scholarly journals Federal Civil Procedure: Supreme Court Authorizes Transfer by a Court Lacking Personal Jurisdiction

1963 ◽  
Vol 1963 (1) ◽  
pp. 168 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
Personal Jurisdiction

Recent Decisions on Specific Personal Jurisdiction in the United States Civil Procedure

2019 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 447-473
Author(s):  
Young-Ran Choi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
Personal Jurisdiction

scholarly journals The Forgotten Property Right

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-528
Author(s):  
Peter Kuylen
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Property Right ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Jurisdiction ◽  
At Home

With its move to the “at home” standard in Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF, the Supreme Court significantly restricted the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation defendants. This restriction offers questionable actual benefits to corporate defendants, but its rigid focus on defendant’s rights has impacted the ability of certain plaintiffs to bring a cause of action against those defendants. Because the at home standard infringes on this group of plaintiffs’ ability to assert their property right of redress in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments), the Court should return to the previous “continuous and systematic contacts” standard developed under International Shoe. Hundreds of articles have been written in the four years since Daimler erased fifty years of general personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. But because personal jurisdiction analysis is traditionally defendant focused, there is little mention of the plaintiff’s property right in access to the courts in that literature. Personal jurisdiction rules should protect a defendant’s interests, but not to the total forfeiture of a plaintiff’s property right. Recognizing the at home standard as a misstep would resolve this constitutional conflict.

Summary Procedures in Israel and Abroad

1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Livneh
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
European Institutions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
History Of ◽  
New Israel ◽  
Rules Of The Game ◽  
Summary Procedure

The new Israel Civil Procedure Rules, 1963 re-enact in rr. 269–82, with certain amendments, rr. 241–50 of the Palestinian Civil Procedure Rules, 1938 dealing with “Summary Procedure on Specially Endorsed Statement of Claim”, which in their turn were a colonial version of Order XIV of the English Rules of the Supreme Court. A glance at some recent judgments in Israel shows a surprising number of cases in which doubts have arisen as to the application and scope of the Summary Procedure in general and the defendant's right to be heard in particular. One may wonder whether litigants and lower courts quite understand the rules of the game or whether the game is after all not as easy as might be expected of a summary procedure. And indeed, compared with institutions in continental Europe, where scores of thousands of claims are disposed of without discussion and complaint, our Summary Procedure seems inelegant and burdensome on plaintiff and defendant alike. It is the object of this study to compare it, and the procedure under the English Order XIV, with those European institutions. In view of the gap between Anglo-Israel and Continental notions of civil procedure it may be useful also to sketch the history of the various forms of action, viz. the (summary) trial by documents, the non-litigious executory instruments and the conditional command to pay.

scholarly journals REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW AT THE APPELLATE-LEVEL COURTS IN INDONESIA

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 348
Author(s):  
Mohammad Amir Hamzah
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
The Supreme Court

AbstractThe frst court and the appellate-level court serve as the judex facti, but there are different regulations about procedural law in HIR, RBG, and Law No. 20 of 1947. It causes high fling of cassation appeals. As a result, the Supreme Court is impaired in fostering and developing the (civil) law due to it being hectic from examining cases. Through reform of civil procedure law of the appellate­level court (PT), the court will be placed in the appropriate position as the means of fltering proceedings, so that not all cases can be fled for a cassation appeal. It is also the time to revoke Law No. 20 of 1947.IntisariPada dasarnya Pengadilan Negeri dan Pengadilan Tinggi diposisikan sebagai judex facti. Namun demikian, terdapat beberapa pengaturan mengenai hukum acara perdata mulai dari HIR, RBG hingga UU No.20 Tahun 1947 yang mengatur hal tersebut secara berbeda. Akibatnya, pengajuan kasasi meningkat sehinggamengganggu fokus Mahkamah Agung melaksanakan fungsi pembinaan hukum. Seharunya pengadilan banding diposisikan sebagai penyaring sehingga tidak semua kasus dapat diajukan ke banding dan kasasi. Selain itu, melalui pembaharuan hukum ini juga UU Nomor 20 Tahun 1947.

scholarly journals A ABSTRATIVIZAÇÃO DO CONTROLE DIFUSO DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE NO ÂMBITO DO STF E A (IN)CONSTITUCIONALIDADE DOS ARTS. 525, §12º, 535, §5º, DO NOVO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL DE 2015

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
AMARO BANDEIRA DE ARAUJO JÚNIOR
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Rational Control ◽  
Procedural Safeguards ◽  
Federal Supreme ◽  
Made In

RESUMO  Os novos influxos relativos à abstrativização do controle difuso de constitucionalidade na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal aliado aos dispositivos inseridos no novo Código de Processo Civil, em especial a norma insculpida no art. 525, §12º, revelam uma força normativa desproporcional legalmente fixada aos precedentes judiciais oriundos da Corte Constitucional brasileira que podem levar à violação das garantias constitucionais processuais. O presente trabalho intenta analisar a inconstitucionalidade do nóvel dispositivo processual, ao mesmo tempo em que busca realizar uma análise sobre o espectro possível de limitações hermenêuticas, para além daqueles tradicionalmente aplicados, que podem ser utilizadas para um controle racional mínimo dos fundamentos dos precedentes judiciais vinculantes oriundos das decisões tomadas em controle difuso de constitucionalidade pelo STF.  Palavras-Chave: Abstrativização. Controle difuso. Constitucionalidade. Garantias processuais. Execução. Hermenêutica. Coisa julgada.   ABSTRACT  The new influxes related to the abstractivization of the diffuse control of constitutionality in the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court, combined with the provisions inserted in the new Code of Civil Procedure, especially the norm inscribed in art. 525, paragraph 12, reveal a disproportionate normative force legally fixed to judicial precedents from the Brazilian Constitutional Court that may lead to violation of constitutional procedural guarantees. The present work tries to analyze the unconstitutionality of the new procedural device, at the same time as it seeks to perform an analysis on the possible spectrum of hermeneutical limitations, beyond those traditionally applied, that can be used for a minimal rational control of the grounds of the binding legal precedents stemming from the decisions made in diffuse control of constitutionality by the STF.  Keywords: Abstractivization. Diffuse control. Constitutionality. Procedural safeguards. Execution. Hermeneutics. Thing judged.  

scholarly journals Hryniak v. Mauldin Comes to Alberta: Summary Judgment, Culture Shift, and the Future of Civil Trials

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Billingsley
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
The Past ◽  
Culture Shift ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Civil Trials ◽  
Summary Judgment

Alberta’s law of civil procedure, and summary judgment in particular, has experienced a culture shift since the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Hryniak v. Mauldin. This article asks whether litigation directed toward a conventional trial is now, or is soon to be, a thing of the past. Although intended to revive traditional trials as a realistic and timely resolution option, it is impossible to say yet if this will be Hryniak’s legacy in Alberta. Three things are clear in post-Hryniak Albertan jurisprudence, however: first, the Hryniak test governs the determination of summary judgment applications in Alberta; second, Alberta courts have embraced the call for proportionality in litigation procedure; and third, the Hryniak culture shift creates uncertainty for Alberta litigants.

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