scholarly journals On There Being Wide Reflective Equilibria: Why it is Important to Put it in the Plural

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 219
Author(s):  
Kai Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Social Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Richard Rorty ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Comme Point ◽  
Internal Justification ◽  
Mathematics And Science

Wide reflective equilibrium [WRE] is a distinctive coherentist method of justification or explanation or both, depending on the domain or purpose for which it is deployed. I deploy it principally as a method of justification for accounts of morality and normative political and social theory. But it is also used in many domains from the philosophy of mathematics and science to ethics and aesthetics. When deployed in domains as I deploy it for here, WRE starts with a cluster of societies’ specific considered judgments and uncontroversial empirical beliefs and theories and seeks to forge them into a coherent whole along with other considered judgments at all levels of generality. I use it here principally for a justification of political liberalism where it can and should be used for an internal justification, as John Rawls uses it, and as an external justification as Richard Rorty uses it. I use it for both. While these two modes of justification are distinct, they are compatible and importantly so. And for a more complete justification, both are required.L’équilibre réflectif étendu est une méthode cohérentiste distinctive de justification ou d’explication ou les deux, selon le domaine ou la fin pour laquelle on le déploie. Je le déploie principalement comme méthode de justification de comptes rendus de moralité et de théorie politique et sociale normative. Mais on l’utilise aussi dans plusieurs domaines à partir de la philosophie des mathématiques et de la science jusqu’à l’éthique et l’esthétique. Lorsqu’il est déployé dans des domaines comme je le déploie ici, l’équilibre réflectif étendu a comme point de départ un groupe de jugements considérés et de croyances et de théories empiriques non controversées spécifiques des sociétés et cherche à les organiser en un tout cohérent avec d’autres jugements considérés à tous les niveaux de généralité. Je l’utilise ici principalement pour justifier le libéralisme politique où l’on peut et on devrait l’utiliser pour une justification interne, comme le fait John Rawls, et pour une justification externe, comme le fait Richard Rorty. Je l’utilise pour les deux. Quoique ces deux modes de justification soient distincts, ils sont compatibles et ce de façon notable. Et pour une justification plus complète, il faut les deux.

scholarly journals CONSTRUING THE REASONABLE. RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM BETWEEN RORTY AND HABERMAS

Il Politico ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-130
Author(s):  
Alberto L. Siani
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Richard Rorty ◽  
Jürgen Habermas ◽  
Jurgen Habermas

L’articolo investiga il concetto di “ragionevole”, che può essere definito la chiave di volta del liberalismo politico di John Rawls, esplicitandone le opposte interpretazioni possibili al fine di ottenere un chiarimento più generale sul progetto filosofico del tardo Rawls. La prima sezione, dopo una schematica presentazione del liberalismo politico di Rawls, offre una discussione analitica delle nozioni di “ragionevole” e “razionale” a livello domestico. La seconda sezione rende esplicita la fondamentale ambiguità contenuta nel concetto di “ragionevole”, utilizzando a tal fine in maniera paradigmatica le letture opposte proposte da Richard Rorty e Jürgen Habermas (rispettivamente, una lettura contestualista-pragmatista e una Kantiano- universalista). Infine, la terza sezione esamina lo sviluppo del concetto di “ragionevole” a livello internazionale, mostrando come proprio a questo livello la ambiguità insita in questo concetto conduca a delle tensioni non adeguatamente risolte da Rawls. Al tempo stesso, pur evidenziando le tensioni paradigmaticamente rappresentate dalle opposte letture di Rorty e Habermas, l’articolo conclude che il progetto del tardo Rawls non può essere ridotto a nessuna di queste opposte letture, e meriti di essere sviluppato nella sua peculiarità, a partire da una riformulazione del concetto di “ragionevole”.

scholarly journals Sattumuslikkus, hegemoonia ning õiglus: John Rawls ja radikaalne demokraatia

2011 ◽  
pp. 39-72
Author(s):  
Peeter Selg
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Radical Democracy ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Justice As Fairness

