Hobbes's Concept of Representation—I

1964 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 328-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Pitkin

It is not customary to regard Thomas Hobbes as a theorist particularly concerned with representation. Hardly any of the traditional commentaries on his thought even acknowledge that he mentions the term; and the index to Molesworth's standard edition of Hobbes's English works contains no reference to it. But the fact is that representation plays a central role in the Leviathan; and Hobbes's analysis of the concept is among the most serious, systematic and challenging in the history of political philosophy. It is an analysis both temptingly plausible and, as I hope to show, peculiarly wrong. And the ways in which it is wrong are intimately related to what is most characteristic and peculiar in the Hobbesian political argument.

Author(s):  
John T. Hamilton

What does the term “security” express? What are or have been its semantic functions: its shifting cultural connotations and its divergent discursive values? This chapter examines the figures and metaphors that have been deployed to think about security across the ages. It outlines the main stations along the word's complex itinerary through historical usage. It begins with a cursory overview that marks the major turning points of this history, beginning with ancient Rome and concluding with seventeenth-century Europe. Among the topics covered is the positive sense of security that established its position as a central topic in political philosophy in the work of Thomas Hobbes. Throughout, the affirmation of security as a good is fundamentally connected with the power of sovereignty to alleviate the cares and concerns of its subjects. The state emerges as an institution that protects its citizens from all varieties of existential threats, from external aggression as well as from internal discord.


1972 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 409-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marvin Schiller

The central purpose of this paper is to examine the case for political authority, i.e., the argument for having political authority rather than for having none. Thus, the case for political authority is the case against anarchism. My construction of that case owes much, no doubt, to observations made long ago by Thomas Hobbes and john locke. Nevertheless, these observations have never been stated in a satisfactory and systematic fashion, not even by Hobbes and locke themselves. Hobbes’ observations have, more often than not, been misunderstood, and those of locke have generally been overlooked. However, this paper is not intended to be an exercise in the history of political philosophy. Rather, it is an assessment of a philosophical thesis, namely, that political authority is essential to man's survival and well-being. Although this thesis is rarely contested and, in fact, borders on the commonplace, it is contestable. Moreover, since disenchantment with authority and how it is exercised is growing, an examination of how men are likely to fare in its absence is appropriate. Such an examination is complex, but it is not impossible.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-124
Author(s):  
Luciano Venezia

In this paper I outline three kinds of analysis of classical texts in the history of political philosophy, which I call “Reconstruction”, “Illustration” and “Use”. I briefly develop each of these methodologies, relying especially on my own work on John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. Finally, I put forward some thoughts about the value of the different kinds of approach.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff ◽  
G. A. Cohen

G. A. Cohen was one of the leading political philosophers of recent times. He first came to wide attention in 1978 with the prize-winning book Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. In subsequent decades his published writings largely turned away from the history of philosophy, focusing instead on equality, freedom, and justice. However, throughout his career he regularly lectured on a wide range of moral and political philosophers of the past. This volume collects these previously unpublished lectures. Starting with a chapter centered on Plato, but also discussing the pre-Socratics as well as Aristotle, the book moves to social contract theory as discussed by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume, and then continues with chapters on Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. The book also contains some previously published but uncollected papers on Marx, Hobbes, and Kant, among other figures. The collection concludes with a memoir of Cohen written by the volume editor who was a student of Cohen's. A hallmark of the lectures is Cohen's engagement with the thinkers he discusses. Rather than simply trying to render their thought accessible to the modern reader, he tests whether their arguments and positions are clear, sound, and free from contradiction. Ultimately, his lectures teach us not only about some of the great thinkers in the history of moral and political philosophy, but also about one of the great thinkers of our time: Cohen himself.


Author(s):  
David Estlund

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.


Author(s):  
Gerald M. Mara

This book examines how ideas of war and peace have functioned as organizing frames of reference within the history of political theory. It interprets ten widely read figures in that history within five thematically focused chapters that pair (in order) Schmitt and Derrida, Aquinas and Machiavelli, Hobbes and Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, and Thucydides and Plato. The book’s substantive argument is that attempts to establish either war or peace as dominant intellectual perspectives obscure too much of political life. The book argues for a style of political theory committed more to questioning than to closure. It challenges two powerful currents in contemporary political philosophy: the verdict that premodern or metaphysical texts cannot speak to modern and postmodern societies, and the insistence that all forms of political theory be some form of democratic theory. What is offered instead is a nontraditional defense of the tradition and a democratic justification for moving beyond democratic theory. Though the book avoids any attempt to show the immediate relevance of these interpretations to current politics, its impetus stems very much from the current political circumstances. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century , a series of wars has eroded confidence in the progressively peaceful character of international relations; citizens of the Western democracies are being warned repeatedly about the threats posed within a dangerous world. In this turbulent context, democratic citizens must think more critically about the actions their governments undertake. The texts interpreted here are valuable resources for such critical thinking.


1984 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 6-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan M. Fishman

The Socratic method was the major pedagogic tool at the first great Western university, Plato's Academy, and continues to be respected, at least in theory, by teachers at our institutions of higher learning. Yet today many of Plato's heirs in the university community seem to hold several perhaps innocent but nonetheless serious misconceptions concerning the Socratic technique. As a political scientist interested in the history of political philosophy, I have developed some thoughts on this subject in response to repeated inquiries by colleagues and students alike.One popular inaccuracy describes the Socratic method as an openended question and answer process. Actually, the Socratic approach has a singular purpose, namely the search for truth, and it is this explicit goal rather than an informal procedure of give and take which distinguishes the Socratic method from other teaching techniques.


Author(s):  
Andre Santos Campos

Historical analyses of the relations between political theory and time often hinge on two claims. The first is that political theorists have until recently put less emphasis on the future than the past when debating political legitimacy and obligation. The second is that the history of political theory draws a fundamental distinction between theories that invoke time to legitimate political structures and theories that reject temporal considerations in favor of timeless principles. This chapter disputes these two claims by maintaining that competing languages of legitimacy harbor different and interrelated conceptions of temporality. A survey of time conceptions in the history of political philosophy shows that normative political theory is inherently multitemporal, involving double regard for the past and the future. And, since even tenseless principles of legitimacy often depend on temporally related forms of formulation and application, considerations about time seem inescapable in normative political theory.


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