scholarly journals IMPROVEMENT OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INSTITUTION IN BANKING SECTOR

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-156
Author(s):  
Александр Рыманов ◽  
Aleksandr Rymanov
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
International Experience ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Excessive Force ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Boards

The article deals with problems of the institution of independent directors in the banking sector. The author analyses the activities of the independent directors, the requirements of regulators, stock exchanges to participation of independent directors on the Board of Directors (supervisory boards) of the banks. It is noted that the presence of independent directors in the Board of Directors (Supervisory Board) increases the objectivity of decisions. However, it is not feasible to perform the requirements of the banks on the high proportion of independent directors at the expense of excessive force. Analyzed international experience of independent directors in the banking sector, testifies to the ambiguous role of independent directors in various jurisdictions. National experiences of independent directors according to Sberbank and the rules of the Moscow Exchange presents on the application of uniform mandatory approach to participation of independent directors in the supervisory boards. It is proposed that the feasibility of increasing the participation of independent directors in the deliberations of the supervisory boards of banks.

scholarly journals The Role of Supervisory Board in Corporate Governance in Vietnam: From Legal Regulations to Practice

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 2546-2563
Author(s):  
Dr. Phan Thi Thanh Thuy
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Company Law ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
Control Body

Good corporate governance is always associated with an effective internal control system, which is expected to quickly forecast and detect the infringements of laws and the company's charters committed by the main corporate governance bodies like the board of directors, the general director, and provide timely advice on remedial solutions. Following this theory, since the adoption of the first Vietnamese company law in 1990, the supervisory board, a special body of Vietnamese corporate governance structure, has formed and become a traditionally internal control body in joint-stock companies (JSCs). However, supervisory boards seem not to promote their effectiveness as expected. Many major violations conducted by the board of directors and the CEO took place in large companies, where the supervisory boards did not detect or were complicit in these violations. Most recently, the trend of replacing supervisory boards with independent directors and audit committees has occurred in many public companies in Vietnam. This paradox raises questions about the ineffectiveness of supervisory boards and the reasons causing the situation. To find the answers, the article will focus on analyzing the role of the supervisory board in Vietnamese JSCs compared with international practices. Thereby, to find out the reasons for the limitations of supervisory boards in both legal provision and practice. To conclude the research, the article will make some suggestions for reforming the supervisory board so that this internal control body could bring its effectiveness.

scholarly journals The Kostyuk report: Corporate board practices in Ukraine

2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kostyuk
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Low Frequency ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Management Board ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
Made In

The author reports on the corporate board practices in Ukraine. The roles of board of directors are mainly about control. The strategic and advisory roles are not developed. The mode of strategic involvement of the members of supervisory boards in Ukraine is mainly about reviewing and approving. Thus, the board of directors in Ukraine is "a rubber stamp". The degree of independence of directors is very low. Major board practices in Ukraine are: small number of independent directors on the board; low frequency of meeting of the board; small number of committees on the board; the management board influences the supervisory board. Board practices in Ukraine need a sort of recommendations, similar to those, made in UK at the end of 1990s, and at the start of the third millennium.

scholarly journals Research on the Influence of the Characteristics of the Board of Directors of Listed Companies on the Growth of the Company

2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 02049
Author(s):  
Gao Ruirui
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Listed Company ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Dynamic Perspective ◽  
A Share

The board characteristics are an important factor affecting the growth of the company. This paper selects the data of A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the five-year period from 2014 to 2019, and analyzes whether the board characteristics will affect the growth of the company from a dynamic perspective. The research found that: ① the scale of the board of a listed company has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the company’s growth; ② the proportion of independent directors has a positive correlation with the company’s growth; ③ the director’s salary has a positive correlation with the company’s growth.

scholarly journals Tanggung Jawab Direksi dalam Meningkatkan Citra Bank (Suatu Telaah Yuridis Normatif)

Wajah Hukum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 682
Author(s):  
Sriayu Indah Puspita
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Public Trust ◽  
Public Funds ◽  
The Public ◽  
Bank Secrecy ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Banking Institutions ◽  
The Government

At this time the banking world has a very important function in the Indonesian economy. Banking is an institution that functions to collect and distribute public funds. For this reason, in order to maintain public trust in the bank, the government continues to try to protect or protect the public from irresponsible persons who can damage public trust in the bank. The issue of civil liability for negligence or carelessness that occurs in a bank can be related to the management of the bank. In order to increase the function of common awareness towards banking institutions, regulations regarding bank secrecy which have been very secretive must be revised immediately. The bank secrecy in question is one of the elements that every bank needs to have as an institution of public trust. Banking practices that violate the laws and regulations in the banking sector as long as these regulations are considered a weakness that can harm their interests, even the owner or management of the bank uses the existing regulatory loopholes so that in the end the bank is in an unhealthy condition. For that we need to know and understand how the bank can improve its image and the role of the board of directors in overcoming the problems faced and how to overcome these problems. The Board of Directors has an important role in the management of the bank, the board of directors is also required to regulate the bank according to its authority and responsibility as stipulated in the articles of association and the provisions of the applicable regulations. The image of the bank is built through communication programs and combined with customer experiences interacting with the bank. 

scholarly journals The influence of cultural values on the board of directors: Lessons from five corporations

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4-2) ◽  
pp. 221-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elsa Satkunasingam ◽  
Aaron Yong ◽  
Sern Cherk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Cultural Values ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Differences Of Opinion ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Code Of Corporate Governance

The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000 emphasises the monitoring role of the Board of Directors, especially that of independent directors. It has not however taken into account the cultural values in Malaysia which do not encourage differences of opinion or criticisms and has failed to provide sufficient safeguards for directors to exercise their role effectively. As a result, it is relatively easy for dominant Chairmen or CEOs especially in government-linked companies or CEO dominated companies to control the Board or senior management with very little opposition. This paper will discuss several incidences of financial mismanagement in companies caused by dominant directors with very little opposition from the rest of the board. It will highlight that the law has to take cultural values more seriously in order to equip the Board and especially independent directors with the ability to challenge dominant Board members.

scholarly journals Independent directors? Supervisors? Who should monitor China’s boards?

