scholarly journals Should the 4 big replace the big 4? An examination of audit quality using internal audit

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Harjinder Singh ◽  
Rick Newby ◽  
Inderpal Singh
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Important Research ◽  
Dummy Variable ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Dichotomous Variable ◽  
Audit Fee

Prior research has linked audit quality with large audit firms. Consequently, a dichotomous variable, Big N/non-Big N has traditionally proxied for audit quality. Applying a different measure of audit quality than audit fee, this study investigates whether a single dummy variable for Big N is an appropriate proxy for audit quality in explaining differences in the existence of clients’ internal audit (IA) function. Results indicate that the existence of clients’ IA function is not consistent among Big 4 firms. This has important research implications for the universal use of a Big N dummy variable as a measure for audit quality.

Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Association Member ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Control Samples

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

scholarly journals Family Firms, Audit Fee, and Auditor Choice: Evidence From Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-96
Author(s):  
Senny Harindahyani ◽  
Celine Widjaja
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Choice ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Family

Family firms in Indonesia have an important role in the Indonesian economy. However, agency problems might happen inside family firms where it will lead to conflict of interest and information asymmetry, along with the entrenchment effect where it leads firms to produce lower quality earnings report. Research from 305 firms in Indonesia shows that the agency problems and the entrenchment effect has not affected the family firms in Indonesia, reflected from the firm‟s decision making in their amount of audit fee and auditor choice. This study will contribute by providing an empirical evidence of the effect of family control on the audit fee and auditor choice in a developing country. The result shows that the type of firms has no correlation on the amount of audit fee paid to the auditor and both firms‟ demands the same level of audit quality where it is shown by their choices of audit firms, which is Big 4 audit firm or Non-Big 4 audit firm. In conclusion, the level of agency problems and entrenchment effect tends to be lower in the family firms of Indonesia.

“Big 4 fee premium” and audit quality: latest evidence from UK listed companies

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (8) ◽  
pp. 680-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Campa
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Research Questions ◽  
The Uk

PurposeUsing the most recent observations (2005‐2011) from a sample of UK listed companies, This paper aims to investigate whether Big 4 audit firms exhibit a “fee premium” and, if this is the case, whether the premium is related to the delivery of a better audit service.Design/methodology/approachUnivariate tests, multivariate regressions and two methodologies that control for self‐selection bias are used to answer the proposed research questions. Data are collected from DataStream.FindingsFindings provide consistent evidence about the existence of an “audit fee premium” charged by Big 4 firms while they do not highlight any significant relationship between audit quality and type of auditor with respect to the audit quality proxies investigated.Research limitations/implicationsEvidence from this paper might signal the need for legislative intervention to improve the competitiveness of the audit market on the basis that its concentrated structure is leading to “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients. Findings might also enhance Big 4 client bargaining power. However, as the paper analyses only one country, generalizability of the results might be a limitation.Originality/valueThis study joins two streams of the extant literature that investigate the existence of a “Big 4 audit fee premium” and different levels of audit quality among Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients. Evidence supports the concerns raised by the UK House of Lords in 2010 that the concentrated structure of the audit market could be the driver of “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients as it does not find differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients.

Spatial Competition in Local Audit Markets and the Fallout on Deloitte from the 2007 PCAOB Censure

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Face ◽  
Market Leader

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.

Audit Firms as Networks of Offices

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott E. Seavey ◽  
Michael J Imhof ◽  
Tiffany J. Westfall
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Network Connectedness ◽  
Partner Knowledge ◽  
Office Level

SUMMARY Prior audit research suggests that most, if not all, audit quality can be explained at the office level. However, the question remains of whether office-level audit quality is contingent on how individual offices relate to the firm as a whole. Motivated by theories of knowledge management, organizational learning, and networks, we posit that individual offices are connected to their audit network through partner knowledge sharing and oversight, which impact office-level audit quality. We interview Big 4 audit partners and learn that knowledge sharing between partners in different offices is common and intended to aid in the provision of audit services. Using network connectedness to proxy for knowledge sharing and oversight between offices of the same firm, we document that more connected offices are associated with fewer client restatements and lower discretionary accruals. We additionally find that network effects are magnified when accounting treatments are more complex and require greater auditor judgement.

The Effect of Office Changes within Audit Firms on Clients' Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-99
Author(s):  
Carl W. Hollingsworth ◽  
Terry L. Neal ◽  
Colin D. Reid
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Additional Analysis ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Audit Partner Rotation

SUMMARY While prior research has examined audit firm and audit partner rotation, we have little evidence on the impact of within-firm engagement team disruptions on the audit. To examine these disruptions, we identify a unique sample of companies where the audit firm issuing office changed but the audit firm did not change and investigate the effect of these changes on the audit. Our results indicate that companies that have a change in their audit firm's issuing office exhibit a decrease in audit quality and an increase in audit fees. In additional analysis, we partition office changes into two groups—client driven changes and audit firm driven changes. This analysis reveals that client driven changes are more likely to result in a higher audit fee while audit quality is unchanged. Conversely, audit firm driven changes do not result in a higher audit fee but do experience a decrease in audit quality.

