scholarly journals Dilemmas about the scope of the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence from a human rights perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (4/2019) ◽  
pp. 193-206
Author(s):  
Darko Simović

The adoption of the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence was driven by the creation of a more effective legal framework for the protection of victims of domestic violence, and, therefore, also by the alignment of the legal system of the Republic of Serbia with international obligations. The main novelties include multi-sectoral cooperation and primarily preventive nature of the law. However, from its very adoption, it has been pointed to its noticeably repressive character, as well as to provisions with potentially harmful impacts. Hence, this paper represents a contribution to the discussion on the importance and scope of the solutions provided for in the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence. On the one hand, it points to major novelties intended to contribute to a more effective prevention of domestic violence. On the other hand, it questions the constitutionality and appropriateness of some of the legal solutions, arguing that, in particular respects, the lawmaker had to use a wiser and more subtle approach to conceptualising the provisions of this law.

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-82
Author(s):  
Neliana Rodean

Abstract In Romania, a semi-presidential system characterized by an exaltation of the powers of the President of the Republic, there would be critical observations to be reported in relation to this institution. More precisely, it refers to the constitutional provisions which weaken the President among the political institutions and could also lead to different interpretations. First of all, the paper examines the President as popularly elected body but that does not reflect fully the will of the nation. Secondly, its oath violated the freedom of religion and if the wording will not be changed, will continue to constitute a discrimination against other non Orthodox President that could be elected. Moreover, the Romanian legal system is characterized by an independence of the President in its relationship with the Parliament but on the one hand, that does not mean that the President is more powerful in the event of dissolution of the Parliament and the other hand, the Parliament is completely independent in determining its competences in relations with the office of the Presidency.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 126-133
Author(s):  
Vlad-Cristian SOARE ◽  

"The fundamental transformations through the Romanian state passed since the Revolution of December 1989, have also put their mark on the legal system. For this reason, there have been major changes in the content of administrative law. However, the regulation of the territorial-administrative subdivisions survived the change of political regime, due to Law 2/1968. Moreover, regulations on administrative-territorial subdivisions are also found in Law 215/2001 and in the 1991 Constitution, revised in 2003. This has led to problems of interpretation. Thus, on the one hand, we need to identify who has the right to constitute administrative-territorial subdivisions, and on the other hand, it must be seen whether the answer to the first question, leads to a possible interpretation that would be unconstitutional. At the same time, administrative-territorial subdivisions have created problems of interpretation regarding their legal capacity. Through this article, we have proposed to look at the issues mentioned above."


2018 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvio Ferrari

The conflicts between rights of God and human rights are on the rise. On the one hand, there are some rights that are qualified as human rights in the most important international conventions and in many national constitutions. As such, they are to be respected always and everywhere. On the other hand, there are rights that are directly or indirectly attributed to the will of God. Their respect is regarded as a religious obligation to be upheld even when it implies the violation of human rights. These are the terms of the conflict and the fact that they sink their roots in non-negotiable beliefs – rights related to the very nature of man vs. rights dependent on the will of God–makes this conflict particularly serious and complex. This article discusses the structural and historical causes of this conflict and proposes a few strategies to reduce the tensions between these two sets of rights.


Author(s):  
Erasmus Mayr

This comment examines the impact of Buchanan’s and Sreenivasan’s critique of the mirroring view on some established theories of human rights, in particular on ‘political’ accounts like Joseph Raz’s, which consider human rights to be a subclass of moral rights. It is argued that, on the one hand, such theories are not best understood as relying on the mirroring view, and, on the other hand, that they have resources to defend the mirroring view against Buchanan’s and Sreenivasan’s criticisms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-45
Author(s):  
Marko Stankovic ◽  
Bojan Milisavljević

The paper analyzes Serbian system of local self-government under the Constitution of 2006 and its possible improvements. There are two major aspects of reform. On the one side, there are weaknesses in internal law and practice that were detected in last three decades and six concrete proposals for their correction. On the other side, considering that Serbia negotiates on integration with the EU, some improvements of the system should be a result of that process, fully in accordance with the European standards of local self-government. Reforming the local self-government in both of these directions should lead to better legal framework in the Republic of Serbia and upgrading the constitutional system.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-42
Author(s):  
Folker Bittmann

The aim of German criminal procedural law is not to convict the accused at any cost. Even a guilty party can only be convicted if the criminal procedure is held in accordance with the law. If this is not possible, the German legal system accepts the risk of possibly acquitting a guilty party; it finds this more tolerable than the irregular conviction of the culprit. A criminal procedure seeks the truth. Only on the basis of a judicial conviction of the crime and its culprit may a sentence be imposed. This, though, can only be based on the so-calledprocedural truth.On the one hand, the past can never be reconstructed precisely; on the other hand, clarification can only be found through legal means and by following designated paths allowed by procedural law. Therefore, further investigation must cease if it is only possible to proceed by violating procedural law.