Artikkel käsitleb kriitiliselt üht viimaste kümnendite vastandust poliitilises filosoofias — ‘poliitilise liberalismi’ (Rawls) ja ‘radikaalse demokraatia’ (Laclau ja Mouffe) vahel. Artikkel püüab käivitada potentsiaalset dialoogi nende kahe näiliselt lahkneva lähenemise vahel. Kokkuvõttes näitab artikkel, et vastandus on möödarääkimine vähemalt ühes fundamentaalses mõttes: mõlemad lähenemised jagavad ühiskonnastmõtlemisel sama aluseetost. Artiklis nimetatakse seda ‘sattumuslikkuse eetoseks’ ning väidetakse, et see on kõige fundamentaalsem alusveendumus nii Laclau ja Mouffe’i ‘radikaalse demokraatia’ kui ka Rawlsi ‘õigluse kui ausameelsuse’ idee jaoks. Artikkel osutab ka ühele kesksele kitsaskohale Laclau ja Mouffe’i lähenemises: nende suutmatusele kontseptualiseerida institutsioonilisi korraldusi tulenevalt nende ülemäärasest rõhuasetust demokraatia dekonstruktiivsele potentsiaalile. Selles suhtes osutatakse ka Rawlsi käsitluse ilmselgetele eelistele, kuna see pakub juhiseid organiseerimaks demokraatlikke institutsioone.The paper concentrates on a controversy in recent decades’ political thought between ‘political liberalism’ of Rawls and ‘radical democracy’ (represented in this paper by Laclau and Mouffe). The article tries to initiate a potential dialogue between these seemingly divisive approaches. In conclusion the paper maintains that the whole controversy is misguided in one fundamental respect: both approaches share the same underlying ethos in envisioning society—‘the ethos of contingency’. It is argued that it is the most fundamental tenet informing both Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony with its complementary idea of ‘radical democracy’, and justice as fairness conceived in terms of reciprocity with its accompanying idea of public justification and reflective equilibrium. _e article points to a central impasse in Laclau and Mouffe’s approach: its incapability to conceptualize institutional arrangements due to their overemphasis on the deconstructive potential of democracy. In this respect the obvious merits of Rawls’ conception are highlighted in view of his proposals for organizing democratic institutions.

One Method to Rule Them All?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Arras ◽  
James Childress ◽  
Matthew Adams
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium

This chapter considers the method of reflective equilibrium, and how it has been used in the context of debates in bioethics. It uncovers the method’s origins in the work of John Rawls and explores how it came to be adopted by Beauchamp and Childress as the unifying method of bioethics. After distinguishing between narrow and wide versions of reflective equilibrium, the chapter proceeds to discuss some problems with the view. The preliminary difficulty that is raised about wide reflective equilibrium in particular is that it is too comprehensive and indeterminate to be useful in bioethics. The chapter ends by outlining deeper concerns with the view, and to what extent internal morality’s conception of “coherence” possesses justificatory force.

Rawlsian Objectivity

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-564
Author(s):  
C. M. MELENOVSKY
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium

AbstractIn a 1981 letter to H .L. A. Hart, John Rawls sketches a view of moral objectivity that substantially differs from that of contemporary constructivists. The view he describes does not rely on constitutive features of agency as Korsgaard's does, and it does not bottom out in a form of realism as Scanlon's moral theory does. Instead, Rawls's view grounds objectivity on the fundamental conceptions that could be shared in wide reflective equilibrium. Constructivism grounds objectivity in a kind of intersubjectivity, and Rawls finds the relevant kind of intersubjectivity in the alignment between fundamental convictions. This article develops this Rawlsian view of objectivity and highlights its strengths.

scholarly journals Rawls’s normative conception of the person: A Kantian reinterpretation

2007 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nythamar De Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Transcendental Subjectivity ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Normative Conception ◽  
Semantic Transformation

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade (Persönlichkeit). Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivo para responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista de justificativa epistêmico-moral. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Construtivismo. Equilíbrio reflexivo. Liberalismo político. Personalidade. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood (Persönlichkeit). A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of selfidentity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. KEY WORDS – Constructivism. Personhood. Political liberalism. Reflective equilibrium.

scholarly journals Reflective Equilibrium: Epistemological or Political?

