Civil Procedure: Statutory Full Faith and Credit: Wisconsin Supreme Court Applies Comity Principles in Determining Whether to Enforce a Tribal Court Judgment. Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 665 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2003)

2004 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 988

1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Livneh

The new Israel Civil Procedure Rules, 1963 re-enact in rr. 269–82, with certain amendments, rr. 241–50 of the Palestinian Civil Procedure Rules, 1938 dealing with “Summary Procedure on Specially Endorsed Statement of Claim”, which in their turn were a colonial version of Order XIV of the English Rules of the Supreme Court. A glance at some recent judgments in Israel shows a surprising number of cases in which doubts have arisen as to the application and scope of the Summary Procedure in general and the defendant's right to be heard in particular. One may wonder whether litigants and lower courts quite understand the rules of the game or whether the game is after all not as easy as might be expected of a summary procedure. And indeed, compared with institutions in continental Europe, where scores of thousands of claims are disposed of without discussion and complaint, our Summary Procedure seems inelegant and burdensome on plaintiff and defendant alike. It is the object of this study to compare it, and the procedure under the English Order XIV, with those European institutions. In view of the gap between Anglo-Israel and Continental notions of civil procedure it may be useful also to sketch the history of the various forms of action, viz. the (summary) trial by documents, the non-litigious executory instruments and the conditional command to pay.



2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 348
Author(s):  
Mohammad Amir Hamzah

AbstractThe frst court and the appellate-level court serve as the judex facti, but there are different regulations about procedural law in HIR, RBG, and Law No. 20 of 1947. It causes high fling of cassation appeals. As a result, the Supreme Court is impaired in fostering and developing the (civil) law due to it being hectic from examining cases. Through reform of civil procedure law of the appellate­level court (PT), the court will be placed in the appropriate position as the means of fltering proceedings, so that not all cases can be fled for a cassation appeal. It is also the time to revoke Law No. 20 of 1947.IntisariPada dasarnya Pengadilan Negeri dan Pengadilan Tinggi diposisikan sebagai judex facti. Namun demikian, terdapat beberapa pengaturan mengenai hukum acara perdata mulai dari HIR, RBG hingga UU No.20 Tahun 1947 yang mengatur hal tersebut secara berbeda. Akibatnya, pengajuan kasasi meningkat sehinggamengganggu fokus Mahkamah Agung melaksanakan fungsi pembinaan hukum. Seharunya pengadilan banding diposisikan sebagai penyaring sehingga tidak semua kasus dapat diajukan ke banding dan kasasi. Selain itu, melalui pembaharuan hukum ini juga UU Nomor 20 Tahun 1947.



Author(s):  
AMARO BANDEIRA DE ARAUJO JÚNIOR

RESUMO  Os novos influxos relativos à abstrativização do controle difuso de constitucionalidade na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal aliado aos dispositivos inseridos no novo Código de Processo Civil, em especial a norma insculpida no art. 525, §12º, revelam uma força normativa desproporcional legalmente fixada aos precedentes judiciais oriundos da Corte Constitucional brasileira que podem levar à violação das garantias constitucionais processuais. O presente trabalho intenta analisar a inconstitucionalidade do nóvel dispositivo processual, ao mesmo tempo em que busca realizar uma análise sobre o espectro possível de limitações hermenêuticas, para além daqueles tradicionalmente aplicados, que podem ser utilizadas para um controle racional mínimo dos fundamentos dos precedentes judiciais vinculantes oriundos das decisões tomadas em controle difuso de constitucionalidade pelo STF.  Palavras-Chave: Abstrativização. Controle difuso. Constitucionalidade. Garantias processuais. Execução. Hermenêutica. Coisa julgada.   ABSTRACT  The new influxes related to the abstractivization of the diffuse control of constitutionality in the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court, combined with the provisions inserted in the new Code of Civil Procedure, especially the norm inscribed in art. 525, paragraph 12, reveal a disproportionate normative force legally fixed to judicial precedents from the Brazilian Constitutional Court that may lead to violation of constitutional procedural guarantees. The present work tries to analyze the unconstitutionality of the new procedural device, at the same time as it seeks to perform an analysis on the possible spectrum of hermeneutical limitations, beyond those traditionally applied, that can be used for a minimal rational control of the grounds of the binding legal precedents stemming from the decisions made in diffuse control of constitutionality by the STF.  Keywords: Abstractivization. Diffuse control. Constitutionality. Procedural safeguards. Execution. Hermeneutics. Thing judged.  



2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Billingsley

Alberta’s law of civil procedure, and summary judgment in particular, has experienced a culture shift since the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Hryniak v. Mauldin. This article asks whether litigation directed toward a conventional trial is now, or is soon to be, a thing of the past. Although intended to revive traditional trials as a realistic and timely resolution option, it is impossible to say yet if this will be Hryniak’s legacy in Alberta. Three things are clear in post-Hryniak Albertan jurisprudence, however: first, the Hryniak test governs the determination of summary judgment applications in Alberta; second, Alberta courts have embraced the call for proportionality in litigation procedure; and third, the Hryniak culture shift creates uncertainty for Alberta litigants.



2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 16
Author(s):  
K. Tjukup ◽  
P.R. A. Potra ◽  
P.A.H. Martana

The procedural  law  of Class Action  is  a legal  concept  known  in  the Anglo-Saxon  legal  system  (Common  Law). Whilst  this  concept  is  not  recognised   in  the  Continental  European  legal  system  (Civil  Law),  likewise  in  Indonesian  civil procedure  that based on Herzien Inlandsch Reglement (H.I.R) and Rechtsreglement  voor de Buitengewesten  (RBg). Initially, the procedural  law of class action in Indonesian  legal  system was arranged consecutively under Law No. 23 of 1997  (Environmental Protection  Law), Law No.  8  of  1999  on Consumer Protection  and Law No. 41 of  1999  on Forestry.  The arrangement  of class action lawsuit  in the substantive  law was inspired by the recognition  of class action lawsuit  in the United  States through Article 23 of the US Federal  Rule of Civil Procedure  prescribing  that the requirements  for filing class action  lawsuit are as follows: numerosity,  commonality, typicality,  and adequacy of representation.  In Indonesia there is no procedural  law setting out the class action  lawsuit,  thus  Supreme  Court  Regulation   No.   1      of  2002  was  enacted.  The  replacement   of Law  No.  23  of  1997 (Environmental  Protection Law) by Law No. 32 of 2009 (Environmental  Protection and Management Law) allows the application of the class action with reference to this Supreme Court Regulation.  The arrangement of class action lawsuit in the Supreme Court Regulation No.  1    of 2002 still  encounters many challenges in its application.  The initial process i.e. certification  is very decisive whether the lawsuit  can be accepted  or is  qualified  as a class action lawsuit. In conjunction with this, the judges'  active role is very  important  whilst  waiting  for a specific  and adequate  legislation  to establish  the class action  procedure.  Meanwhilst,  the judges  are supposed to patch up the Supreme Court Regulation No. 1   of 2002.  Keywords:  Environmental Disputes, Procedural Law,  Class Action Lawsuit



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