Dissent on the Supreme Court, 1943–44

1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-54
Author(s):  
C. Herman Pritchett
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Public Attention ◽  
White Marble ◽  
The Past ◽  
Sherman Act ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Statute ◽  
Verbal Exchanges

During the 1943–44 term of the Supreme Court, public attention was attracted to that body on several occasions by verbal exchanges in decisions of the Court which seemed unusually sharp and personal. On January 3, 1944, Justices Black and Murphy admonished Justice Frankfurter that “for judges to rest their interpretation of statutes on nothing but their own conceptions of ‘morals’ and ‘ethics’ is, to say the least, dangerous business.” In another opinion on the same day, the same two judges referred to “what is patently a wholly gratuitous assertion as to constitutional law in the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.” In the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case, Justice Jackson observed that the minority judges were apparently willing to enforce the full faith and credit clause “only if the outcome pleases….” Justice Murphy told the Court on one occasion that it was “rewriting” a criminal statute, Justice Jackson called the decision bringing insurance under the Sherman Act a “reckless” one, and Justice Roberts several times waxed sarcastic about the disregarding or over-ruling of precedents. “This tendency,” he said, “indicates an intolerance for what those who have composed this court in the past have conscientiously and deliberately concluded, and involves an assumption that knowledge and wisdom reside in us which was denied to our predecessors.” It is not surprising that the newspapers translated these disagreements into personal terms and began to write about the “feud that was smoldering behind the Grecian columns of the white marble court building.”There are many reasons for not taking such accounts too seriously. Thomas Reed Powell has wisely warned “laymen … not to draw too broad conclusions from any reportorial propensity to play up judicial disagreements as contests like those in war or sports.” Disagreement is no new thing on the Court. The faultless phrasing of the Holmes dissents may have raised to a higher plane, but did not conceal, differences as sharp as any evident during the past term.

State Constitutional Law in 1930–31

1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 650-670
Author(s):  
Oliver P. Field
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
The State ◽  
Rural Districts ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Significant Case ◽  
State Constitutional Law

The most significant case in the field of state constitutional law decided during the past year is that of State ex rel. Miller v. Hinkle, decided by the supreme court of Washington in 1930. This case held that an apportionment act is a “law,” and can be popularly initiated under the initiative and referendum provisions of the constitution of the state of Washington. The court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to accept a petition submitting to popular referendum a proposal to redistrict the state for purposes of representation in the legislature. The legislature had failed for many years to perform its constitutional duty to reapportion the state, and this case illustrates the most conclusive argument in favor of the use of the initiative and referendum for purposes of ordinary legislation, even though the only legislation to which it be applied be that of reapportionment. Many states are faced with a serious problem in connection with over-representation of rural districts in the legislature and under-representation of urban districts. The initiative and referendum seem to offer about the only way out of the difficulty if state legislatures refuse to correct the inequality. The only alternative is that we change our ideas as to the necessity of majority rule in the selection and composition of legislative bodies, a change which the rural districts appear already to have made.

Summary of Results

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Trademark Law ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Networked Economy

The persuasive force of the accepted account’s property logic has driven antitrust and intellectual property law jurisprudence for at least the past three decades. It has been through the theory of trademark ownership and the commercial strategy of branding that these laws led the courts to comprehend markets as fundamentally bifurcated—as operating according to discrete types of interbrand and intrabrand competition—a division that had an effect far beyond the confines of trademark law and resonates today in the way government agencies and courts evaluate the emerging challenges of the networked economy along the previously introduced distinction between intertype and intratype competition. While the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court in ...

The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Cultural Rights ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Interpretive Strategies ◽  
The Right

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.

scholarly journals The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on American Political Parties

1994 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 565-575
Author(s):  
Howard A. Scarrow
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Voting Rights Act ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Impact

The weakening of American political parties has been a theme featured in the writings of political scientists for the past several decades. This essay is addressed to developments which may further that decline-developments which have undermined the very purpose which American political parties are said to serve. I refer to legal standards which were established by the Supreme Court in 1964, and which have since been expanded by the Court and then incorporated into the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its amendment in 1982.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Local State ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Entire Nation ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication ◽  
The Impact

This book examines the impact of Supreme Court cases from Texas on the entire nation. It argues that the most important Supreme Court cases have originated in Texas, which help explain why it is Texas and not California that provides breadth and depth to constitutional adjudication. Texas litigants, lawyers, politicians, and judges all play important roles in the underlying interplay of law and politics at the local, state, and national levels. In all its facets, Texas offers a window to all constitutional law and the Supreme Court. The book shows that Texas's impact literally started at the beginning by precipitating a debate over national powers and then a war with Mexico, and that the fraught relationship between Texas, the nation, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court in the century and a half since Texas v. White has produced more constitutional law than any other state.

