scholarly journals Review of the advisory role of the international court of justice

2010 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 629-640
Author(s):  
Senad Ganic

This paper presents a brief review and analysis of advisory proceedings before the International Court of Justice as well as an explanation of the nature and importance of advisory opinions as specific decisions of the International Court of Justice. The intention was to make the public more familiar with the nature of these proceedings drawing attention of the professional public to some specific elements that characterize advisory procedures, which in a sense make them closer to the proceedings in resolving disputes between states. Although not binding by their nature as are decisions of the Court, advisory opinions have, however, some weight and importance that primarily stem from the importance and authority of the body that provides them. A non-binding effect of advisory opinions is just a starting point in explaining them. Actually, it is the fact that opinions have a great authority and this requires some further explanations.

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-207
Author(s):  
Mahasen Aljaghoub

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, (UN) and its Statute is an integral part of the UN's Charter. The court's integral role within the UN has largely been misunderstood especially in the way the court has viewed its advisory jurisdiction. The ICJ always asserts that the delivery of an advisory opinion represents its participation in the UN's work and thus, in the absence of compelling reasons, a request for an opinion ought not to be refused. Some commentators note that the principle that the ICJ must participate in the work of the Organisation might sometimes conflict with its judicial character, which might result in not embracing the philosophy of “judicial restraint” in the court's advisory jurisdiction. They also contend that the absence of consent in advisory cases has led the court to overlook its judicial restraint. This article argues that those commentators have overlooked the main role of the ICJ's advisory function in clarifying the law and providing guidance for future action by the UN organs, and has consequently called for applying the principle of consent as a condition for giving an advisory opinion on questions relating to disputes pending between States. In the present article, the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory opinion is analysed to see whether the absence of Israeli consent has undermined the ICJ's judicial character. The author is of the view that the court, as the principal judicial organ of the UN, should, by a cautious judicial policy, provide enlightenment to the UN and participate to achieving its goals while at the same time adhering to its judicial character.


1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-271
Author(s):  
A. S. Muller

The simplistic ideas about the judicial function in international relations are very harmful to the public perception of the role of the International Court of Justice. […] The general public both expects too much of the Court, and is then disappointed that there is so much violence in the world which the Court does not seem to be effective to control.


Author(s):  
Ravindra Pratap

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) procedure has been, within and across contentious cases and advisory opinions, both a catalyst for, and a constraint on, the emergence and evolution of erga omnes obligations. Clarification, interpretation, and affirmation of the law have most frequently worked as catalysts for the emergence and evolution of erga omnes obligations. Judicial propriety and/or judicial discretion have most frequently tended to constrain the emergence and evolution of erga omnes obligations. Judicial propriety and/or judicial discretion, evidence, consent, and standing before the Court have been other catalysts. Formalism, jurisdiction, fact-finding, and interpretation have been other constraints on the emergence and evolution of erga omnes obligations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-218
Author(s):  
Ksenia Polonskaya

Abstract This article examines the notion of consent as an element of judicial propriety as defined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of its advisory function. The article situates the issue of judicial propriety within a broader conversation on the Court’s normative outlooks in international law, and examines the most recent advisory opinion on the Chagos Archipelago to understand how the Court itself views its role in international law. The article concludes that the Court’s advisory opinions do not provide much clarity as to the circumstances in which a lack of consent will become a compelling enough reason to justify a refusal to give an advisory opinion. The Court appears to ritually recite consent as a relevant element in its assessment of judicial propriety, however, it continues to limit such relevance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-288
Author(s):  
Katayoun Hosseinnejad

Abstract Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties calls for consideration of the ordinary meaning as the starting point in the process of interpretation. Although the linguistic concept of ordinary meaning is founded on the idea that the meaning of a sentence is directly imposed by the norms of language so that interpreters are provided with an objective standard which is external to their subjectivity, this article demonstrates that the interpretive jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has departed from the imperatives of the ordinary meaning doctrine. Rather, the Court, mindful of the problem that no mere sequence of words can represent actual legal meaning, has moved towards construction of ordinary meaning.


1985 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 182-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

En s'efforçant, au lendemain de la guerre [1914 – 1918], de poser les bases d'une société de peuples régie par le droit, les fondateurs de cette communauté internationale nouvelle se rendaient pleinement compte qu'il ne saurait y avoir une société organisée sans un pouvoir judiciaire chargé de veiller, en dehors de toute préoccupation de politique et de force, à la stricte observation du droit. C'est dans cette conviction qu'ils ont prévu, dès l'origine, la création de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.Feinberg in 1931Reviewing the history of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the International Court of Justice from 1922—the World Court, a convenient but possibly misleading expression which embraces both the Permanent Court from 1922 to 1945 and the present International Court of Justice established as an integral part of the United Nations since—four clearly separated periods can be discerned. They run from 1922 to 1931, 1932 to 1940, 1946 to 1966, and from 1967 onwards.The establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court after a cataclysmic war in Europe and the awe-inspiring Russian Revolution released a wave of euphoria upon the exhausted and war-weary peoples of what is now known as Western Europe, and they placed great hopes in the new League and Court.


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