Nonmilitary Areas in UN Practice

1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sydney D. Bailey

There have been many occasions since the inception of the United Nations when it has been found useful to establish nonmilitary areas. A nonmilitary area is one from which all potential combatants, weapons, military equipment, and military installations are excluded and from which no hostile acts or activities in support of or related to the conduct of military operations may be undertaken. In addition to being of historical interest, demilitarization is again being implemented in Sinai and will almost certainly be resorted to in Namibia and other places in the future. Demilitarization thus gives rise to important questions: By whom may such zones be established? What purposes are they intended to serve? What are the implications for state sovereignty? Do such zones have any status for states not parties to the agreements establishing them or for the United Nations and its agencies? And how effective has the supervisory system been?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon McKenzie

[Law and the Future of War Research Paper No 3] Armed forces around the world are rapidly developing un-crewed maritime vehicles (UMVs) for use in military operations. Key to the strategic value of UMVs is that they will have no people on board, and instead be remotely controlled or, in the future, will be able to carry out some or all of their mission autonomously. But will they fit into the existing categories of the law of the sea set out in the in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? This paper considers whether two of the basic classifications of this body of law – being categorised as a ‘ship’ or ‘vessel’ and being a ‘warship’ – require people to be on board the vehicle and thus exclude UMVs. These categories are critical for the distribution of rights and obligations in the UNCLOS. Failing to qualify as a ship would significantly limit the strategic value of UMVs, restricting their navigational rights and possibly preventing states claiming sovereign immunity. Along with the important practical implications of these definitional challenges, they also serve as an example of when an evolutionary interpretation of international treaty law should be preferred. The paper shows that the better interpretation of ship in UNCLOS is capacious enough to include both remotely controlled and autonomous UMVs. However, the more restrictive definitional requirements of warship in UNCLOS will be more difficult for UMVs to meet.


Author(s):  
Rosemary Foot

Over a relatively short period of time, Beijing moved from passive involvement with the UN to active engagement. How are we to make sense of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) embrace of the UN, and what does its engagement mean in larger terms? Is it a ‘supporter’ that takes its fair share of responsibilities, or a ‘spoiler’ that seeks to transform the UN’s contribution to world order? Certainly, it is difficult to label it a ‘shirker’ in the last decade or more, given Beijing’s apparent appreciation of the UN, its provision of public goods to the organization, and its stated desire to offer ‘Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind’. This study traces questions such as these, interrogating the value of such categorization through direct focus on Beijing’s involvement in one of the most contentious areas of UN activity—human protection—contentious because the norm of human protection tips the balance away from the UN’s Westphalian state-based profile, towards the provision of greater protection for the security of individuals and their individual liberties. The argument that follows shows that, as an ever-more crucial actor within the United Nations, Beijing’s rhetoric and some of its practices are playing an increasingly important role in determining how this norm is articulated and interpreted. In some cases, the PRC is also influencing how these ideas of human protection are implemented. At stake in the questions this book tackles is both how we understand the PRC as a participant in shaping global order, and the future of some of the core norms that constitute global order.


China Report ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-144
Author(s):  
Vikash Chandra

This article illustrates China’s counter-terrorism strategy at the United Nations (UN), analyses its cornerstones and underscores changing patterns. On this basis, it also seeks to make some broader observations about how rising powers behave in international organisations and to highlight their attitudes towards the liberal international order. It considers Chinese positions in the debates in the General Assembly (1972–2018), its Sixth Committee and the Security Council (since the early 1990s) and identifies four pillars of China’s counter-terrorism strategy. These include norm entrepreneurship, diplomatic measures, promotion of international cooperation and domestic measures to fulfil obligations emanating from UN resolutions, conventions and declarations. It shows how China has shaped the discourse on terrorism at the UN and how its counter-terror narratives and advocacy have been and are being shaped by the discourse among states and competing blocs like the Organization of Islamic Conference over this period. It concludes with the observation that, despite changes in its strategy in recent years, the defining principles of China’s counter-terrorism strategy, such as respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, have not eroded. Changes like accepting that the UN must play a ‘central coordination role’ in international counter-terrorism should be regarded as a further extension of China’s zeal to maintain the international order because the UN is a defining pillar of the present international order.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 564-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman J. Padelford

Economic and social cooperation through the United Nations seems destined to face new challenges and alternatives in the coming years as a result of the changed composition of the United Nations membership, the increased bargaining power of the African, Asian, and other states seeking economic and technical assistance, and the precedent of UN operations in the Congo.


1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Perlmutter

This article focuses on the apparent disjunction between the Italian reluctance to allow Albanians to come as refugees and Italy's enthusiastic leadership of the United Nations military-humanitarian mission. It explains the Italian response both in terms of Italian popular opinion regarding Albanians and Italy's concern for the impression on Europe that its politics would make. Italy's leadership of the mission represents the first time a medium-sized power has assisted a neighboring country with whom it has had deep historical connections. The conclusion argues that such proximate interventions are likely to increase in the future, and spells out the implications of the Italian case.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Gilmour

Ever since the Charter of the United Nations was signed in 1945, human rights have constituted one of its three pillars, along with peace and development. As noted in a dictum coined during the World Summit of 2005: “There can be no peace without development, no development without peace, and neither without respect for human rights.” But while progress has been made in all three domains, it is with respect to human rights that the organization's performance has experienced some of its greatest shortcomings. Not coincidentally, the human rights pillar receives only a fraction of the resources enjoyed by the other two—a mere 3 percent of the general budget.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-147

The twelve-nation Preparatory Committee of IMCO met at Lake Success on November 30, 1948. The session was devoted essentially to preparatory work, since the organization would not become a fully operative agency of the United Nations until twenty-one nations ratified its convention. The Committee voted unanimously that the future agency should keep its activities within a budget of $80,500 yearly for the first two years of operation, since it was pointed out that during that time its work would be largely of an organizational nature. This budget was to be laid before a Maritime Assembly, which would be summoned within three months after twenty-one nations had signed the agency's convention; the Assembly would also review work accomplished by the Preparatory Committee. The Committee agreed to recommend to the Assembly that all nations contribute equal shares to the agency's budget, although it coupled the recommendation with a compromise formula. The Committee also agreed that the budget estimates should be made in pounds rather than at the dollar exchange since permanent headquarters of the organization would be in London.


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