Majority Party Leadership in Congress.

1971 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
Richard Bolling ◽  
Randall B. Ripley
1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 1593-1604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis P. Westefield

In this paper one party leadership strategy with respect to the committee system of the House is examined. Building on several relatively clear concepts such as compliance, quality of assignment, expectation, scarcity, and exchange, a very elementary, yet explicit, theory is constructed. It is shown that the leaders pursue a strategy of accommodation. The leaders increase the number of positions on those committees prized by the members in order to guarantee a steady supply of resources to gain leverage with the members. But a steady increase in the supply of positions reduces the scarcity of positions and hence their value to the leaders. Thus, a consequence of the strategy is the need periodically to reorganize or make adjustments in the committee system.


Author(s):  
Justin Buchler

When a majority party works on normal legislation, it faces a collective action problem of sincere voting, and must prevent legislators from centrist districts from voting against noncentrist legislation. From 2011 through 2016, though, Republican Party leadership faced a different challenge, and leaders were pitted against the extremists in their caucus. This occurred because of a change to the legislative agenda resulting from the combination of extreme polarization and divided government introduced by the 2010 election. With no incentive to work on normal legislation, the agenda did little but avoid reversion points, like debt ceiling breaches, which the extreme elements in the caucus actually found acceptable. Speaker Boehner was forced to solve a new collective action problem, then, convincing a group of Republicans to join with Democrats on bipartisan deals to avoid these reversion points. While historically unusual, the dynamic is what would be expected from the unified model.


2021 ◽  
pp. 801-824
Author(s):  
David Gelman ◽  
Max Goplerud

This chapter analyzes the trends in speaking behavior in the United States Congress from 1921 to 2010 in the House and Senate. We find that key determinants of political behavior from the existing American and comparative literature (seniority, committee leader, party leadership, ideological extremism, and majority party membership) correspond to more floor speeches by members. Senators deliver more speeches per member than their counterparts in the House, although the determinants of activity are broadly similar. Splitting the results by historical period and examining the relationship by the polarization of the chamber show that the effects of certain variables have changed considerably over time. In the House, in particular, the effects of committee leader, extremism, and majority party status have increased over time while the effect of seniority has noticeably decreased in the post-Gingrich period.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 724-747
Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi

Harry Reid is often lauded by fellow Democrats as one of the most powerful Senate Majority leaders in modern history. One tactic that he used to usher in legislation was a parliamentary procedure known as “Filling the Amendment Tree.” Amendment trees are diagrams that demonstrate the amendment process for legislation, but Reid often limited the number of amendments that could be offered on a piece of legislation using this procedure. From the majority’s perspective, this procedure helps usher in legislation and protects vulnerable moderates from having to vote on controversial legislation. Still, others argue that the restrictive procedure limited the ability of moderate Democrats to distinguish themselves from their party leadership, making them vulnerable to attacks. In this article, I find that filling the amendment tree did not limit moderate Democrats from proposing amendments. In fact, although moderate Republicans shied away from the process of filing amendments in protest, there was no statistical relationship between ideology and the number of amendments filed for Democrats. Still, upon examination of voting data, the use of the procedure homogenized the voting records of moderate Democrats in the 112th and 113th Congresses. Furthermore, it forced moderate Republicans to vote more often with the Democrats in each of the Congresses in which Reid employed the procedure.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph K. Huitt

Party leadership in Congress has been one focal point for the sustained attack on the structure and performance of the American party system that has gone on for a decade and a half. Academic critics and members of Congress, individually and in committees, supplemented by a wide array of interested citizens and groups, have laid out blueprints for institutional reorganization. While there is some variety in their prescriptions, it is not hard to construct a composite model of party leadership in legislation on which there has been a fairly wide consensus among the reformers.The fount of party policy would be a reformed national convention, meeting biennially at the least. The obligation of the majority party in Congress, spurred by the president if he were of the same party, would be to carry out the platform put together by the convention. For this purpose frequent party conferences would be held in each house to consider specific measures. Some would be for the purpose of discussion and education, but on important party measures the members could be bound by a conference vote and penalized in committee assignments and other party perquisites for disregarding the will of the conference. Party strategy, legislative scheduling, and continuous leadership would be entrusted to a policy committee made up, in most schemes, of the elective officers of the house and the chairmen of the standing committees. Some have suggested a joint policy committee, made up of the policy committees of the respective houses, which might then meet with the president as a kind of legislative cabinet. The committee chairmen would not be exclusively, and perhaps not at all, the products of seniority.


1969 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 604
Author(s):  
Jordan A. Schwarz ◽  
Randall B. Ripley

1969 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 411
Author(s):  
Jerome M. Clubb ◽  
Randall B. Ripley

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