2002 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-147
Author(s):  
Gabriela Shalev

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to give a panoramic view of Chief Justice Barak's theory of interpretation, namely the purposive theory, which is contained in a six volume treatise in Hebrew, Interpretation in Law. In order to understand this theory, it is useful to imagine a spectrum where, on the one hand, there is the subjective intent – namely the meaning that can be deduced from the intent of the writer of the text – and, on the other hand, the objective intent – namely the meaning based on the fundamental principles of the legal system. Various legal texts are interpreted by placing them on different points of this spectrum in accordance with the relevant area of law. Accordingly, in defining the purpose of Basic Laws, Barak gives primary regard to the fundamental principles of the system, with very little regard to the intentions of the drafters. In contrast, the purposive interpretation of wills occupies the other end of the spectrum, with maximum regard for the subjective intention of the drafter and a much smaller regard for the fundamental principles of the legal system. After a brief review of the philosophical and theoretical application of the purposive interpretation of various legal texts, the article moves on to demonstrate, through decisions of Chief Justice Barak, the judicial application of the purposive interpretation in two of the most important fields of interpretation: constitutional interpretation and interpretation of contracts.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-284
Author(s):  
Marian Burchardt

AbstractLegal anthropologists and sociologists of religion increasingly recognize the importance of law in current controversies over religious diversity. Drawing on the case of South Africa, this article explores how such controversies are shaped by contestations over what counts as ‘religion’. Analyzing the historical context and emergent forms of institutional secularity from which contemporary contestations over religious diversity draw, the article explores debates and practices of classification around religion, tradition, and culture, and the ways in which these domains are co-constituted through their claims on the law: on the one hand through an analysis of religion-related jurisprudence; on the other hand through an examination of the debates on witchcraft, law, and religion. I argue that the production of judicial knowledge of ‘religion’, ‘culture’, and ‘tradition’ is tied up with contestations over the power to define the meaning of the domains. In fact, contrary to notions of constitutionality in which rights seem to exist prior to the claims made on their basis, in a fundamental sense rights struggles help to constitute the contemporary human rights dispensation. Against the Comaroffs’ claim that judicialization depoliticizes power struggles, I show that legal claims making remains vibrantly political.


Itinerario ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 25 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 143-153
Author(s):  
Robert Ross

What is, and was, South Africa? This is clearly not a question which has a single answer, nor has it ever had one. On the one hand, there is a constitutional answer. In these terms, South Africa did not exist before the creation of the Union in 1910 and since then has been the state created then, transformed into the Republic of South Africa in 1961 and transformed once again with the ending of white minority rule in 1994. On the other hand, there are innumerable answers, effectively those to be found in the minds of all South Africans, and indeed all those foreigners who have an opinion about the country. Nevertheless, these opinions are not random. Clearly, there are regularities to be found within them, such that it is possible, in principle, to describe at the very least the range of answers to this question which were held within particular groups of the population, either within the country or outside it, and also to use specific sources, emanating from a single person, or group of individuals, as exemplary of the visions held by a far wider group.


ΠΗΓΗ/FONS ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Sun Yu-Jung

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that 1) the ostensible inconsistency between the judgments of value on different kinds of lying, like poetry, fabricated story, myth and noble lies, is not a veritable one, and 2) Plato does not hold a utilitarian position on the question of lying, or making up something false to be more precise, and lies do not turn into noble lies once they are told to be in the service of some superior purpose. Plato does state in Book II of the Republic that the veritable lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) is what all gods and all man hate (382a), and poets must be punished for deceiving people by linking the Supreme Being to its contrary. But Plato also discusses the useful lie, especially the one lie that is necessary for the unity and stability of the polis: the Noble Lie. Neither useful lies nor noble lies can be acceptable just because we can make a use out of it, and it does not hold either that the greater the use we can make out of a lie, the nobler a lie is. A true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) for Plato is the kind of lie leading people to believe that the hierarchy of the forms can be reordered in any way, and we can make random associations between the forms, like forming the relation between gods and the action of war. On the other hand, useful lies and the noble lies are in fact a duplicate of the order of the forms. This order, which articulates forms, is what makes thinking of truth possible, and we can later find this idea of the order of the forms which allows us to think truth and falsity in both the Theaetetus and the Sophist.Keywords: Lie, imitation, dialectic, falsehood


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