The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence

1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cemil Bilsel

It will be remembered that notes were exchanged between the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Kussia, and the Republic of Turkey on the subject of the Turkish Straits which it was desired during the Potsdam talks to link with the general problem of peace. It is our intention to discuss the problem of the Straits in the light of these notes.

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 970-975
Author(s):  
James K. Pollock

With the military defeat of Germany now assured, it becomes imperative to complete plans for occupation of the country. There is apparent agreement among the United Nations that Germany must be occupied; but, although much work has been done on the subject, by both the military and political branches of the several Allied Governments, to date we have not had any general policy directives from the heads of the three great powers, namely, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. Presumably, at the Teheran conference Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin came to a preliminary meeting of minds with reference to the various aspects of the war against Germany. At the second Quebec conference, it may reasonably be assumed that the President and Mr. Churchill, keeping in close contact with the Soviet leader, finally came to some definite agreement regarding the measures necessary to encompass the complete defeat and occupation of Germany.It has been generally agreed all around that Germany must be occupied by the troops of the Allied Nations, but many of the specific details of such an occupation have not yet been thought through. When we speak of the occupation of Germany, we must first of all define exactly what we mean by the term Germany. It is expected that “Germany” will be understood to cover only those territories included within the Republic prior to Hitler's accession to power. It might be better to agree that the boundaries shall be understood to be those of January 1, 1932.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-182

On August 8, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Bakalian v. Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, Case No. 13-55664. In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims seeking compensation from the Republic of Turkey and two Turkish national banks for lands that they claim were unlawfully confiscated from their ancestors during what the Court refers to as the Armenian Genocide of 1915–1923. In 2006, California adopted a statute extending the statute of limitations for claims arising out of the Armenian Genocide to December 31, 2016. Thus, the claims filed by the plaintiffs in 2010 were not time-barred under the statute; however, the panel found that since the Court had previously found the statute to be unconstitutional, no statute existed to extend the statute of limitations and therefore the claims were time-barred. The panel held that since the claims were plainly time-barred, the Court need not address legal questions posed regarding Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act jurisdiction.


Author(s):  
Przemysław Sieradzan

The present paper aims to present the rivalry of global and regional capitalist powers for political, strategic, diplomatic, and economic influences in the contemporary Republic of Uzbekistan. The modern history and the contemporary political situation of the Uzbek state are the most important points of issue. After years of international isolation and etatist social and economic policy, under the new political leadership Uzbekistan implements economic transformation in the spirit of neo-liberal capitalism and it opens itself towards different forms of international cooperation and foreign investments. As a result, a Central Asian country which was isolated until recently gradually becomes an object of rivalry for economic and geopolitical influences. So far Uzbekistan has not become a satellite state or a quasi-colony of any of the powers. The multi-vector policy pursued by the political environment of Shavkat Mirziyoyev seems so far to successfully prevent the country being dominated by any outside center. The present article brings up the subject of relations of Uzbekistan with four great powers: the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of Turkey.


1917 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-238
Author(s):  
Carlos Castro-Ruiz

The Monroe Doctrine has been the subject of much discussion by American and European publicists, and their estimates have been widely different, ranging from those who consider it the principle which has maintained the territorial integrity of this continent for nearly a century to those who deny to it any real influence in the preservation of the nations which emerged into independent life during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Both concepts are, in my judgment, exaggerated. To accept the first judgment would be to ignore and to forget the failure of the United States to assert the doctrine on three different occasions when it was flagrantly violated: the occupation of the Falkland Islands by Great Britain in 1843, islands which were regarded by the Argentine Republic as national property; the military intervention of France in the Republics of the River Platte in 1838, an intervention repeated in conjunction with Great Britain in 1845; and the occupation of the Chincha Islands by Spain in 1865. The attitude of the government of the United States is readily explained when one recalls the fact that the Monroe Doctrine had not become a real factor in world politics until the naval and military strength of the United States had given to that country the position of a great power. Before that time the doctrine was nothing more than a happy formulation of an aspiration deeply felt by the American nations which had on several occasions prior to the celebrated message of 1823 proclaimed the same idea.


1955 ◽  
Vol 59 (530) ◽  
pp. 127-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Edwards

Some five years ago the author was privileged to deliver a Section Lecture to the Royal Aeronautical Society on the subject of reheat. The present paper attempts to summarise the problems which now arise and to give some idea of the progress which has been made in the intervening years.In 1949, reheat was in its infancy in Great Britain. A certain amount of progress had been made in the United States but the information from that source was scanty and vague. Tests at the National Gas Turbine Establishment (N.G.T.E.) had given some engine data but this was in the nature of preliminary information only and was by no means complete. In fact the majority of the problems which now beset us were then completely unknown or were considered unimportant. The N.G.T.E. work was valuable, however, in that it demonstrated the practicability of reheat, although at the time the comments of many who saw this and other schemes in operation were somewhat sceptical and definitely unflattering.


2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 797-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATTHEW JONES

ABSTRACTThe subject of when nuclear weapons might have to be employed by the United States during the early Cold War period was the setting for a prolonged and uneasy dialogue within the Anglo-American relationship. While British governments pressed for a formal agreement that there should be prior consultation before the atomic bomb was ever used, the Americans were determined to retain the freedom to take this crucial decision alone. This article explores the debates that ensued and the tensions that were created by this issue, between the meetings of Attlee and Truman in December 1950 and the Indochina crisis of 1954, and highlights the contrasting geopolitical positions of Britain and the United States as they sought to reconcile their views. For the British, playing host to a clutch of important US airbases, the risk of early nuclear devastation in any outbreak of general war was a paramount consideration. Although impatient with British caution, the Americans recognized an overriding need for allied support in general war giving British views the capacity to exercise a restraining influence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 201
Author(s):  
Nguyen Van Sang ◽  
Le Thanh Nam ◽  
Luu Trang

This article presents the annexation of Texas in the relations between Great Britain and the United States from 1836 to 1846. The first part presents an overview of the territory, history of exploration and development of Texas from the early stages of history until the formation of the republic in 1836. The next section of the article refers to the interests of Great Britain and the United States in Texas. The final section provides the British-American diplomacy from 1836 to 1846 on the annexation of Texas. On the basis of the exploitation of correspondences, treaties and other material sources, the article contributes to clarifying the Anglo-American relations relating to the annexation of Texas and the expansion history of the United States during the first half of the XIX century.   Received: 3 June 2021 / Accepted: 19 July 2021 / Published: 5 September 2021


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document