Competition Law regulations on Digital Platforms

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-234
Author(s):  
YOUNG HOA SON
2021 ◽  
pp. 0003603X2199702
Author(s):  
Anne C. Witt

In a high-profile decision of February 6, 2019, the German Federal Cartel Office prohibited Facebook’s data collection policy as an abuse of dominance for infringing its users’ constitutional right to privacy. The case triggered a remarkable interinstitutional dispute between the key players in German competition law. Conflicting rulings by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court and the German Federal Court of Justice further illustrate how deeply divided the antitrust community is on the role of competition law in regulating excessive data collection and other novel types of harm caused by dominant digital platforms. This contribution discusses the original prohibition decision, the ensuing court orders, and legislative reform proposals in the broader context of European Union and U.S. competition law.


Author(s):  
Toshiaki Takigawa

ABSTRACT This article examines antitrust issues concerning digital platforms equipped with big data. Recent initiatives by the Japanese competition agency are highlighted, comparing them with those by the USA and EU competition authorities. First examined is whether competition among platforms would result in a select few super platforms with market power, concluding that AI with machine learning has augmented the power of super platforms with strong AI-capability, leading to increased importance of merger control over acquisitions by platforms. Next scrutinized is the argument for utility-regulation to be imposed on super platforms, concluding that wide support is limited to data portability, leaving competition law as the key tool for addressing super platforms, its core tool being the provision against exclusionary conduct, enforcement of which, initially, concerns whether to order super platforms to render their data accessible to their rivals. Passive refusal-to-share data needs to be scrutinized under the essential facility doctrine. Beyond passive refusal, platforms’ exclusionary conduct requires competition agencies to weigh the conduct’s exclusionary effects against its efficiency effects. Finally addressed is exploitative abuse, explaining its relation to consumer protection, concluding that competition law enforcement on exploitative abuse should be minimized, since it accompanies risk of over-enforcement.


Pravovedenie ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 522-572
Author(s):  
Ioannis Lianos ◽  
◽  
Zingales Nicolo ◽  
Andrew McLean ◽  
Azza Raslan ◽  
...  

The article reveals new problems arising in the digital economy and the need for antimonopoly regulation. It also analyzes the legal remedies and procedures for competition law in the context of digitalization. Redesigning competition law procedures for the digital economy can take two forms: 1) ensure the rate of competition law enforcement so as to avoid acting in situations when market tipping has already occurred and it is almost impossible to reverse the anticompetitive outcome; 2) develop remedial action that takes into account the scale of anticompetitive behavior, which might better reflect the complexity of digital markets. Competition authorities should consider utilizing interim measures and commitment decisions in the digital economy, both instruments playing a complementary role. Interim measures can be used within a revised framework with lower thresholds, but this should only be reserved for complicated and lengthy investigations where there is risk of irreversible harm to competition. These measures should be applied to the most harmful violations, such as cartels and abuse of dominance. Commitment decisions can be utilized to address less serious violations where it is also beneficial to the competition authority to reach a swift resolution. The article analyzes the division of companies as a way to eliminate violations. Division can take different forms and need not be structural. A certain ‘light-touch’ separation may be achieved by policies mandating that digital platforms not use personal data that has been harvested by the members of their ecosystems unless they have the explicit consent of their users. The article also addresses issues such as data portability and cross-platform compatibility. The authors have proved that the BRICS countries need to supplement their national legislation on the protection of personal data in terms of norms on their portability. Although it is not mainly designed as a tool to combat monopolies and market power, data portability will have a significant impact on competition in digital markets. Multisided digital platforms are characterized by a high network and lock-in effects. In a winner takes all, or most, where undertakings compete for the market rather than in the market, the right to data portability may provide some relief from the power that large digital platforms hold.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.


Author(s):  
A. O. Maslov

Year by year, digital platforms are becoming more popular in doing business. At the same time antitrust regulators around all the world face with challenges in analyzing the market boundaries where digital platforms’ owners participate.The article examines legal aspects of determining product and geographical boundariesof markets where digital platforms’ owners operate.The article deals with Amex case in which The US Supreme Court held that boundaries of the market where two-sided transactional digital platforms’ owners operate should be determined by the transaction. No doubt, this approach is debatable and the fact that the Court issued 5—4 decision proves that.The article also deals with approaches in competition law doctrine to defining the boundaries of product markets in which the owners of digital platforms are involved.