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Lister
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Théorie Sociale ◽  
Novel Methods ◽  
Political Philosopher

One of the reasons for ongoing interest in the work of political philosopher John Rawls is that he developed novel methods for thinking systematically about the nature of justice. This paper examines the moral and epistemological motivations for Rawls’s method of “reflective equilibrium,” and the tension between them in Kai Nielsen’s use of “wide reflective equilibrium” in the service of critical and emancipatory social theory.Une des raisons de l’intérêt soutenu pour l’oeuvre du philosophe politique John Rawls est qu’il a développé de nouvelles méthodes de réflexion systématique au sujet de la nature de la justice. Cet article étudie les motifs moraux et épistémologiques soutenant la méthode d’ «équilibre réflectif» de Rawls, et les tensions entre eux dans l’utilisation par Kai Nielsen d’ «équilibre réflectif étendu» au service de la théorie sociale critique et émancipatrice. 

Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Process Philosophy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Static View ◽  
Process Oriented ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Right

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.

scholarly journals In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-level Principles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Juan Moreso ◽  
Chiara Valentini
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

AbstractThis article addresses the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. We draw on the ideas of wide reflective equilibrium and public reason in order to defend an engagement model of comparative adjudication. According to this model, the judicial use of foreign law is justified if it proceeds by testing and mutually adjusting the principles and rulings of our constitutional doctrines against reasonable alternatives, as represented by the principles and rulings of other reasonable doctrines. By this, a court points to a wide reflective equilibrium, justifying its own interpretations with reasonable arguments, i.e. arguments that are acceptable from the perspectives defined by other constitutional doctrines, as endorsed by other courts. The point of a judicial engagement of this sort is to work out an overlap between different, reasonable, doctrines in the judicial forum, as part of a liberal forum of public reason. Here, the exercise of public reason filters out the premises of comprehensive doctrines so as to leave us in the region of an overlapping consensus: a region of mid-level principles that can be shared, notwithstanding the fact of legal pluralism.

Habermas on Rawls and the normative foundations of democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102098541
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kędziora
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Normative Foundation ◽  
Internal Relations ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Politics And Law ◽  
Normative Foundations

The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concerns the question of how to do political philosophy under conditions of cultural pluralism, if the aim of political philosophy is to uncover the normative foundation of a modern liberal democracy. Rawls’s political liberalism tries to bypass the problem of pluralism, using the intellectual device of the veil of ignorance, and yet paradoxically at the same time it treats it as something given and as an arbiter of justification within the political conception of justice. Habermas argues that Rawls not only incorrectly operationalizes the moral point of view from which we discern what is just but also fails to capture the specificity of democracy which is given by internal relations between politics and law. This deprives Rawls’s political philosophy of the conceptual tools needed to articulate the normative foundation of democracy.

scholarly journals Comprehensive or Political Liberalism? The Impartial Spectator and the Justification of Political Principles

Utilitas ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Nir Ben-Moshe
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Alternative Framework ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Political Form ◽  
Political Principles

Abstract John Rawls raises three challenges – to which one can add a fourth challenge – to an impartial spectator account: (a) the impartial spectator is a utility-maximizing device that does not take seriously the distinction between persons; (b) the account does not guarantee that the principles of justice will be derived from it; (c) the notion of impartiality in the account is the wrong one, since it does not define impartiality from the standpoint of the litigants themselves; (d) the account would offer a comprehensive, rather than a political, form of liberalism. The narrow aim of the article is to demonstrate that Adam Smith's impartial spectator account can rise to Rawls's challenges. The broader aim is to demonstrate that the impartial spectator account offers the basis for a novel and alternative framework for developing principles of justice, and does so in the context of a political form of liberalism.

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