Challenges in the homecoming of released prisoners of war: Israeli defense force preparations—A case study of freed prisoners of war from the Yom Kippur War and Second Lebanon War.

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-279
Author(s):  
Ofir Levi ◽  
Eyal Fruchter ◽  
Yitshak Kreiss
Keyword(s):  
Prisoners Of War ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Israeli Defense Force ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Second Lebanon War

Yom Kippur War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Rezk
Keyword(s):  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Military Capability ◽  
Arab Culture ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Radical Revision ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Military Victory

The Yom Kippur War was a critical game changer in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the politics of the Middle East. Henry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur thus: ‘Our definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.’ The most recently released material suggests that Kissinger’s explanation requires some revising. This chapter demonstrates that British and American analysts understood perfectly well Sadat’s intentions, specifically his desire for a limited military victory to gain ‘face’ at home and leverage abroad. Instead analytical weakness lay in assessments of Egypt’s military capability where there was a unanimous consensus of Egypt’s impotency. Ideas about Arab ‘culture’ seem to have played a key role in this underestimation: the notion of a fatalistic Islam for example, prevailed in numerous analyses. In a radical revision of the conventional wisdom about the strengths and weaknesses of Western intelligence agencies, the Yom Kippur war provides a revealing case study whereby the West excelled in understanding the ‘mystery’ or intentions leading to war, but simply did not believe that Egypt possessed the capability to act effectively, and so perilously dismissed the prospect of an Egyptian attack.

Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War

1976 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avi Shlaim
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Systematic Research ◽  
Accurate Information ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Theory Of Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Intelligence Failures

The principal question which this article seeks to answer is: Why was the intention of the Arabs to launch the Yom Kippur War misperceived despite the fact that Israeli Intelligence had ample and accurate information on enemy moves and dispositions? In this anatomy of the Israeli intelligence failure, extensive use is made of the report of the official commission of inquiry that investigated the events leading up to the war. The article is equally concerned with the phenomenon of strategic surprise in general, and this case study is used to explore the psychological and organizational roots of intelligence failures. Some safeguards and institutional reforms for reducing the frequency of failure are examined. However, there is no suggestion that surprise can ever be eliminated altogether. In conclusion a case is made for developing a theory of intelligence through case studies and systematic research.

Disaffiliating From the Cult of the Fallen

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 381-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Lavie-Ajayi
Keyword(s):  
Israeli Society ◽  
Yearly Cycle ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
The Past ◽  
Israeli Defense Force ◽  
The Future ◽  
Yom Kippur

This article is an autoethnographic exploration of how my family lives with the memory of my uncle, who was killed in service as an enlisted soldier of the Israeli Defense Force during the Yom Kippur War (also known as the 1973 Arab–Israeli War). This article considers how the memory of my uncle has been constructed through the yearly national cycle of military and family ceremonies. Participation in military ceremonies of this nature is a way for my family to deal with the intolerable pain of my uncle’s death. Yet, I argue, this yearly cycle of commemoration is part of “the cult of the fallen” at the heart of contemporary Israeli society; a cult which places the death of my uncle as part of the narrative of inevitable, ongoing national conflict, connecting the past and the present and justifying further militarism in the future.

From Routine Security Operations to War

2020 ◽  
pp. 93-125
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Organizational Experience ◽  
The Future ◽  
Rapid Transition ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Second Lebanon War

The chapter explores the personal and organizational cognitive and command challenges in the rapid transition from peacetime or RSO to war. The challenge is three fold: identifying the change against the background of previous personal and organizational experience; assimilating the need for a transition in superior and subordinate echelons; implementing the change, mainly in the field of C2. Three cases are presented in the Yom Kippur War: the ground forces on the southern and northern fronts and the IAF. The Second Lebanon War case is discussed first from the GHQ perspective and then from the 91st Galilee Division's perspective. Lessons for the future are drawn.

scholarly journals From "silent generation" to cyber-psy-site, story and history: The 14th Tank Brigade battles on public collective memory and official recognition