Author(s):  
Tilottama Raychaudhuri

An ongoing debate in competition jurisprudence today is with respect to the enforcement of competition law in digital markets. Digital markets are newer markets in context of which traditional tools of competition law have to be understood and applied. Though the challenges of competition enforcement in digital markets are manifold, this paper focusses on the assessment of dominance and abuse in platform markets, particularly in light of the 2019 Supreme Court judgement in the Uber matter. The Supreme Court’s opinion that loss-making pricing can be an indicator of dominance is inconsistent with the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) views, which had cautioned against this circular interpretation of dominance and put the issue to rest. The author submits that conflicting interpretations such as these erode the certainty of the law. Competition laws can be flexible but not uncertain or unpredictable. The author identifies areas of concern in digital platforms that are yet unresolved and need to be addressed urgently by guidelines/amendments before the law on this issue becomes incoherent.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

Abstract In view of a growing number of competition law investigations into the gathering and use of personal data by digital platforms, this article discusses the extent to which consumer sovereignty can be given greater weight in concentrated marketplaces where firms employ multi-sided business models and compete along quality dimensions such as privacy rather than price. The article explores the concept of direct consumer influence as a novel approach vis-à-vis switching or choosing differently in the public enforcement of competition law. Direct consumer influence constitutes a distinct avenue for embedding consumers’ choices into the market when consumers have few possibilities to act and holds the potential to shape digital markets in unanticipated ways. Using the example of the German Federal Cartel Office’s investigation into Facebook’s data-gathering practices, the article illustrates how direct consumer influence may clarify the relationship between data protection, consumer rights, and competition law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-54
Author(s):  
Lenka Geidt

AbstractMiddle Temple Library has recently significantly enriched its portfolio of electronic resources. This situation was caused not only by the Covid-19 crisis, which certainly accelerated its efforts in this field, but also by the changing demands and habits of the Inn's members. The library specialises in arbitration and competition law, so a decision was taken to try two new digital platforms and, as Lenka Geidt writes, to share their experiences in the course of this article.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margherita Colangelo ◽  
Mariateresa Maggiolino

The rise of new software platforms presents regulators and antitrust agencies all over the world with a challenge. Should regulations adapt to the new services of the digital economy? Should competition law change its paradigm in relation to the sharing economy? Despite the growing expansion of these services, in most countries there is still no regulatory framework addressing these problems. Uber is the most emblematic example of this phenomenon. Indeed, it is subject to a large number of ongoing lawsuits merging many issues, ranging from questions pertaining to labour law of problems connected with unfair competition laws. This article first analyses the particular business model adopted by Uber and the antitrust concerns that it could raise. In so doing, the article pays heed to the approach that antitrust authorities should take towards the complex rivalry between (regulates) incumbents and (unregulated) new entrants. The article then considers the legal nature of the services provided by Uber, i.e. whether should be considered as transport services or as services of the information society. Either way, the chosen characterisation will affect the law applied to all digital platforms. The analysis, which adopts a comparative approach, focuses on the European context where national courts are in great turnmoil and the CJEU will be issuing a preliminary ruling on the nature of Uber services.


2021 ◽  
pp. 026732312110283
Author(s):  
Stefan Larsson

Anti-competitive notions, it seems, are increasingly informing the critical debate on a data-driven economy organised into scalable digital platforms. Issues of market definitions, how to value personal data on multisided platforms, and how to detect and regulate misuses of dominant positions have become key nomenclature on the battlefield of addressing fairness in our contemporary digital societies. This article looks at the central themes for this special issue on governing trust in European platform societies through the lens of contemporary developments in the field of competition law. Three main questions are addressed: (1) To what extent are the platforms’ own abilities to govern their infrastructures, that is, to be de facto regulators over both human behaviour and market circumstances, a challenge for contemporary competition regulation? (2) In what way is the collection, aggregation, or handling of consumers’ data of relevance for competition? (3) How can the particular European challenges of governing US-based digital platforms more broadly be understood in terms of the relationship between transparency and public trust? Of particular relevance – and challenge – here are the platforms’ abilities to govern their infrastructures, albeit through automated moderation, pricing or scalable data handling. It is argued that this aspect of coded, and possibly autonomously adapting, intra-platform governance, poses significant anti-competitive challenges for supervisory authorities, with possible negative implications for consumer autonomy and wellbeing as well as platform-dependent other companies.


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