scholarly journals Input Production Joint Venture

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianpaolo Rossini ◽  
Cecilia Vergari
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Organizational Setting ◽  
Vertical Separation ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
The Social ◽  
Differentiated Goods ◽  
Partial Collusion

In many industries, it is quite common to observe firms delegating the production of essential inputs to independent ventures jointly established with competing rivals. The diffusion of this arrangement and the favourable stance of competition authorities call for the assessment of the social and private desirability of Input Production Joint Ventures (IPJV), which represent a form of input production cooperation, scantly investigated so far. IPJV can be seen as an intermediate organizational setting lying between the two extremes of vertical integration and vertical separation, with a major difference, due to partial collusion. Our investigation is based on an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated goods. We characterize the conditions under which IPJV is privately optimal finding that firms' incentives may be welfare detrimental. We also provide a rationale for the empirical relevance of IPJV both in terms of its ability to survive and in terms of disengagement incentives which account for the large number of divorces among members of joint ventures. The stance of the paper as to IPJV is more cautious with respect to the received wisdom of competition authorities and in favour of the wide application of the rule of reason.

scholarly journals The Fiduciary Duties of Joint Venture Parties – When do They Arise and What Do They Comprise?

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Knowler ◽  
Charles Rickett
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Goal ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Fiduciary Obligations ◽  
Australian Case

Joint Ventures are often used by parties in commercial enterprises where parties seek to achieve a common goal. One issue which is increasingly contentious is the extent to which, if any, joint venture parties owe each other fiduciary obligations. This paper refutes, as a dangerous heresy, the idea that joint venture relationships are discrete legal relationships that are inherently fiduciary in nature. The majority of self-styled "joint ventures" are, invariably, nothing more in legal terms than contracts. If parties are going to be bound by fiduciary duties, over and above the contractual duties they owe each other, this will only be so by virtue of the particular arrangement they have entered into which, on a thorough examination of the facts, is found to require each party to give unstinting loyalty to the other. Recent Australian case law bears this out.

scholarly journals Zugangsentgelte zur Infrastruktur der Deutsche Bahn AG: Fluch oder Segen durch vertikale Separierung?

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Bataille ◽  
Michael Coenen
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Vertical Separation ◽  
Railway Transport ◽  
Network Operator ◽  
Policy Proposal ◽  
The Public ◽  
Effective Competition ◽  
Deutsche Bahn

AbstractIt has been a policy proposal since long to vertically separate transport and infrastructure in Germany’s railway sector. The proposal received new momentum, when selling the transport subsidiaries of Deutsche Bahn AG to the public was discussed in 2008 / 2009. While vertical separation is general ly understood to prevent foreclosure and discrimination by the incumbent network- operator, advocates of vertical integration claim separation to have adverse effects on access prices to the infrastructure. We examine the price setting incentives of an integrated and a separated network-operator and compare our results to rough empirical findings on the profitability of the Deutsche Bahn AG infrastructure branches. Theoretical analysis highlights that after separation exceptional mark-ups on access prices to the railwayinfrastructure are feasible only in segments of railway-transport with insufficient competition. We therefore conclude that an economic policy for the railway sector directed on efficient supply and promoting effective competition should unbind itself from alleged price synergies and should press ahead with vertical separation instead.

Roman Business Associations

2020 ◽  
pp. 233-272
Author(s):  
Andreas Martin Fleckner
Keyword(s):  
Joint Venture ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Business Associations ◽  
Important Lesson ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
The Social ◽  
Legal Forms ◽  
High Level ◽  
Capital Intensive

Roman businessmen eager to launch a joint business venture could choose among three legal forms: the societas, the societas publicanorum, and the peculium of a commonly held slave. None of these forms led to large capital associations, let alone business corporations with publicly traded shares. The high level of instability is one of the key explanations: under Roman law, it was virtually impossible to commit capital for the long term and finance capital-intensive enterprises. The societas was inevitably liquidated following numerous dissolution events; its members could withdraw their money at any time; and private creditors were not barred from seizing common assets. The peculium was even more unstable: In addition to the dissolution events of the societas, the joint venture came to an end and all peculium items reverted back to the masters when the commonly held slave died. While the societas publicanorum developed into a more stable institution over time, during the same period, its business almost disappeared as state authorities stopped putting capital-intensive projects out to tender. How can a modern reader make sense of the picture that emerges from the sources? The present chapter suggests that reservations in the social and political setting, rather than economic factors or oddities of Roman legal doctrine, caused business associations to remain small. This is an important lesson from history, both for the theory of the firm and for the role that law plays in it.