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-147
Author(s):  
Margaret Wang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Effective Model ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
American Model ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
German Model ◽  
Anglo American

After the collapse of a number of well-known companies such as Enron and WorldCom, there has been much debate over this is the most effective model of corporate governance in monitoring the board of directors from misconduct: the Anglo-American model of independent directors or the German model of supervisory boards. Most countries have chosen to adopt one either the Anglo-American or the German model. However, the People’s Republic of China (“China”) has adopted both models of corporate governance. This paper seeks to explore the differences between the two models as they apply in China. Further, it examines the challenges which these two models face with regard to their implementation. Finally, an evaluation will be made to ascertain whether the two models encounter the same problems and whether either or both of these two models would be able to effectively monitor Chinese boards.

scholarly journals Board of directors’ characteristics and bank performance: Evidence from the Egyptian banking sector

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 116-125
Author(s):  
Mohamed Hassan Abdel-Azim ◽  
Sabah Soliman
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Performance Indicator ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Bank Performance ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Foreign Directors ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of the board of directors’ characteristics on bank performance in an Egyptian context. Board of directors’ size and composition diversity in terms of gender, nationality, and independence are used as proxies for the board of directors’ characteristics. Bank performance is measured using the return on assets as an accounting-based profitability indicator besides stock return volatility as a market-based performance indicator while controlling for the bank, regulatory and country-specific characteristics. Regression analysis is performed for a sample of 21 Egyptian banks covering the period from 2012 till 2018. The results show that banks with large boards including a high proportion of female and foreign directors achieve higher performance. Also, the higher is the proportion of independent directors, the lower is the performance, which contradicts with the agency theory proponents. Most importantly, the findings provide empirical evidence that market-based performance indicators react negatively to females’ directorship, while the opposite is found with independent directors as reflected in the positive market reaction. The findings are highly relevant since improved financial performance is one of the key objectives of bank supervisors and regulators to sustain economic growth.

scholarly journals The independence of the Shari’a supervisory board in the Islamic financial institutions of the GCC countries

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-34
Author(s):  
Samy Nathan Garas ◽  
Chris Pierce
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Code Of Conduct ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Executive Management ◽  
Gcc Countries ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Islamic Financial Institutions ◽  
Supervisory Boards

Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) are governed by two boards: the Board of Directors (BoD) and the Shari’a Supervisory Board (SSB). The SSB is a panel of Shari’a scholars who act independently from other governance organs. This paper discriminates between dependent SSBs and independent SSBs by using twenty one variables, which are classified into three groups: the implementation of governance best practices, the recruitment of SSB members, and the relationship between the SSB members and other governance organs. This study is one of the first studies that provide empirical results about the SSB independence. Nevertheless, the research focuses exclusively on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and excludes the other countries where Shari’a supervision might have different forms. The study has developed a hypothesis, which was tested by a questionnaire. Data was collected from 76 Shari’a Supervisory Boards, 73 Boards of Directors, and 59 shareholders of IFIs in the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) during 2009. The discriminant analysis has been used in identifying both dependent and independent SSBs. The paper finds five variables relevant in discriminating the two groups. These variables are the incentives provided to the SSB; the average remuneration to the SSB members; the existence of the policy of penalties for violating the code of conduct; the relation between the SSB members and the BoD; and the role of executive management in recruiting SSB members.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and financial performance: An empirical study on Egyptian banks

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1359-1374
Author(s):  
Hassan M. Hafez
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Obvious Effect ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Conventional Banks ◽  
The Impact

There is a distinct lack of research into the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ financial performance in the banking sector in Egypt. This research paper tries to fills this gab by examining the impact of corporate governance, with particular reference to the role of board of directors and ownership concentration, on the financial performance of Egyptian banks. Using a sample of 39 banks represent all commercial banks operate in Egypt for the period 2004– 2015 and controlling banks size and age. The study relied on the data through the annual reports of the respective banks, website of the central bank of Egypt and Data scope. The banks were selected for the study cutting across the local Islamic and Conventional banks, foreign Islamic and conventional banks, and regional Islamic and conventional banks. The results showed that banks ownership either foreign or national has an obvious effect on the banks’ financial performance. Board size has no significant effect. However, the hierarchy of the board of directors and the duality of the CEO has a direct effect on the banks financial performance in Egypt.

scholarly journals The association between corporate governance and earnings management: The role of independent directors

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Benkel ◽  
Paul R. Mather ◽  
Alan Ramsay
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Codes ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Relationship

The agency perspective of corporate governance emphasizes the monitoring role of the board of directors. This study is concerned with analyzing whether independent directors on the board and audit committee (recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results support the hypotheses that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board and on the audit committee are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results are robust to alternative specifications of the model. This study adds to the very limited research into the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in Australia. It also provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of some of the regulators’ recommendations, which may be of value to regulators in preparing and amending corporate governance codes

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