A Step Too Far? Whittington Hospital NHS Trust v XX [2020] UKSC 14

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Andrew Powell
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Family Formation ◽  
Commercial Surrogacy ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court

Abstract This comment piece explores the decision in Whittington Hospital NHS Trust v XX [2020] UKSC 14. It argues that despite notable shifts in public policy in respect of the acceptability of surrogacy as a means of family formation in the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has taken a step too far in deciding that foreign commercial surrogacy is as widely socially accepted. This impacts on the reasonableness of any claim for damages in negligence for the costs of commercial surrogacy. It is posited that the issue of whether damages for foreign commercial surrogacy are reasonable or not will be the key battleground in future negligence cases of this type.

Teaching Constitutional Law Using Real-life Examples: An Example from the Practice of Assent to Bills Passed by the National Assembly After the Tenure of Office of the President and the Assembly

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Chukwuka Onyeaku ◽  
Tonye Clinton Jaja
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

As a matter of tradition and necessity, teachers of constitutional law within Nigeria (and elsewhere) are often compelled to refer to case law to provide illustrations of principles of constitutional law as enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). However, in some instances, where the said constitution does not provide explicit provisions, teachers of constitutional law are compelled to cite foreign case law as persuasive precedents. Still there are instances wherein there are neither foreign case law nor indigenous case law as precedents. In such situations, teachers of constitutional law are compelled to examine existing case law and relevant legislation until there is a pronouncement from either the Supreme Court or an alteration of the constitution by the National Assembly. One such situation is the subject of the analysis in this article: the situation whereby a president provides assent to bills after the expiration of the tenure of the National Assembly. As legislative tradition, the last session of each Chambers of the Nigeria’s National Assembly culminating each legislative term is usually a valedictory Session. Accordingly, Thursday, 6 June 2019 witnessed the last Session of the eighth National Assembly. As the president transmitted a Proclamation letter terminating the term of the eighth National Assembly inaugurated on 9 June 2015, it becomes paramount to examine the legal and constitutional implications of bills passed by the eighth National Assembly between 2016 and 2018 and up to 5 June 2019, which were assented to by the president after the tenure of the Assembly and office of the president. Thus, this article examines the constitutionality or otherwise of assenting to bills passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the president after the expiration of tenure of their offices. The article argues that the provisions of the 1999 Constitution had been violated when the president signed into law bills passed by the eighth National Assembly after the tenure of office of the president and the eighth National Assembly. It concludes that bills rejected by the president will require another legislative process of being passed into law again by the same Assembly or subsequent one before it can be assented to by the president. Failure to follow this constitutional process will render the assent unconstitutional.

From promise to retrenchment: On the changing landscape of Israeli constitutionalism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Shinar ◽  
Barak Medina ◽  
Gila Stopler
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Israeli Society ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Revolution

Abstract Israeli constitutionalism has long interested comparative constitutional law scholars, whether due to its geopolitical status, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, its internal divisions, or its unique constitutional evolution. Unlike many other countries that have ratified constitutions after the Second World War, Israel was established as a parliamentary democracy, with an explicit intention to ratify a constitution at a later stage. This did not happen. Instead, it underwent a “constitutional revolution” announced by its Supreme Court. Fitting a revolution, much of comparative constitutional law scholarship has focused on this pivotal moment. The articles in this symposium depart from the scholarship focused on that moment. They seek to critically understand what has become of Israeli constitutionalism in the past decade. In this introduction, we highlight several transformations and features which we believe are essential if one is to understand the extant constitutional order in Israel. These should be understood as background conditions against which Israeli constitutionalism is operating. They include the strengthening of judicial review alongside rising political resistance to the Court’s power; populism in political discourse targeting rule of law institutions; the erosion of individual rights alongside the strengthening of nationalist elements; and increasing divisions inside Israeli society. These challenge the idea of a successful constitutional revolution in terms of its inherent promise to better protect individual rights and safeguard the rule of law. In describing these features, we seek to situate the Supreme Court, judicial review, and the legal-constitutional order generally, in the larger sphere of Israeli society and politics.

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