scholarly journals Continuity through change: Augustus and a change without a break

Author(s):  
Alessandro Roncaglia

“Everything needs to change, so everything can stay the same”: this sentence, overstepping the borders of its novel (the famous G. T. di Lampedusa’s “The Leopard”) and the context of the reaction of local nobles to Garibaldi’s Sicilian expedition, has entered in a sort of timeless dimension, becoming appropriate for several ages and events. It effectively depicts the case of the “Augustan Revolution” – recalling Ronald Syme – when the birth of the new regime brought with it a pivotal change and the need to hide it under the cloak of continuity. Augustus’ absolute preeminence was by itself the proof of a completely new situation; the will and the need to show continuity was instead evident in his flaunted adherence to republican laws, according to which he assumed only the powers prescribed by the Roman “constitution”, but exceeding them in virtue of his superior “auctoritas”. In this continuous dualism between persistence and rupture, I shall attempt to consider what in actual fact changed and what did not. I think that behind the idea of a complete transformation it is possible to see a politics that was still working in accordance with the same guide-lines and in the same ways.

Author(s):  
Stephen H. Daniel

For Berkeley, I am not a substance who just happens to associate ideas; rather, I am the differentiation and association of those ideas, the will that there be such an order, variety, and comprehension. In creating minds, God creates an infinity of active principles in terms of which objects are intentionally identified in virtue of actions for which we are justifiably held responsible. As Malebranche suggests, God impels us toward the good in general, but we fixate on particular goods. For both thinkers, we need to see how things exhibit God’s grandeur in being related in infinite ways. In this way, we are freed to identify all things as purposive and harmonious.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-215
Author(s):  
Effendi Chairi

This article presents an analysis result on contemporary phenomenon inIndonesia by sociological approach. This states that Ulama or kiai whowere formerly the only religious authorities fused religious purity inpolitical interest. This gives negative influence for religious authorityitself. Substantive divine will is forced to submit to the will of individualor certain group. So Islam which is previously inclusive and moderatmelts to exclusive and discriminative acts. The distance betweenreligious goals to rahmatan lil-’alamin and individual political interesthas been eroded (hyper-reality). Therefore, society has not trusted to thetraditional authority and rational-legal authority. In actual fact,authority construction of Weber is nothing.


Author(s):  
Jay L. Garfield

This chapter addresses the causes of the passions and their role in Hume’s psychology. I argue that the passions form the foundation of Hume’s naturalistic program to explain human nature and normativity. It also addresses the relationship between the passions and the idea of the freedom of the will, showing that the account of the passions undergirds Hume’s critique of the idea of freedom. This chapter also shows how central our social context is to the development of the passions, and to our psychology in general, in virtue of Hume’s argument that not only is our social nature determined by our passions, but that many of our passions are conditioned by social factors.


ĪQĀN ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Dr. Ubaid Ur Rahman ◽  
Dr. Hamid Hammad

The Quranic sciences of interpretations and principles of interpretations were originated in the epoch of holy prophet (saw) but compilation of both were started later. This is called principles of interpretations, which is the basic and important part of Islamic studies. Islamic scholars, commentators and explicators explained the holy Quran in the light of principles of interpretations. These are such basic principles those are guide lines for them so they will not deviate or drop the right way while interpreting and explaining the holy verses. These principles are laid down and followed by them so that they may find the will of Allah and actual meaning of holy Quran. A little difference in principles causes a huge difference in interpretation. Different methodology in principles resulted in many schools of thought. This article focusses on examining these schools of thought found in sub-continent and introduce their main books. This article deals with chronological evolution of said knowledge i.e. principles of interpretations, and Quranic sciences specially originated by the famous principalities and interpreters of sub-continent.


Author(s):  
Marie Jayasekera

This chapter investigates Descartes’s conception of the imago Dei, that it is above all in virtue of the will that human beings bear the image and likeness of God. The chapter begins by illuminating his understanding of the doctrine—how he conceives of the relation between human beings and God. It is argued that Descartes is alluding not to Scholastic conceptions of analogy but instead to the Augustinian–Thomistic tradition on the nature of image. Turning to Descartes’s conception of the likeness between the human will and God’s will, the chapter argues that he thinks the likeness is that both are infinite in ‘extent’. This means that human will can ‘extend itself’ to things that can be the object of God’s will, notable because Descartes famously thinks that absolutely anything can be the object of God’s will. An explanation is offered for why this interpretation is not implausible, contrary to first appearances.


1954 ◽  
Vol 142 (907) ◽  
pp. 208-224 ◽  

David Ferrier, whom this lecture commemorates, was both an experimental physiologist and a clinician. It is in virtue of his achievement in the first role that he is remembered to-day, and the man to whom Sherrington dedicated The integrative action of the nervous system, must indeed have had elements of greatness in him. Yet, if he does not rank with the great clinicians of his time (Hughlings Jackson, Gowers, Bastian and others in this country who were his contemporaries in the Fellowship of this Society, not to mention those in other lands), it is not because the clinical method failed him as an instrument of research, but rather that his phase of active original thought ended when he left the laboratory, and that he lacked the genius for the clinical discipline that these men so signally displayed. This may, perhaps, explain how he persuaded himself—in words quoted by my predecessor in this lectureship three years ago—that ‘experiments on animals, under condition selected and varied at the will of the experimenter, are alone capable of furnishing precise data for sound indications as to the functions of the brain and its various parts’.


Dialogue ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.G. Classen
Keyword(s):  
The Will ◽  

In her recent paper, “Belief, Values and the Will,” Trudy Govier raises several interesting and challenging points. Most interesting is her conclusion that it is at least logically possible for a person to believe something “simply in virtue of having taken that decision,” i.e., by fiat. In otherwords, it is possible to believe something by an act of will.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-328
Author(s):  
Simin Rahimi

Are actions that are morally good, morally goosd because God makes them so (e.g., by commanding them)? Or does God urge humans to do them because they are morally good anyway? What is, in general, the relationship between divine commands and ethical duties? It is not an uncommon belief among theists that morality depends entirely on the will or commands of God: all moral facts consist exclusively in facts about his will or commands. Thus, not only is an action right because it is commanded by God, but its conformity to his commands is what alone makes it right. An action is right (wrong) solely because he commands (forbids) it, and solely in virtue of his doing so. This view has come to be known as the „divine command theory of morality". This paper is devoted to a brief reconstruction of claims and controversies surrounding the theory, beginning with Plato's Euthyphro, which is the historical initiator of the debate and to a reconstruction of the various lines of argument that have been set forth to defend the theory.


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