Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War

1976 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avi Shlaim
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Systematic Research ◽  
Accurate Information ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Theory Of Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Intelligence Failures

The principal question which this article seeks to answer is: Why was the intention of the Arabs to launch the Yom Kippur War misperceived despite the fact that Israeli Intelligence had ample and accurate information on enemy moves and dispositions? In this anatomy of the Israeli intelligence failure, extensive use is made of the report of the official commission of inquiry that investigated the events leading up to the war. The article is equally concerned with the phenomenon of strategic surprise in general, and this case study is used to explore the psychological and organizational roots of intelligence failures. Some safeguards and institutional reforms for reducing the frequency of failure are examined. However, there is no suggestion that surprise can ever be eliminated altogether. In conclusion a case is made for developing a theory of intelligence through case studies and systematic research.

Yom Kippur War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Rezk
Keyword(s):  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Military Capability ◽  
Arab Culture ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Radical Revision ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Military Victory

The Yom Kippur War was a critical game changer in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the politics of the Middle East. Henry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur thus: ‘Our definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.’ The most recently released material suggests that Kissinger’s explanation requires some revising. This chapter demonstrates that British and American analysts understood perfectly well Sadat’s intentions, specifically his desire for a limited military victory to gain ‘face’ at home and leverage abroad. Instead analytical weakness lay in assessments of Egypt’s military capability where there was a unanimous consensus of Egypt’s impotency. Ideas about Arab ‘culture’ seem to have played a key role in this underestimation: the notion of a fatalistic Islam for example, prevailed in numerous analyses. In a radical revision of the conventional wisdom about the strengths and weaknesses of Western intelligence agencies, the Yom Kippur war provides a revealing case study whereby the West excelled in understanding the ‘mystery’ or intentions leading to war, but simply did not believe that Egypt possessed the capability to act effectively, and so perilously dismissed the prospect of an Egyptian attack.

scholarly journals From "silent generation" to cyber-psy-site, story and history: The 14th Tank Brigade battles on public collective memory and official recognition

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Miri Gal-Ezer
Keyword(s):  
Collective Memory ◽  
Critical Discourse Analysis ◽  
State Level ◽  
Military History ◽  
Generation Gap ◽  
Thick Description ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Public Recognition ◽  
Yom Kippur

This audience research case study focuses on the Israeli 14th Tank Brigade veterans, who were involved in the 1973 Yom Kippur War horrific battles against the Egyptians in the Sinai Desert. In 2007, this offline traumatised remembrance community constructed an online commemorative and historical website to advance their unrelenting struggle on public recognition in the Israeli national collective memory and military history. The theoretical framework combines diverse perspectives: the Yom Kippur War and its consequences on Israeli society; theories of generations and media generations, war and trauma, war and remembrance; and Israel's collective memory and culture of remembrance. An integrated methodology offline and online was conducted: multi-sited and multimodal "Thick Description" ethnography and netnography; critical discourse analysis and semiotics of texts and artifacts; and in-depth interviews with veterans and historians. Findings are constructed on three levels: first - analysis of veterans’ interrelations with common Israeli culture of memory, and their active participation as a "remembrance community" in creating cultural artifacts offline and online; second – interpretation of Israeli cultural codes in battlefield "actuality", even under the most traumatic conditions; and third - the universal state level, analysis of the deep conflict impelling the remembrance community to write the Yom Kippur War battles also as history in their cybersite, thus attaining public recognition. This case study demonstrates the war veterans’ ability of "Breaking the Silence", empowering their traumatised community by bridging the "generation gap" of their "actual" "media generation", by merging their comradeship and high cultural capital, towards official affirmation within Israeli military history.

Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable

1978 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard K. Betts
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Rehabilitation ◽  
Worst Case Analysis ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Policy Failure ◽  
Strategic Intelligence ◽  
Psychological Attributes ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
Many Sources ◽  
Intelligence Failures

Strategic intelligence failures cannot be prevented by organizational solutions to problems of analysis and communication. Analytic certainty is precluded by ambiguity of evidence, ambivalence of judgment, and atrophy of institutional reforms designed to avert failures. Many sources of error are unresolvable paradoxes and dilemmas rather than curable pathologies. Major failures in attack warning, operational evaluation, and intelligence for strategic planning are due primarily to leaders’ psychological attributes rather than to analysts’ failures to detect relevant data. Since analysis and decision are interactive rather than sequential processes, and authorities often hear but dismiss correct estimates, intelligence failure is inseparable from policy failure. Solutions most often proposed—worst-case analysis, multiple advocacy, devil's advocacy, organizational consolidation, sanctions and incentives for analysts, and cognitive rehabilitation—are either impractical because of constraints on the leaders’ time, or they are mixed blessings because they create new problems in the course of solving old ones.

The Role of Doctrine

2020 ◽  
pp. 30-53
Author(s):  
David Barno ◽  
Nora Bensahel
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Iterative Process ◽  
Military Doctrine ◽  
World War ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Chain Of Command ◽  
Yom Kippur

This chapter explores the role of doctrine in military adaptation and how it prepares commanders and soldiers for the fog and friction of the battlefield. It argues that doctrine must remain flexible and open to change through a constant iterative process of improvement. Effective adaptation of doctrine also requires input from all levels of the chain of command and the ability to rapidly disseminate changes throughout the force. The chapter illustrates successful and failed adaptability of military doctrine using case studies of the French and German armies in World War II and the Egyptian and Israeli armies during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

At the Decisive Point in the Sinai

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Even ◽  
Simcha B. Maoz
Keyword(s):  
Suez Canal ◽  
The Political ◽  
Commanding Officer ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
Major General

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War or the October War, was fought by Israel against a coalition of Arab nations, led by Syria and Egypt. The war lasted nineteen days, with the pivotal moment being Major General Ariel Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal, which is known as the crossing battle In this narrative Jacob Even and Simcha B. Maoz consider the war and Sharon’s leadership as a case study of generalship for the benefit of new generations of senior field commanders. By focusing on the divisional command, Even and Maoz balance the macro view of the war (in the context of the political atmosphere of the time) with the micro view (as a cascade of individual decisions made by each commanding officer).

Patientenbezogene Komplexität in der Pflege – Kollektive Case Studies im Akutspital

Pflege ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 237-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Gurtner ◽  
Rebecca Spirig ◽  
Diana Staudacher ◽  
Evelyn Huber
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Study Designs

Zusammenfassung. Hintergrund: Die patientenbezogene Komplexität der Pflege ist durch die Merkmale „Instabilität“, „Unsicherheit“ und „Variabilität“ definiert. Aufgrund der reduzierten Aufenthaltsdauer und der steigenden Zahl chronisch und mehrfach erkrankter Personen erhöht sich die Komplexität der Pflege. Ziel: In dieser Studie untersuchten wir das Phänomen patientenbezogener Komplexität aus Sicht von Pflegefachpersonen und Pflegeexpertinnen im Akutspital. Methode: Im Rahmen eines kollektiven Case-Study-Designs schätzten Pflegefachpersonen und Pflegeexpertinnen die Komplexität von Pflegesituationen mit einem Fragebogen ein. Danach befragten wir sie in Einzelinterviews zu ihrer Einschätzung. Mittels Within-Case-Analyse verdichteten wir die Daten induktiv zu Fallgeschichten. In der Cross-Case-Analyse verglichen wir die Fallgeschichten hinsichtlich deduktiv abgeleiteter Merkmale. Ergebnisse: Die Ausprägung der Komplexität hing in den vier Cases im Wesentlichen davon ab, ob klinische Probleme kontrollierbar und prognostizierbar waren. Je nach individuellen Ressourcen der Patientinnen und Patienten stieg bzw. sank die Komplexität. Schlussfolgerungen: Komplexe Patientensituationen fordern von Pflegefachpersonen Fachwissen, Erfahrung, kommunikative Kompetenzen sowie die Fähigkeit zur Reflexion. Berufsanfänger und Berufsanfängerinnen werden zur Entwicklung dieser Fähigkeiten idealerweise durch erfahrene Berufskolleginnen oder -kollegen unterstützt und beraten.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document