Jus Gentium and International Law

1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon E. Sherman

At the present moment, when the very existence of international law as a practical element in the conduct of human affairs is doubted or derided by many and when such precepts as are claimed to be fundamental in that law itself are daily set at nought by belligerents in the world conflict, it has been thought that a brief outline of the earliest conceptions characterizing international jurisprudence will prove neither, useless nor unwelcome.The term “International Law” has, in the usage of our day, quite superseded the earlier expression “law of nations,” long since adopted as a translation of the Latin phrase jus gentium. The expression “International Law,” however, so familiar to us, properly denotes a wholly variant conception. In modern days it is used by the celebrated D’Aguesseau and occurs in Volume II of his works, page 337 in the edition of 1773; it is shortly afterward employed by Bentham in his “Principles of Morals and Legislation” (XVII, 326, n. 1), and has since his time come into general use. D’Aguesseau’s expression (droit entre les gens) is doubtless, in its turn, an adaptation from Zouche, Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, who uses, about 1650, the term jus inter gentes in harmony with the thought of Grotius as expressed in the opening paragraph of the Prolegomena to his De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, where Grotius explains at the outset the intended subject of his great treatise, — at jus illud quod inter populos plures aut populorum rectores intercedit, sire ab ipsa natura profectum, aut divinis constitutum legibus, sine moribus et pacto tacito introductum, attigerunt pauci, universim ac certo ordine tractavit hactenus nemo; cum tamen id fieri intersit humani generis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 35-70
Author(s):  
Scott Slorach ◽  
Judith Embley ◽  
Peter Goodchild ◽  
Catherine Shephard

This chapter focuses on the sources of law in England & Wales, and is organised as follows. Section 2.1 describes the key jurisdictions relevant to lawyers in England and Wales. Section 2.2 deals with the issue of where the law comes from: sources of law. Section 2.3 reviews the development of the two ‘traditional’ sources of law in England and Wales: case law and statutes. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 consider the status and operation of EU and international law, including the potential effect of Brexit. Section 2.7 goes on to discuss public and private law, common law, and civil law, and other classifications used by lawyers. This is followed by a discussion of legal systems and their cultures across the world.



Author(s):  
Nan Goodman

This book traces the emergence of a sense of kinship with and belonging to a larger, more inclusive world within the law and literature of late seventeenth-century Puritanism. Connected to this cosmopolitanism in part through travel, trade, and politics, late seventeenth-century Puritans, it is argued, were also thinking in terms that went beyond these parameters about what it meant to feel affiliated with people in remote places—of which the Ottoman Empire is the best, but not the only example—and to experience what Bruce Robbins calls “attachment at a distance.” In this way Puritan writers and readers were not simply learning about others but also cultivating an awareness of themselves as “stand[ing] in an ethically significant relation” to people all around the world. The underlying source of these cosmopolitan predilections was the law, specifically the law of nations, often considered the precursor to international law. Through the terms for sovereignty, obligation, and society made available by a turn toward the cosmopolitan within the law, the Puritans experimented with concepts of extended obligation and ideas about a society consisting of all humans, not just those living on certain trade routes or within certain foreign communities. In mapping out these thought experiments, The Puritan Cosmopolis uncovers Puritans who were reconceptualizing war, contemplating new ways of cultivating peace, and rewriting the rules for being Puritan by internalizing legal theories about living in a larger, more inclusive world.



Author(s):  
C. H. Alexandrowicz

In recent years there has been a growing awareness of the need to write a global history of law of nations that disengages from parochial national and regional histories. It is hoped that these developments will bring centre-stage the work of Charles Henry Alexandrowicz (1902–75), a scholar who was among the first to conceptualize the history of international law as that of intersecting histories of different regions of the world. Alexandrowicz was aware that, while the idea of writing a global history of law of nations is liberating, there is no guarantee that it will not become the handmaiden of contemporary and future imperial projects. What were needed were critical global histories that provincialize established Eurocentric historiographies and read them alongside other regional histories. This book aims to make Alexandrowicz’s writings more widely available and read. The Introduction to this book sums up the context, issues, problems, and questions that engaged Alexandrowicz, as well as some of his central theses. His writings are a gold mine waiting to be explored. Alexandrowicz contributed to the effort of promoting the idea of international rule of law by rejecting a Eurocentric history and theory of international law.



2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 644-649 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Kontorovich

In the first criminal piracy decision by a United States court in nearly a century, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the federal piracy statute’s reference to the “law of nations” explicitly ties the scope of the offense to evolving customary international law definitions of the crime. The court went on to find that under current customary and treaty law, attempted piracy falls within the scope of the international crime. In doing so, it joined several courts in nations around the world that have confronted the issue as a result of the outbreak of Somali piracy that began in 2008.



