Income Taxes and the Labor Supply of Married Women in Quebec

1985 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 1053 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morton Stelcner ◽  
Jon Breslaw
1994 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Aldrich Finegan ◽  
Robert A. Margo

Economic analysis of the labor supply of married women has long emphasized the impact of the unemployment of husbands—the added worker effect. This article re-examines the magnitude of the added worker effect in the waning years of the Great Depression. Previous studies of the labor supply of married women during this period failed to take account of various institutional features of New Deal work relief programs, which reduced the size of the added worker effect.


SERIEs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nezih Guner ◽  
Javier López-Segovia ◽  
Roberto Ramos

AbstractCan the Spanish government generate more tax revenue by making personal income taxes more progressive? To answer this question, we build a life-cycle economy with uninsurable labor productivity risk and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face progressive taxes on labor and capital incomes and proportional taxes that capture social security, corporate income, and consumption taxes. Our answer is yes, but not much. A reform that increases labor income taxes for individuals who earn more than the mean labor income and reduces taxes for those who earn less than the mean labor income generates a small additional revenue. The revenue from labor income taxes is maximized at an effective marginal tax rate of 51.6% (38.9%) for the richest 1% (5%) of individuals, versus 46.3% (34.7%) in the benchmark economy. The increase in revenue from labor income taxes is only 0.82%, while the total tax revenue declines by 1.55%. The higher progressivity is associated with lower aggregate labor supply and capital. As a result, the government collects higher taxes from a smaller economy. The total tax revenue is higher if marginal taxes are raised only for the top earners. The increase, however, must be substantial and cover a large segment of top earners. The rise in tax collection from a 3 percentage points increase on the top 1% is just 0.09%. A 10 percentage points increase on the top 10% of earners (those who earn more than €41,699) raises total tax revenue by 2.81%.


ILR Review ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry R. Johnson ◽  
John H. Pencavel

This paper outlines a scheme that forecasts the change in net earnings or in hours worked that results from the introduction of a negative income tax (NIT) program. The authors illustrate this scheme by estimating labor supply functions for married men, married women, and single women who participated in the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiments. These functions are then used to simulate the effects of several NIT programs. The findings suggest that changes in the wage rate of an individual covered by an NIT program result in important changes in the hours of work of the individual's spouse.


1974 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen G. Cain ◽  
Walter Nicholson ◽  
Charles D. Mallar ◽  
Judith Wooldridge

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document