scholarly journals Editorial

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Bavoso

The recent issue of the journal “Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition” is devoted to the issues of interlocking directorates, corporate governance, social network analysis, corporate networks, power structure, financial distress, sustainability, liquidation, corporate law, decision making, cognitive science, behavioural finance, executive compensation, firm performance, commercial banks, board of directors etc.

Author(s):  
Jaap Winter

This chapter examines corporate law and governance from a behavioral perspective. It begins with an overview of the growing body of behavioral knowledge and its impact on the core assumptions of the agency theory. It then goes on to consider a number of specific areas of corporate law and governance where behavioral perspectives are particularly relevant, with particular emphasis on rule making. The chapter also explores how the board of directors performs, along with modern executive compensation systems, often in the form of performance-based pay. Finally, the chapter turns to the interaction between executives, non-executives, and (institutional) investors in corporate governance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Alexander Kostyuk

The recent issue of Corporate Ownership and Control journal contains both empirical and review papers describing the wide variety of corporate governance issues from the board of directors and executive compensation to mergers and acquisitions, stock market and institutional investors. The geographical representation of the papers provides an excellent opportunity for international comparison.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 274-317
Author(s):  
Angelo Borselli ◽  
Ignacio Farrando Miguel

This paper explores corporate law rules adopted in some European states amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to track the major reform trends and consider how corporate law in Europe has adjusted to the emergency. The analysis focuses primarily on the U.K., Germany, France, Italy and Spain; occasionally, depending also on the relevant rules actually introduced by the states, other systems are considered as well. The paper groups the emergency measures into three main categories that include rules aimed at facilitating shareholders’ meetings and meetings of the board of directors, rules relaxing directors’ duties and liability and giving directors some leeway as companies face unprecedented challenges and uncertainties, and rules designed to support corporate liquidity. The analysis shows that while some points of similarity exist among the emergency rules considered, there are nevertheless numerous differences in their nature, scope, technicalities, and also timing. These differences emphasize a lack of coordination at the European level. The discussion also sheds light on the potential of some emergency measures to call traditional corporate law rules into question and last in what will be the new normal after the crisis.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
Mahdi Filsaraei ◽  
Reza Jarrahi Moghaddam

Given the importance of corporate governance for increasing the monitoring of company operations, i.e., reducing information asymmetry and increasing control over operations, in this study, we investigate some indicators of corporate governance and financial distress as one of the most important criteria in the decisions of the users of financial statements. Corporate governance Indicators that have been mentioned in this study, including the independence of the board of directors (the ratio of non-executive members), institutional investors and duality of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors. This study is applied research and the required information is gathered from financial statements of listed companies on the TSE. Using a sample of 82 company stock during the period 2010-2014 and multivariate regression analysis, the results of the analysis of information gathered indicates that institutional ownership reduces the financial distress. However, there was no significant relationship between board independence (proportion of outside board members) and the duality of CEO and Chairman of the Board with the financial distress. The results also indicate that financial leverage and a qualified audit opinion increases financial distress and firm size and management performance reduces it.


Author(s):  
Anil Hargovan ◽  
Timothy M. Todd

Directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to their corporations, and by extension to their shareholders. When a corporation approaches or enters insolvency, however, courts have recently found that the fiduciary duty calculus may change. Recognizing that creditors have financial interests similar to those of shareholders at or near insolvency, courts in several countries have extended fiduciary duty protection to creditors on equitable grounds. This trend has led to a state of flux and uncertainty in corporate law. Consequently, courts and commentators are battling to fully comprehend the controversial subject of director fiduciary duties to creditors in various jurisdictions. Due to this jurisprudential flux, unresolved issues include, for example, the core notion that the duty arises when the company enters into an “ill-defined sphere” known as the “zone” or “vicinity” of insolvency. The law is remarkably short of specific judicial guidance as to how directors who engage in commercial risk-taking with a view to corporate rescue should discharge their duties without harming the interests of creditors. Indeed, the debate continues even on the critical doctrinal question of whether such a duty is even needed.This Article uses corporate law in both the United States and Australia as emblematic of the real practical concerns inherent in the expansion of fiduciary duties. Consequently, the Article argues that the judicial recognition of directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors when at or near insolvency is objectionable, both from a policy and a doctrinal standpoint, and that any further attempt to develop the common law in this regard should be jettisoned in favor of reliance upon the existing, or modified, statutory regime aimed at creditor protection during times of financial distress. 


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