1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elihu Root

With this meeting we finish the first decade of this Society. How great is the change of conditions in the field of international law during that period. Ten years ago all the governments of the world professed unqualified respect and obedience to the law of nations, and a very small number of persons not directly connected with government knew or cared anything about it. In this country at least international law was regarded as a rather antiquated branch of useless learning, diplomacy as a foolish mystery, and the foreign service as a superfluous expense. Now that governments have violated and flouted the law in many ways and with appalling consequences, the people of this country at least have begun to realize that observance of the law has a real and practical relation to the peace and honor of their own country and their own prosperity. They are beginning to take an interest in the subject, to discuss it in the newspapers, to inquire how observance of the law may be enforced. There appears a dawning consciousness that a democracy which undertakes to control its own foreign relations ought to know something about the subject. If we had not established this Society ten years ago to study and discuss and spread a knowledge of international law it would surely be demanded now, and we may be certain that our annual public discussions and the publication of the admirable Journal which we have always maintained, with its definite and certain informa-lion upon international events, its interesting and well informed discussion of international topics, and its supplements, with their wealth of authentic copies of international documents, have contributed materially towards fitting the people of our country to deal with the international situations which are before them.



1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Wilford Garner

The above is the title of an article by. Mr. E. G. Trimble in the January (1930) issue of this Journal, which contains a rather severe indictment of the Allied Powers, and particularly of Great Britain, for having violated during the World War various well-settled rules of international law regarding the conduct of maritime warfare. I do not deny at all that there were violations of certain rules and practices which had come to be generally, if not universally, recognized as a part of the customary law of nations—violations not only by the Allied Powers, but on an even larger scale by their opponents, which latter, however, the author passes over in silence. But, in my opinion, his charges in some cases are not well founded either upon principles of international law, reason or the logic of the actual conditions under which the rules had to be applied. In presenting here a different view of the case, my object is not so much to defend the Allied Powers against the charges contained in Mr. Trimble's indictment as to reaffirm and maintain views which I expressed during the war regarding certain rights of belligerents in naval warfare, especially under the peculiar conditions which prevailed during that war—rights the exercise of which I believe was justified in principle by those conditions, whatever may have been the opinion of statesmen and prize judges a century ago, and which would have been claimed and exercised by Germany had the geographical situation as between her and Great Britain been reversed.



1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Willing Balch

Modern international law is generally regarded as beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. But it is necessary to go much further back in the history of the world for the beginnings of the law governing the intercourse of nations. The Greek states had a rudimentary inter-state law that regulated their relations. Thus they practiced arbitration in a way among themselves: they recognized the sanctity of the person of heralds, and they followed other recognized customs in their dealings one with another. When Rome and Carthage and other nations were struggling for the mastery of the world, the beginnings of a law of nations were recognized and practiced between them. Upon, however, practically all the known world coming under the sway of imperial Rome, all possibility as well as need of a law of nations was wanting, and as a result the faltering beginnings of an international law as recognized among the Greek states and then by the Powers surrounding the Mediterranean, were extinguished by the extension of the Pax Romana to all the known world.



1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Fenwick

There is no more significant commentary on the growth of international law, both in precision and in comprehensiveness, than an estimate of the relative authority of the name of Vattel in the world of international relations a century ago and in that of today. A century ago not even the name of Grotius himself was more potent in its influence upon questions relating to international law than that of Vattel. Vattel's treatise on the law of nations was quoted by judicial tribunals, in speeches before legislative assemblies, and in the decrees and correspondence of executive officials. It was the manual of the student, the reference work of the statesman, and the text from which the political philosopher drew inspiration. Publicists considered it sufficient to cite the authority of Vattel to justify and give conclusiveness and force to statements as to the proper conduct of a state in its international relations.At the present day the name and treatise of Vattel have both passed into the remoter field of the history of international law. It is safe to say that in no modern controversy over the existence and force of an alleged rule of international law would publicists seek to strengthen the position taken by them by quoting the authority of Vattel. As an exposition of the law of nations at a given period of its growth, the work can, it is true, lose nothing of its value, but in saying that it has thus won its place irrevocably among the classics of international law, we are merely repeating that it has lost its value as a treatise on the law of the present day.



Author(s):  
Nan Goodman

The Puritans’ cosmopolitan thought in late seventeenth-century New England had its source in the cosmopolitanism of a law of nations that was as much about the world as a whole as it was about the nation-state it later came to epitomize. With the nation-state not yet a consolidated entity, the seventeenth-century law of nations was far more open-ended than the international law to which it gave rise more than a century later. In the absence of a fixed idea of sovereignty, the law of nations was able to articulate multiple historical possibilities for social, political, and legal communities, one of which—the cosmopolitan—is fundamental. The cosmopolis emerges as a central part of the intellectual project of the law of nations put forth by the Protestant thinkers Alberico Gentili, Hugo Grotius, and John Selden, with the main features of the law recast as the building blocks of the cosmopolis.



Author(s):  
Christian Volk

This chapter points out that Montesquieu argues in favour of a specific kind of political cosmopolitanism. For him, the law of nations appears as the civil law of the whole world. Essentially, it can be said that Montesquieu conceives of a law of nations that attempts to avert both the exploitation of other communities and also slavery. At the same time, however, he is not concerned with equating the law of nations with global ethics, or with establishing morally substantial yet politically ineffective obligatory requirements. Montesquieu tries to remain a political thinker who assumes the reality of individual state interests, but who wishes to integrate these in an international legal order that represents more than the consensus between states.



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