Legal Aspects of Defining Market’ Boundaries where Digital Platforms’ Owners Participate: Amex Case

Author(s):  
A. O. Maslov

Year by year, digital platforms are becoming more popular in doing business. At the same time antitrust regulators around all the world face with challenges in analyzing the market boundaries where digital platforms’ owners participate.The article examines legal aspects of determining product and geographical boundariesof markets where digital platforms’ owners operate.The article deals with Amex case in which The US Supreme Court held that boundaries of the market where two-sided transactional digital platforms’ owners operate should be determined by the transaction. No doubt, this approach is debatable and the fact that the Court issued 5—4 decision proves that.The article also deals with approaches in competition law doctrine to defining the boundaries of product markets in which the owners of digital platforms are involved.

Author(s):  
A. O. Maslov

Digital platforms are getting more general because of growing the level of online commerce. As a result, courts and antimonopoly regulators around the entire world face with the issues of applying antitrust rules to digital platforms. And each time it raises a number of interesting questions from the practical and theoretical point of view. In antitrust cases it’s difficult to define the product and geographic boundaries of the market where digital platforms operate. In 2019 the US Supreme Court decide a case between a group of iPhone users and Apple Inc. iPhone users filed a lawsuit against Apple Inc. claiming that Apple had unlawfully monopolized market for the sale of apps by charging consumers higher than competitive prices. US Supreme Court’s judgment in Apple v Pepper is really crucial for competition law, indeed. During analyzing the case, the following questions arise. Whether the «App Store» is a digital platform or not? Whether the «App Store» is a product market or not? If the «App Store» is a product market, what way should we determine geographic boundaries of this market? However, US Supreme Court’s judgment in Apple v Pepper does not provide us with answers to these questions. Obviously, the court had good reasons for this. Let's analyze this judgment and try to find answers to the questions that the US Supreme Court left opened.


2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 216-218
Author(s):  
Maria Popova

Justin Crowe has written an accessible, thorough, and compelling history of the institutional development of the US Supreme Court and the federal judiciary it sits atop, from their inconspicuous inception in February 1790 to their current status as, perhaps, the most powerful judiciary in the world.


2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-492
Author(s):  
Christopher Forsyth

The Constitution of India is a mammoth instrument—the largest Constitution in the world—with 395 articles, 12 Schedules and 83 amendments. Accounts of the constitutional law of India are thus inevitably very large. The late H.M. Seervai’s multi-volume Constitution of India (4th edn., 1993) is well known and rightly described as “monumental”. But now a new work is making its presence felt. Arvind Datar originally intended to write no more than a Student’s Edition of Seervai. But Seervai refused permission for this project, taking the view, probably with justice, that his work could not be summarised. So Datar decided to write an article by article commentary of the Constitution and Datar on Constitution of India is the result. The resulting book is monumental in its own right. It deals exhaustively with each of the articles of the constitution. The author makes it plain that he could have written a much longer book in that he refers only to decisions of the Supreme Court of India. Only where the Supreme Court has been silent does he refer to relevant decisions of the several state High Courts. None the less, his approach is commendably comparative. The Constitution of the United States is often referred to (and it is in fact reproduced in an appendix) as are decisions of the US Supreme Court. But the work as a whole shows that “Not the Potomac, but the Thames, fertilises the flow of the Yamuna” (Krishna Iyer J. in Samsher Singh v. Union of India AIR 1974 SC 2192 at 2212 cited by Datar on p. 396).


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-347
Author(s):  
Vanja-Ivan Savić

Exactly 80 years has passed since the completion of the United States Supreme Court building. This comment is not another paper about the importance or historical influence of the greatest of all American institutions, nor about dramatic cases which shaped America, nor about justices and their approaches, nor about characters or world views. It is about architecture and the messages which are sent from the facade of this strong institution to which legal scholars and practitioners from around the world look.


2020 ◽  
pp. 168-200
Author(s):  
David E. Settje

No period during Watergate moved as quickly as mid-1974. In May, judicial action forced President Nixon to release damaging transcripts of private taped conversations. By July, the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Nixon must release the actual recordings, which was followed by the House Judiciary Committee passing the first three articles of impeachment with the charge of obstruction of justice. The content of the tapes proved the smoking gun to many because of conversations the president had within a week of the initial Watergate break-in, exposing how early he knew about it. Like Republicans on the Judiciary Committee who changed their vote as a result of the tapes, conservatives joined liberals within Protestantism to now condemn the president, though they continued to differ about their theological outlooks.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
András Koltay

The issue of the use of religious symbols by the State, the Government, the Municipalities and Courts has emerged as a practical constitutional problem during the last quarter of a century. Contradictory examples of us Supreme Court jurisprudence prove that this issue is among the constitutional ‘hard cases’. The relatively recent appearance of the problem clearly indicates the ways in which American social conditions have changed and the transformation of us society’s attitude to religion.


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