Criminal Law. New York Authorizes Police to "Stop-and-Frisk" on Reasonable Suspicion. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 86, Section 2, N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. Section 180(a)

1964 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 473 ◽  

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-580
Author(s):  
Andrew Dammann

In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court announced that mere presence in a high-crime area is a constitutionally significant factor for deciding if there is the necessary reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot in order to justify a stop and frisk. Relying in part on the constitutional significance Wardlow attached to the vague term high-crime area, New York instituted an aggressive stop-and-frisk policy to combat crime and make New York a safer city. New York was sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Floyd v. City of New York. New York’s appeal was dropped when new mayor Bill de Blasio agreed to the remedies outlined in the Floyd opinion. At the press conference where Mayor de Blasio announced the settlement that dropped the appeal, Police Commissioner William Bratton said, “[W]e will not break the law to enforce the law.” This Article asserts that enforcing the law without breaking it becomes impossibly problematic when the law is as uncertain as it is with high-crime areas. This Article begins with a critique of the uncertainty created by attaching constitutional significance to high-crime areas without defining or describing what a high-crime area is. The Article urges city councils and other appropriate legislatures to designate which areas are high-crime areas. It argues that such a designation would foreclose the difficult problem of municipal liability that Judge Scheindlin grappled with in Floyd, that legislative designations of high-crime areas square with Fourth Amendment principles, and that legislatures, not executive auxiliaries like police departments, are the proper governmental bodies to make that designation.



Criminology ◽  
2021 ◽  

Stop and frisk is a proactive policing strategy that is widely used by police departments across the globe. In the United States, the origins of stop and frisk are rooted in the English practice of allowing night watchmen to stop and question individuals who were deemed suspicious. This ability to stop and question suspicious individuals serves two primary purposes. First, it gives law enforcement officers the ability to identify individuals who are looking to engage in criminal activity, stop those individuals, and prevent them from committing a criminal offense. Second, it may have a deterrent effect if potential offenders refrain from criminal offending because they do not want to risk being stopped. By the early 20th century, the implementation of stop and frisk in the United States varied by state. The Uniform Arrest Act, proposed in 1942, sought to standardize the practice. While several states adopted the Uniform Crime Act, which stipulated the circumstances under which a stop and frisk could occur, most states failed to do so. The practice of stop and frisk also faced constitutional challenges, with plaintiffs alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. In 1968, the US Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of stop and frisk. When law enforcement officers can establish reasonable suspicion, they can stop and question an individual. If there is reasonable suspicion to believe that a stopped individual possesses a weapon or poses a threat, law enforcement officers can also conduct a frisk. Stop and frisk has faced significant criticism and has been the subject of several class-action lawsuits, particularly in New York City. First, there is significant concern that nonwhite pedestrians are more likely than white pedestrians to be stopped, frisked, and subjected to the use of force. Next, stop and frisk may reduce perceptions of legitimacy and trust in law enforcement. The practice may also have adverse health consequences for those who are subjected to it or are in fear of being subjected to it. Finally, it is unclear whether stop and frisk prevents crime. It is also important to note that stop and frisk faces these same criticisms in other nations. The literature cited in this article summarizes key pieces on stop and frisk.



2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 230
Author(s):  
Anthony Vito ◽  
George Higgins ◽  
Gennaro Vito

The findings of this study outline the racial differences in stop and frisk decisions by Illinois officers in consent searches and those based upon reasonable suspicion within the context of the elements of focal concerns theory. The analysis for this study was performed using propensity score matching (PSM) and allowed the researchers to create a quasi-experimental design to examine the race of the citizen and police decision making. According to our analysis of official Illinois law enforcement data, Black citizens, particularly males, were less likely to give their consent to a stop and frisk search. Black male citizens were also more likely to be stopped and searched due to an assessment of reasonable suspicion by the officer. Elements of focal concerns theory were also factors in pedestrian stops under conditions of consent and reasonable suspicion. Citizens judged as blameworthy were more likely to be stopped and frisked under conditions of consent and reasonable suspicion. The effect of a verbal threat and the officer’s prior knowledge about the citizen had even more significant impacts.



2001 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Nancy Morawetz
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  




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