scholarly journals Simulation analysis of incentives on employees' acceptance of foreign joint venture management practices: a case study

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (8) ◽  
pp. 2047-2078
Author(s):  
Jingxiao Zhang ◽  
You Ouyang ◽  
Hui Li ◽  
Pablo Ballesteros-Pérez ◽  
Martin Skitmore
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Joint Management ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Venture Management ◽  
Employee Acceptance

PurposeCultural differences between employees of different nationalities are hindering the development of some transnational joint ventures. Describing and modelling the positive (or negative) factors that cause joint venture employees to accept (or reject) joint management business practices is of great value to all corporations operating abroad with locally sourced employees.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a Sino-Japan construction joint venture project as a representative case study. First, structural equation modelling is used to identify the factors influencing Chinese employees' acceptance of joint venture management practices. Then, a system dynamics model is adopted to simulate the time-dependent effects of the incentives.FindingsThe study results (1) indicate which incentives strongly affect employee acceptance of joint venture management practices; (2) identify inefficient management practices in cross-cultural joint ventures; and (3) provide evidence that the employees' perceptions of clear purpose, good working relationships and helpful mechanisms positively and directly also support their acceptance of joint management practices.Originality/value–A dynamic simulation method is used to analyse the influence of various incentive factors on employee acceptance of joint management. This provides unprecedented information regarding how these factors interact with each other, hence how their effectiveness varies (both positively and negatively) over time. Further findings also provide new ideas for joint venture managers to adopt more effective management methods.

Control, Conflict, and Performance: A Study of U.S.-Chinese Joint Ventures

1997 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 31-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Z. Ding
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Questionnaire Survey ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Managerial Control ◽  
Foreign Partner ◽  
Venture Performance ◽  
General Managers ◽  
And Performance

This study was designed to test empirically the linkages between control, conflict, and performance using a sample of U.S.-Chinese joint ventures established in China during the period of 1979–1989. Data were gathered through a questionnaire survey among U.S. managers and personal interviews with both U.S. and Chinese general managers in the selected joint ventures. Results showed that dominant managerial control exercised by the foreign partner had a positive impact on the perceived joint venture performance. The study identified major areas in which conflict between joint venture partners occurred. Empirical evidence was found that conflict between joint venture partners significantly hindered joint venture performance.

Agreeing to disagree: structuring future capital investment provisions in joint ventures

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
Edgar Elliott ◽  
Lois D’Costa ◽  
James Bamford
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Capital Investments ◽  
Agreeing To Disagree ◽  
Structural Work ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Contractual Structures

Abstract Prior to entering into any joint venture agreement (JVA), dealmakers should be aware of the options available to resolve future investment disagreements. There are three broad capital investment structures commonly found in joint ventures: (i) standard passmark rules; (ii) non-consent/opt-out; and (iii) sole risk. Within each category, deal practitioners have numerous options to tailor capital investment structures. As much as possible, deal practitioners should contemplate the most likely areas of disagreement, and then tailor the capital investment structures appropriately to ensure that the joint ventures (JV) can manage capital investment decisions in an efficient, value-preserving way. While it is impossible to establish a formula to determine which specific contractual structures will best accommodate future capital investments in a given JV, companies should weigh various factors to inform their position. We reviewed 40 JVAs to understand various capital investment mechanics and how they differ based on the nature of the venture and owner context. Our research found an extremely diverse array of creative structural work-arounds to address different owner appetites to make future capital investments. The purpose of this article is to describe, illustrate and provide benchmarks on different mechanics and contractual terms found in joint venture agreements, and to offer guidance as to which future capital investment mechanics should be included in venture agreements.

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