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Miri Gal-Ezer
Keyword(s):  
Collective Memory ◽  
Critical Discourse Analysis ◽  
State Level ◽  
Military History ◽  
Generation Gap ◽  
Thick Description ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Public Recognition ◽  
Yom Kippur

This audience research case study focuses on the Israeli 14th Tank Brigade veterans, who were involved in the 1973 Yom Kippur War horrific battles against the Egyptians in the Sinai Desert. In 2007, this offline traumatised remembrance community constructed an online commemorative and historical website to advance their unrelenting struggle on public recognition in the Israeli national collective memory and military history. The theoretical framework combines diverse perspectives: the Yom Kippur War and its consequences on Israeli society; theories of generations and media generations, war and trauma, war and remembrance; and Israel's collective memory and culture of remembrance. An integrated methodology offline and online was conducted: multi-sited and multimodal "Thick Description" ethnography and netnography; critical discourse analysis and semiotics of texts and artifacts; and in-depth interviews with veterans and historians. Findings are constructed on three levels: first - analysis of veterans’ interrelations with common Israeli culture of memory, and their active participation as a "remembrance community" in creating cultural artifacts offline and online; second – interpretation of Israeli cultural codes in battlefield "actuality", even under the most traumatic conditions; and third - the universal state level, analysis of the deep conflict impelling the remembrance community to write the Yom Kippur War battles also as history in their cybersite, thus attaining public recognition. This case study demonstrates the war veterans’ ability of "Breaking the Silence", empowering their traumatised community by bridging the "generation gap" of their "actual" "media generation", by merging their comradeship and high cultural capital, towards official affirmation within Israeli military history.

The Outbreak of War during Conceptual or Doctrinal Change

2020 ◽  
pp. 67-92
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Suez Canal ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Operational Concept ◽  
Second Lebanon War ◽  
Concept Of Operations

While conceptual and doctrinal debates are the "bread and butter" of military organizations in peacetime, what happens when war begins before the debate is settled? The chapter explores two cases – the debate over the defensive concept on the Suez Canal line prior to the Yom Kippur War and the IDF's 2006 concept of operations and operational concept for fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon prior to the Second Lebanon War. The aim of the chapter is to illuminate the fact that conceptual debates should be monitored and managed in a way that minimizes the likelihood of conceptual incoherency when war suddenly breaks out.

The Effect of Prolonged Routine Security Operations on Wartime Capabilities

2020 ◽  
pp. 38-66
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Full Scale ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Low Intensity ◽  
Potential Loss ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Second Lebanon War ◽  
The Impact

The chapter presents the consequences of long periods of low intensity engagements on the ability of military organizations to shift successfully from a routine security operations (RSO) mindset (fighting norms, C2 procedures) to war, and the potential loss of doctrinal knowledge and organizational competency needed for fighting a full-scale war. The historical cases include the impact of 1967-1973 RSO on the IDF's performance in the Yom Kippur War (mainly the IAF) and the effect of RSO between 1995 and 2006 on the IDF's performance in the Second Lebanon War (mainly the ground forces). Lessons are brought forth for the necessary balance between winning the current low intensity conflict and preparing for the initial battles in a suddenly erupting war.

At the Decisive Point in the Sinai

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Even ◽  
Simcha B. Maoz
Keyword(s):  
Suez Canal ◽  
The Political ◽  
Commanding Officer ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
Major General

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War or the October War, was fought by Israel against a coalition of Arab nations, led by Syria and Egypt. The war lasted nineteen days, with the pivotal moment being Major General Ariel Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal, which is known as the crossing battle In this narrative Jacob Even and Simcha B. Maoz consider the war and Sharon’s leadership as a case study of generalship for the benefit of new generations of senior field commanders. By focusing on the divisional command, Even and Maoz balance the macro view of the war (in the context of the political atmosphere of the time) with the micro view (as a cascade of individual decisions made by each commanding officer).

Sadat and the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Grunwald ◽  
Mark Perrin
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur
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