Corporations: Cumulative Voting, Classified Boards and Proportional Representation

1957 ◽  
Vol 55 (7) ◽  
pp. 997
Author(s):  
William R. Luney
2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Gamboa ◽  
Mauricio Morales

AbstractIn 1925 a new electoral system was introduced in Chile. This reform changed the electoral formula from a cumulative voting system to a proportional one (d'Hondt) and established new rules about district magnitude and form of voting. It has been argued that this reform was motivated by the emergence of new parties or the expansion of the electorate. This article offers an alternative explanation: in the case of Chile, the main reason for the electoral reform was the parties' need to solve problems of strategic coordination stemming from the characteristics of the Chilean cumulative voting system. In this context, the Chilean case shows that there are many routes to proportionality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 3997
Author(s):  
Roberto Cagliero ◽  
Francesco Bellini ◽  
Francesco Marcatto ◽  
Silvia Novelli ◽  
Alessandro Monteleone ◽  
...  

The process to define the 2023–2027 Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) is underway. The implementation model governing the process requires each EU Member State to design a National Strategic Plan to deliver operational actions exploiting the synergies under the two pillars of the policy. Each Plan must be built from an evidence-based needs assessment that undergoes rigorous prioritisation and planning to create comprehensive, integrated, and achievable interventions. In Italy, the success of this planning process requires all interested stakeholders to generate options for the regional authorities who plan, manage, and legislate agricultural activities. This research proposes a decision-making technique, based on the cumulative voting approach, that can be used effectively when multiple persons from different backgrounds and perspectives are engaged in problem-solving and needs prioritisation. The results indicate that the model can be applied both theoretically and practically to prioritise Strategic Plan needs that involve national and regional authorities. Validation of the model allows it to be used in the next consultative processes and for expansion to socioeconomic stakeholders.


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