scholarly journals Independent directors? Supervisors? Who should monitor China’s boards?

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-147
Author(s):  
Margaret Wang

After the collapse of a number of well-known companies such as Enron and WorldCom, there has been much debate over this is the most effective model of corporate governance in monitoring the board of directors from misconduct: the Anglo-American model of independent directors or the German model of supervisory boards. Most countries have chosen to adopt one either the Anglo-American or the German model. However, the People’s Republic of China (“China”) has adopted both models of corporate governance. This paper seeks to explore the differences between the two models as they apply in China. Further, it examines the challenges which these two models face with regard to their implementation. Finally, an evaluation will be made to ascertain whether the two models encounter the same problems and whether either or both of these two models would be able to effectively monitor Chinese boards.

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-71
Author(s):  
A.V. Butov

M. Video reports that the company’s board of directors has decided to hold an annual general meeting of shareholders on May 7, 2021. As part of the implementation of measures to improve corporate governance, the Board of Directors approved the list of candidates for the new composition of the Board. If appropriate decisions are made by the shareholders, the share of independent directors in the board of directors will increase to one third.


2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 653-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicente Pina ◽  
Lourdes Torres

Purpose Online transparency has become a tool to increase legitimacy and trust in governments. The purpose of this paper is to study the online transparency of Spanish Central Government agencies and analyze whether their corporate governance (CG) structures influence their online transparency. Design/methodology/approach The information used for building an online transparency index and about the board of directors has been collected from the websites of the 168 agencies and from their statutes and activity reports. Ordinary least squares analysis is used. Based on a previous literature review and the requirements of the EU Directive and Spanish legislation, 108 items included in the websites have been analyzed. Findings The average information displayed through the website agencies is significantly less than the information considered as relevant in previous literature and in the Spanish legislation. The highest values are presented by the technical dimensions and the lowest by the organizational/political dimension. The presence of independent directors and women on the boards of directors are revealed as the most important explanatory factors of online transparency. Practical implications Practical implications to improve online transparency are related to the organizational/political dimension – including the positions and CVs of members of governing bodies, minutes, etc. and to the presence of independent directors and, to a lesser extent, of women, on the board of directors. Originality/value The contribution of this paper is the identification of some online transparency determinants in public entities under the same general legal framework. This is the first paper that analyzes the relationship between online transparency and CG in public agencies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 01-24
Author(s):  
Muhammad Noman Ansari ◽  
◽  
Dr. Sayed Fayaz Ahmed

The corporate governance measures emphasize on presence of independence of the board of directors to bring objectivity and reducing the agency cost; whereas the institutions have the ability, skills and time to supervise the activities of the management and channelize it to better financial performance. The objective of this study is to explore the effect of independence of the board of directors on the financial performance of the firms. The independence was gauged by number of independent directors and non-executive directors, chairing of board committees by independent directors, institutional holding in the firm, and presence of institutional directors on the board. The financial performance of the firm is gauged using the return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). The corporate governance and financial performance data comprising of 75 firm years from 2014 to 2018 of the firms listed in the cement sector of the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) were selected. GLM regression was performed to study the relationship between the variables. The results suggest that the majority of independence on the board of directors do not affect the financial performance of the firm; the independence in the board committees negatively affects the financial performance, whereas the presence of institutional holding and director in the firm does not have any effect on the performance of the firm. The study will provide a basis for future studies to find the association that independence can bring objectivity, reduce agency cost, and affect the performance of the firm.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4-2) ◽  
pp. 221-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elsa Satkunasingam ◽  
Aaron Yong ◽  
Sern Cherk

The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000 emphasises the monitoring role of the Board of Directors, especially that of independent directors. It has not however taken into account the cultural values in Malaysia which do not encourage differences of opinion or criticisms and has failed to provide sufficient safeguards for directors to exercise their role effectively. As a result, it is relatively easy for dominant Chairmen or CEOs especially in government-linked companies or CEO dominated companies to control the Board or senior management with very little opposition. This paper will discuss several incidences of financial mismanagement in companies caused by dominant directors with very little opposition from the rest of the board. It will highlight that the law has to take cultural values more seriously in order to equip the Board and especially independent directors with the ability to challenge dominant Board members.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-156
Author(s):  
Александр Рыманов ◽  
Aleksandr Rymanov

The article deals with problems of the institution of independent directors in the banking sector. The author analyses the activities of the independent directors, the requirements of regulators, stock exchanges to participation of independent directors on the Board of Directors (supervisory boards) of the banks. It is noted that the presence of independent directors in the Board of Directors (Supervisory Board) increases the objectivity of decisions. However, it is not feasible to perform the requirements of the banks on the high proportion of independent directors at the expense of excessive force. Analyzed international experience of independent directors in the banking sector, testifies to the ambiguous role of independent directors in various jurisdictions. National experiences of independent directors according to Sberbank and the rules of the Moscow Exchange presents on the application of uniform mandatory approach to participation of independent directors in the supervisory boards. It is proposed that the feasibility of increasing the participation of independent directors in the deliberations of the supervisory boards of banks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 2546-2563
Author(s):  
Dr. Phan Thi Thanh Thuy

