Deciding on the Electoral System: Chile's Adoption of Proportional Representation in 1925

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Gamboa ◽  
Mauricio Morales
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
New Parties ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Strategic Coordination ◽  
Cumulative Voting ◽  
Voting System

AbstractIn 1925 a new electoral system was introduced in Chile. This reform changed the electoral formula from a cumulative voting system to a proportional one (d'Hondt) and established new rules about district magnitude and form of voting. It has been argued that this reform was motivated by the emergence of new parties or the expansion of the electorate. This article offers an alternative explanation: in the case of Chile, the main reason for the electoral reform was the parties' need to solve problems of strategic coordination stemming from the characteristics of the Chilean cumulative voting system. In this context, the Chilean case shows that there are many routes to proportionality.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

Electoral Reform Under Limited Party Competition: The Adoption of Proportional Representation in Latin America

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel L. Negretto ◽  
Giancarlo Visconti
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Political Liberalization ◽  
New Parties ◽  
History Of

AbstractThe adoption of proportional representation in Western Europe has been portrayed as either a defensive or an offensive competition strategy used by established parties to deal with the rise of new parties under majoritarian electoral rules. Neither explanation accounts for PR reform in other regions of the world, where the change took place in the absence of increased party competition. Analyzing the history of electoral reform in Latin America, this article argues that in a context of limited party competition, the initial adoption of PR was part of a strategy of controlled political liberalization promoted by authoritarian rulers. Subdividing this general reasoning, the article shows that PR reform followed different paths depending on the nature of the authoritarian regime and the events that called into question the existing majoritarian electoral system. This argument is supported with a comparative historical analysis of cases within and across each route to reform.

Electoral Reform and the Electronic Voting System

2020 ◽  
pp. 182-204
Author(s):  
Dashbalbar Gangabaatar
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Electronic Voting ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
Parliamentary Election ◽  
Election Process ◽  
Election System ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Electronic Voting System

Mongolia introduced a new electronic voting system for the first time for the 2012 parliamentary election. E-voting empowers citizens by making voting simpler and providing better opportunities for certain groups of citizens to participate in the election process. The electoral reform was one of the major steps the parliament carried out in order to restore public trust lost in the violent protests against the 2008 parliamentary election results. A free, transparent, and fair electoral system was important to correct the fraud in the old election system. This chapter examines the effectiveness of the mixed system of election, the electronic voting system, the constitutionality of the electoral systems, and other changes to the electoral system in Mongolia.

scholarly journals Political opportunity structures and the parliamentary entry of splinter, merger, and genuinely new parties

Politics ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 026339572094343
Author(s):  
Mihail Chiru ◽  
Marina Popescu ◽  
István Gergő Székely
Keyword(s):  
Contextual Factors ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Original Sample ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
New Parties ◽  
Opportunity Structures ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Political Opportunity Structures ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
Type Of Transition

Drawing on an original sample of 351 elections held in new and consolidated democracies from 1960 to 2013, this article examines the likelihood that new parties gain parliamentary representation as a function of electoral system permissiveness and contextual factors that shape political entrepreneurs’ perception of political opportunity. We distinguish between the success of genuinely new parties and that achieved by splinters or parties formed through mergers. We find that the district magnitude matters for the success of all three types of newcomers, while the electoral formula and proportionality matter only for the parliamentary entry of splinter parties. Another novel finding is that government instability facilitates the success of genuinely new and splinter parties. The analysis also shows that, irrespective of the type of transition, the more elections have taken place since then, the less likely it becomes that genuinely new parties and merger new parties enter parliament.

scholarly journals Electoral Reform and Strategic Coordination

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jon H. Fiva ◽  
Simon Hix
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Strategic Coordination ◽  
Main Effect

Abstract Electoral reform creates new strategic coordination incentives for voters and elites, but endogeneity problems make such effects hard to identify. This article addresses this issue by investigating an extraordinary dataset, from the introduction of proportional representation (PR) in Norway in 1919, which permits the measurement of parties’ vote shares in pre-reform single-member districts and in the same geographic units in the post-reform multi-member districts. The electoral reform had an immediate effect on the fragmentation of the party system, due in part to strategic party entry. The authors find, though, that another main effect of the reform was that many voters switched between existing parties, particularly between the Liberals and Conservatives, as the incentives for these voters to coordinate against Labor were removed by the introduction of PR.

Portugal

2021 ◽  
pp. 173-196
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart ◽  
Matthew E. Bergman ◽  
Cory L. Struthers ◽  
Ellis S. Krauss ◽  
Robert J. Pekkanen
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Geographic Location ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Varying Population

This chapter focuses on Portugal and its districted, closed-list proportional representation system of elections to the Assembly of the Republic. The closed party lists imply that individual candidates have little to benefit from cultivating a personal vote. Parties control the order in which their members are elected and can be expected to be relatively free to deploy their personnel in a manner that enhances the collective reputation of the party. On the other hand, Portugal’s electoral system is one in which geographic location of votes matters to seat maximization, because instead of nationwide proportional representation, the country has several regional districts of varying, population density, and district magnitude. The results show some tendency of the major parties to use both the expertise and electoral–constituency models in assigning members to legislative committees, although stronger in the Socialist Party than in the Social Democratic Party.

District magnitude and electoral mobilization: how uneven electoral systems shift the focus of campaign efforts by political parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Michio Umeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Survey Period ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Party Strategies ◽  
Electoral Mobilization ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

Proportional Representation, Large District Magnitude and Closed Lists

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radek Buben ◽  
Karel Kouba
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Historical Sociology ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Public Debate ◽  
The Public ◽  
District Magnitude

AbstractChoosing the type of electoral system in new democracies has become a contested issue for social scientists as well as for political actors. Contrary to the state of the public debate on the issue, the article advances the position from a multidisciplinary standpoint (political science, historical sociology, economics) that proportional representation with large districts and closed lists performs better on a variety of key indicators. We review recent literature on the performance of electoral systems especially in post-communist and Latin American democracies. The article identifies the centripetal theory of democracy as a normative basis for our institutional prescriptions and discusses how distinct types of political representation relate to the debate on electoral systems. We focus especially on four main concerns commonly associated with proportional representation (the rise of “extremist” parties, government instability, party system deconsolidation, and corruption and clientelism). Contrary to much of the public debate on electoral systems, we conclude that further steps towards personalization (by opening lists or reducing district magnitude) are not advisable.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 672-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
Verónica Hoyo
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Political Context ◽  
New Parties ◽  
Fifth Republic ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Political Actors

Overall, elections in France take place in a two-round system (with the exception of the European elections), and although each different electoral arena has its own particular procedures, most promote majoritarian principles. This chapter analyzes the electoral system of the French Fifth Republic by focusing on the operation of these rules in the larger political context: including the interaction between the rules, the party system, and the main political actors that compete in them. It shows that the two-round majoritarian system has proven remarkably stable and has managed to survive both internal (a quick detour to proportional representation in 1986) and external challenges (rise of new parties, EU common rules on proportional representation).

scholarly journals Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 609-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carles Boix
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
New Parties ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
History Of ◽  
Electoral Regime ◽  
Developed World ◽  
Rules Of The Game

Looking at the history of democracies in the developed world, I show that electoral systems derive from the decisions the ruling parties make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. As long as the electoral arena does not change and the current electoral regime benefits the ruling parties, the electoral system is not altered. As the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in voters' preferences), the ruling parties modify the electoral system, depending on the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old parties. When the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority to proportional representation if no old party enjoys a dominant position, but they do not do this if there is a dominant old party. When new entrants are weak, a system of nonproportional representation is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system.

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