¿Mision Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition

1991 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Loveman
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Political Transition ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Augusto Pinochet ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
Military Relations

The armed forces have reconstructed authentic democracy. They have once again definitively carried out their mission…. I love this country more than Life itself.Captain General Augusto Pinochet11 September 1989The Constitution of 1980 does not meet, in its elaboration of the manner in which it was ratified, the essential conditions required by constitutional doctrine for the existence of a legitimate political order based on the rule of law.Francisco Cumplido C. (1983)Minister of Justice (1990)On 11 March 1990, Patricio Aylwin took office as Chile's first elected president since 1970. Chile thus joined the list of Latin American nations making a transition from military to civilian government. Like the civilian governments in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala, Chile's new government faced the challenge of returning the armed forces to a less central role in politics and reducing their institutional prerogatives.

normally only gradually, and this situation is not universally the case. There is growing understanding of the need for security arrangements which underpin the economic and political co-operation whose value is so clear to most decision-makers. Those who wish to see greater co-operation from the Latin American states in the non-proliferation and arms control fields should attempt to understand these phenomena and make a greater effort to bring the Latin Americans along. The North can help a great deal in educating key members of the civilian elites in these countries about defence matters. This would go a long way to easing some of the issues of civil-military relations mentioned. Showing more transparency ourselves in the working of arms control groupings can help to reduce concerns in these countries about their ability to resist excessive northern pressures if they accept the objectives sought by those countries in such groups. Working with nascent but interested elements of civil society, from universities and research centres for example can help to build the constituency for these objectives in key countries. And efforts to show the military that collaboration does not necessarily mean the end of a legitimate degree of armed forces influence in the security area and more widely in foreign policy, and that arms control does not necessarily imply ruin for them and their families, need to be made and indeed should be more closely studied in order to address these real concerns. There is thus a good deal which can be done. But culture remains formative and vital to states and individuals. These societies are the result of a lived historic experience and only an understanding of the very real security concerns they have will allow us to obtain more support from them in security fields which are, as in the past, still offering great challenges globally and regionally.

2012 ◽  
pp. 193-196
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The North ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Research Centres

Military Government in Latin America, 1959–1990

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian E. Loveman
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Military Government ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Latin America’s armed forces have played a central role in the region’s political history. This selective annotated bibliography focuses on key sources, with varying theoretical, empirical, and normative treatments of the military governments in the region, from the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990). The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. No pretense is made of comprehensiveness or of treating the “causes” of military coups (a vast literature) and of civil-military relations under civilian governments. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, 1968–1989; Honduras, 1963–1966 and 1972–1982; Chile, 1973–1990; and Uruguay, 1973–1984. In El Salvador the military dominated the government from 1948 until 1984, but the last “episode” was from 1979 to 1984. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. They had staunch supporters and intense opponents, and they were usually subject to internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.

Growing Participation in Peace Operations and Conflict Resolution in Latin American Countries

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Michael Kenkel
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
American States ◽  
The Right ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Latin American Countries

Latin American states have become major providers of troops for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since the early 2000s. MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti), the UN mission in Haiti, 55% of whose troops were from the region, was a major watershed for local security cooperation and PKO contributions. Led by Brazil, these states were able to develop a specific approach to peacebuilding that reflects regional strengths and experiences, rooted in minimizing the use of force and bringing successful domestic development policies to bear abroad. This approach also reflects the common security and intervention culture that underpins policy in the region. Two states in particular have taken on a role as major providers of peacekeeping contingents. Tiny Uruguay, with a population of 3 million people, has maintained over 2,000 troops deployed on UN PKOs (more than 10% of its armed forces) since 2005. While Uruguay’s motivations are mostly economic—UN reimbursements exceed the country’s costs—Brazil’s ascendance as a major peacekeeping provider during MINUSTAH was part of a larger emerging-power foreign policy project. Participating in peacebuilding allowed the country to provide security through actions in the development realm, bridging a key gap in many rising states’ capabilities, and to mount an incipient challenge to the Western-led peacebuilding paradigm. The remaining states of Latin America show considerable diversity in their peacekeeping engagement, with many others sending small or token contributions and some no troops at all. Latin American states’ involvement in PKOs cannot be understood without looking at their interaction with patterns of civil–military relations in the region. In the case of such states, the effect of peacekeeping participation on civil–military relations, while a key point in need of monitoring, has not been decisive, as other factors prevail. Finally, PKOs have served as the locus for a significant increase in policy coordination and cooperation in the defense arena in the region. As the UN moves toward stabilization operations which privilege counterterrorism measures over the peacebuilding paradigm that is a strength of Latin American countries, PKOs may lose attractiveness as a foreign policy avenue in the region. Additionally, the swing to the right in recent elections may serve to reduce the appeal of a practice which came to the fore under previous left-wing governments.

Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras

1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mark Ruhl
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Considerable Body

During the last two decades, military rulers have been replaced by democratically elected civilian governments throughout Latin America. Nevertheless, scholars (Mainwaring et al., 1992:3,8) contend that nearly all contemporary Latin American polities remain unconsolidated democratic regimes principally because civilian control over the armed forces has not yet been established. Although the armed forces have returned to their barracks, they have retained considerable political and institutional autonomy. A number of scholars (Loveman, 1994; Agüero, 1992; and others) emphasize that most Latin American constitutions still recognize the military's right to intervene when the constitutional order is threatened. The armed forces are also generally granted broad jurisdiction over internal security, as well as the freedom to organize their institution without civilian interference. There is a considerable body of opinion which maintains that fears of military intervention continue to constrain the behavior of civilian politicians and social groups (Valenzuela, 1992; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Rouquié, 1986; and Rial, 1990).

Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers By Wendy Hunter. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 243p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-243
Author(s):  
Craig Arceneaux
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Theoretical Orientation ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Latin American Politics ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Chapel Hill ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Military Relations

Writing at a time when the literature on transitions to democracy was fixated on the mode of transition, and when concepts such as authoritarian legacy, authoritarian enclave, or the shadow of the past dominated, Wendy Hunter's 1997 book, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, went against the grain. In a direct attack on institutionalist approaches that emphasized the resiliency of military prerogatives in transitions from military regimes, Hunter argues that democracy itself would, over time, reduce the influence exerted by the armed forces. A solid theoretical orientation, rich casework, and insightful commentary on the dynamics behind the creation of civilian control all mark the book as a noteworthy contribution to the literature on democratic transitions, civil–military relations, and Latin American politics.

Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Societal Explanation

1981 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mark Ruhl
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Government ◽  
American Military ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Authority

In spite of the reestablishment of civilian democracy in Ecuador and Peru, military government continues to be the norm in Latin America. In recent years, many scholars have examined the rise of military regimes in the region in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations. Few analysts, however, have studied civil-military relations in the handful of nations where civilian government has persisted. The purpose of this analysis is, therefore, to contribute to a broader understanding of Latin American military behavior by attempting to explain the Colombian armed forces’ atypical obedience to civilian authority.

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