Good corporate governance is always associated with an effective internal control system, which is expected to quickly forecast and detect the infringements of laws and the company's charters committed by the main corporate governance bodies like the board of directors, the general director, and provide timely advice on remedial solutions. Following this theory, since the adoption of the first Vietnamese company law in 1990, the supervisory board, a special body of Vietnamese corporate governance structure, has formed and become a traditionally internal control body in joint-stock companies (JSCs). However, supervisory boards seem not to promote their effectiveness as expected. Many major violations conducted by the board of directors and the CEO took place in large companies, where the supervisory boards did not detect or were complicit in these violations. Most recently, the trend of replacing supervisory boards with independent directors and audit committees has occurred in many public companies in Vietnam. This paradox raises questions about the ineffectiveness of supervisory boards and the reasons causing the situation. To find the answers, the article will focus on analyzing the role of the supervisory board in Vietnamese JSCs compared with international practices. Thereby, to find out the reasons for the limitations of supervisory boards in both legal provision and practice. To conclude the research, the article will make some suggestions for reforming the supervisory board so that this internal control body could bring its effectiveness.


Author(s):  
Chih-Yi Hsiao ◽  
Qing-Yuan Zhang ◽  
Hao-Nan Huang ◽  
Wei-Xun Xi

Since the meeting of China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2020 once again emphasized the issue of earnings quality of corporate governance, this paper intends to study this issue from different perspectives. This study takes the IT industry of China's A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as the sample, and makes an empirical analysis with the fuzzy set/ Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). The results show that the companies with large scale and good corporate governance concept, poor financial structure but with the assistance of external experts, high salary and high proportion of independent directors have relatively high earnings quality. According to the above research results. According to the findings, we put forward the following suggestions. For enterprises, good corporate governance concept and the concept of integrity are very important, but there must be efficient operation of the board of directors in order to play the role of corporate governance. Therefore, the size of the board of directors should not be too large, but it can be adjusted flexibly depends on whether the required professionals are enough. In addition, enterprises with poor financial structure should rely on the assistance of professional managers, rather than using earnings manipulation to obtain short-term benefits. For the regulators of listed companies, the procedures of independent directors’ selection should be more strictly supervised, so as not to make the setting of independent directors become mere formality. For investors, we should always pay attention to the corporate governance, and announce the disclosure of real-time information about directors, supervisors and senior executives, to prevent losses caused by investment misjudgment.


2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Benkel ◽  
Paul R. Mather ◽  
Alan Ramsay

The agency perspective of corporate governance emphasizes the monitoring role of the board of directors. This study is concerned with analyzing whether independent directors on the board and audit committee (recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results support the hypotheses that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board and on the audit committee are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results are robust to alternative specifications of the model. This study adds to the very limited research into the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in Australia. It also provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of some of the regulators’ recommendations, which may be of value to regulators in preparing and amending corporate governance codes


Wahana ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-259
Author(s):  
Rifqi Muhammad ◽  
Hapsari Yuni Oktaviyanti

This study aims to determine the effect of Good Corporate Governance as measured by the number of sharia supervisory boards, sharia supervisory board meetings, number of board of directors, board of directors meetings, number of board of commissioners, board of commissioners meeting on the performance of sharia maqashid. The sample used in this study is Full-fledge sharia banks in Indonesia based on sharia banking statistics published by the Financial Services Authority as of July 2019. The study was conducted based on an analysis of 72 annual reports and GCG reports obtained from 12 Sharia Commercial Banks in 2013 - 2018. The results of this study indicate that the variables of the board of directors' meeting significantly influence the performance of the Maqashid syariah. While the variable number of sharia supervisory boards, sharia supervisory board meetings, number of board of directors, number of board of commissioners and board of commissioners meeting on maqashid syariah performance.


2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kostyuk

The author reports on the corporate board practices in Ukraine. The roles of board of directors are mainly about control. The strategic and advisory roles are not developed. The mode of strategic involvement of the members of supervisory boards in Ukraine is mainly about reviewing and approving. Thus, the board of directors in Ukraine is "a rubber stamp". The degree of independence of directors is very low. Major board practices in Ukraine are: small number of independent directors on the board; low frequency of meeting of the board; small number of committees on the board; the management board influences the supervisory board. Board practices in Ukraine need a sort of recommendations, similar to those, made in UK at the end of 1990s, and at the start of the third millennium.


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