Leaving a joint audit system: conditional fee reductions

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Holm ◽  
Frank Thinggaard
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Theory Development ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit System ◽  
Interaction Terms ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee

Purpose – The authors aim to exploit a natural experiment in which voluntary replace mandatory joint audits for Danish listed companies and analyse audit fee implications of using one or two audit firms. Design/methodology/approach – Regression analysis is used. The authors apply both a core audit fee determinants model and an audit fee change model and include interaction terms. Findings – The authors find short-term fee reductions in companies switching to single audits, but only where the former joint audit contained a dominant auditor. The authors argue that in this situation bargaining power is more with the auditors than in an equally shared joint audit, and that the auditors' incentives to offer an initial fee discount are bigger. Research limitations/implications – The number of observations is constrained by the small Danish capital market. Future research could take a more qualitative research approach, to examine whether the use of a single audit firm rather than two has an effect on audit quality. The area calls for further theory development covering audit fee and audit quality in joint audit settings. Practical implications – Companies should consider their relationship with their auditors before deciding to switch to single auditors. Fee discounts do not seem to reflect long-lasting efficiency gains on the part of the audit firm. Originality/value – Denmark is the first country to leave a mandatory joint audit system, so this is the first time that it is possible to study fee effects related to this.

Did the 2007 PCAOB Disciplinary Order against Deloitte Impose Actual Costs on the Firm or Improve Its Audit Quality?

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rates ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Other ◽  
Archival Studies ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee

ABSTRACT We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

The role of audit quality in firm valuation

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 575-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mishari M. Alfraih
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Book Value ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Team

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of audit quality on the value relevance of earnings and book value. Because joint audit is mandated for all Kuwait Stock Exchange-listed firms, it is hypothesized that the higher the quality of the audit team (as measured by the number of Big 4 audit firms in the joint audit team), the higher the value relevance of earnings and book values for equity valuation. Design/methodology/approach Consistent with prior research, the value relevance of earnings and book value is measured by the adjusted R2 derived from the Ohlson’s 1995 regression model. The number of Big 4 audit firms represented on the firm’s audit team is used as a proxy for audit quality. Three tiers of audit quality exist, namely, two non-Big 4 audit firms, one Big 4 and one non-Big 4 audit firms or two Big 4 audit firms. To address this paper’s objective, the association between audit quality and the value relevance of earnings and book value were examined using four approaches. The final sample consists of 1,836 firm-year observations and covers fiscal years from a 12-year period (2002-2013). Findings Taken together, the four approaches used collectively provide empirical evidence that audit quality positively and significantly affects the value relevance of accounting measures to market participants. Importantly, the results reveal significant variations in the value relevance of earnings and book value jointly across the three possible auditor combinations. Research limitations/implications Although using auditor size as a proxy for audit quality is well established in the auditing literature, a limitation of that proxy is that it measures audit quality dichotomously, which implicitly assumes a homogeneous level of audit quality within each group. Practical implications The findings show the importance of high-quality and rigorous external audits in improving the value relevance of accounting information. Originality/value This study contributes to the extent literature on audit quality by exploring the role of audit quality in a unique institutional setting that imposes mandatory joint audits. Although prior studies have investigated the effect of joint audit pair choice on earnings management and audit fee premium, this study is the first to investigate the effect of joint audit pair choice on the value relevance of accounting information.

Does Audit Fee Homogeneity Exist? Premiums and Discounts Attributable to Individual Partners

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 249-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart D. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Homogeneity Assumption ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Made In

SUMMARY This paper investigates the implied assumption, made in many audit fee determination studies, that, within a given audit firm, all partners produce a statistically identical level of audit quality and earn a statistically identical level of audit fees. This is referred to as the “homogeneity assumption.” However, this is contradicted by the individual auditor behavioral literature, which shows that different individual auditor characteristics can have an impact on audit quality. Given the fact that audit partners differ in their quality, this paper hypothesizes that different audit partners will be able to earn differing levels of fees. This hypothesis is tested by estimating an audit fee model using data from 822 Australian publicly listed companies for the year 2005. Australia is an ideal audit market for this research, as the disclosure of the name of the audit engagement partner in the audit report is mandatory. The empirical results indicate that individual audit partners earn individual audit fee premiums (or discounts) that are not explainable by the audit firms of which they are members. Data Availability: All data have been extracted from publicly available sources.

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