite hegemonic entrenchment by imperial British colonial elites in the retention of the JCPC as the highest court of appeals in Canada from the creation of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1875 until Canada abolished appeals to the JCPC in 1949. Some Canadian elites tried and failed to end JCPC judicial review in Canadian cases in 1875. Canadian judicial review from 1867 to 1982 was exclusively concerned with federalism and separation of powers judicial umpiring because Canada had no constitutional Bill of Rights until 1982. There are thus two founding moments in the judicial review of legislation in Canadian history: firstly, the period from 1867 to 1982 when Canadian federalism and separation of powers law took shape as a result of federalism and separation of powers umpiring; and, secondly, the period from 1982 to the present, when the Supreme Court of Canada began vigorously enforcing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The emergence of judicial review from 1982 down to the present day is partly a rights from wrongs phenomenon, and it is partly the result of constitutional borrowing from the United States’s Warren Court.

De facto and de jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme Court of Canada

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Ryan Beaton
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Nations ◽  
Short Story ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Shed Light

This paper offers a short story of Crown sovereignty at the Supreme Court Canada in order to shed light on questions the Court has raised about the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty over territory claimed by First Nations. In skeletal form, the story is simple. The Crown — first Imperial British and later Canadian federal and provincial — asserted sovereignty over what is now Canadian territory, and Canadian courts (and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) accepted those assertions without question. Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has lately qualified Crown sovereignty in striking ways, perhaps most notably in speaking of “de facto Crown sovereignty” in reasons released in 2004.The purpose behind this qualification, in line with the Court’s Aboriginal rights and title cases since Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), seems to be to encourage the Crown to negotiate modern treaties and settle outstandingAboriginal rights and title claims in order to perfect or legitimate Crown sovereignty. As Crown negotiations with First Nations stalled, however, the Court proceeded to develop its own framework for the procedural legitimation of Crown sovereignty, i.e. a framework of procedural safeguards designed to weed out “bad” exercises of Crown sovereignty from legitimate ones.

scholarly journals The Original Living Tree

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asher Honickman
Keyword(s):  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Deep Roots ◽  
Living Tree ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tradition

One of the main arguments in Canada in favour of the “living tree” doctrine is that it has deep roots in our constitutional tradition. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, the living tree is “one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation.” The argument goes something like this: beginning with the famous “Persons case” of 1929 (Edwards v. Canada(Attorney General)), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recognized the Constitution to be a living tree, capable of evolving to meet new social and economic realities, and this method of constitutional interpretation has remained fundamental to Canada’s constitutional order ever since.

scholarly journals After Labaye: The Harm Test of Obscenity, the New Judicial Vacuum, and the Relevance of Familiar Voices

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Jochelson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Tolerance Test ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Obscenity Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Tolerance Approach ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Community Standards

In R. v. Labaye, the Supreme Court of Canada finally retired the community standards of tolerance test of obscenity. The test had been the subject of much academic critique, a matter that reached its zenith in the period following Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), in which a gay and lesbian bookshop contested the procedures and legislative regime of customs officials in detaining its imports. The engagement in the literature on the efficacy of the community standards test that followed was often heated, always interesting, and ultimately unresolved. To date, we have not seen any clarifying applications of the newly proposed harm test by the Supreme Court, nor have we seen a profound articulation in any lower courts. Subsequently, the academic discussion has slowed to a crawl. In this article, the author reviews four accounts of the community standards test that were prominent following Little Sisters, and asks if the newly proposed Labaye standard meets their concerns. The Labaye case provides much fodder for the previous critics and supporters of a community standards of tolerance approach to analyze. After a critical analysis of the new Labaye test, the author concludes that the concerns have not been muted by the retirement of the community standards test, even if the voices have been. The engaged voices heard in the aftermath of Little Sisters should not hold back and they should not abandon the work to be done in obscenity law and freedom of expression discourse generally.

15. Remedies providing for specific relief and restitutionary remedies

2021 ◽  
pp. 769-796
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier
Keyword(s):  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Specific Performance ◽  
Total Failure ◽  
One Step ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Selection Of

Poole’s Casebook on Contract Law provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter deals with remedies providing for specific relief and so-called ‘restitutionary’ remedies. It first considers debt claims (agreed sums), before turning to specific performance and injunctions. It concludes by discussing restitution—recovery where there has been a total failure of consideration, and recovery on a quantum meruit (as where a contract fails to materialize)—following the Supreme Court decision of Morris-Garner and another v One Step (Support Ltd) and its impact on Wrotham Park damages and the availability and nature of the account of profits in Attorney-General v Blake.

Repeat Litigators and Agenda Setting on the Supreme Court of Canada

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 811-833 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy B. Flemming ◽  
Glen S. Krutz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Comparative Research ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
High Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Selection Of

The expanding public policy role of high courts heightens concerns over whether societal and political inequalities affect the outcomes of litigation. However, comparative research on this question is limited. This article assesses whether status inequalities between parties and differences in the experience and resources of attorneys influence the selection of cases for judicial review in the Supreme Court of Canada. A series of statistical models reveal that governments are more likely than other parties to influence whether leave is granted but that the experience and resources of lawyers, unlike in the United States, have little impact. The decentralized, low volume and high access features of the Canadian process may explain this finding.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

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