Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94
Author(s):  
Sonya D. Winner

In 1985 two intelligence agencies of the South Korean Government announced that they had successfully disrupted a North Korean spy ring operating in the United States. Their press release, which was widely publicized in the Korean press, named Chang-Sin Lee as a North Korean agent associated with a spy ring at Western Illinois University, where Lee had been a student. The story was picked up and reported in the United States by six Korean-American newspapers and a public television station. When Lee sued for libel, the defendants relied upon the official report privilege, which gives absolute protection to the accurate republication of official government reports. The district court, holding that the privilege applied and that Lee had not overcome it by showing malice, dismissed the case. Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which in a two to one decision reversed (per Ervin, J.) and held: that the official report privilege does not apply to the republication of official reports of foreign governments. Judge Kaufman, sitting by designation, dissented from the majority’s reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 828-830
Author(s):  
Edward M. Leigh

Plaintiff Zedan, an American citizen, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for breach of a contract guaranteeing wages and profits. While performance under the contract occurred in Saudi Arabia, plaintiff alleged that the jurisdictional requirements under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1982)) (FSIA) were satisfied by a recruitment call in California from a representative of the royal overseer of a private Saudi company. The district court granted the Saudi motion to dismiss. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (per Silberman, J.) unanimously affirmed and held: (1) that the telephone call did not have the requisite substantiality of contact with the United States; (2) that it was not sufficient to form the basis of a cause of action; and (3) that the alleged breach did not have sufficient direct effect in the United States to satisfy the exceptions to immunity under the FSIA.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 918-923
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Price

In response to a request by Canadian tax authorities under the United States-Canada Double Taxation Convention (Convention), the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued summonses to obtain U.S. bank records concerning certain accounts of respondents, Canadian citizens whose Canadian tax liability was under investigation. Respondents sought to quash the summonses, arguing that because under 26 U.S.C. §7609(b) the IRS is prohibited by U.S. law from using its summons authority to obtain information about a U.S. taxpayer once a case is referred to the Justice Department for prosecution, and because the tax investigation of respondents was part of a Canadian criminal investigation, the IRS should be precluded from using its summons authority to honor the Canadian request under the Convention. Unsuccessful in the district court, respondents prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that under the “good faith” standard applicable to enforcement of domestic summonses, the IRS may issue a summons pursuant to a Convention request only if it first determines and makes an affirmative statement to the effect that the Canadian investigation has not reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral by the IRS. The U.S. Supreme Court (per Brennan, J.) reversed, and held: (1) that if the summons is issued in good faith, it is enforceable regardless of whether the Canadian request is directed toward criminal prosecution under Canadian law; and (2) neither United States law nor anything in the text or the ratification history of the Convention supports the imposition of additional requirements. Justice Kennedy (joined by O’Connor, J.), concurring in part and in the judgment, filed a brief opinion to state his view that it is unnecessary to decide whether Senate preratification materials are authoritative sources for treaty interpretation. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to oppose the use of such materials in treaty construction.


1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 833-837
Author(s):  
Eric S. Koenig

Plaintiff, the United States, brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and four individuals seeking an injunction to close the PLO’s Permanent Observer Mission (Mission) to the United Nations as violative of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA). The district court (per Palmieri, J.) entered summary judgment for defendants and held: (1) the ATA does not require the closure of the PLO’s Mission to the United Nations; (2) the status of the PLO’s Mission, an invitee of the United Nations, is protected by the Agreement Between the United States and the United Nations Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (Headquarters Agreement); and (3) Congress did not intend the ATA to supersede the Headquarters Agreement.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-469
Author(s):  
Ashley Clare Hague

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently upheld a United States District Court for the District of Maine Judge's decision to dismiss a Maine plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against a Massachusetts hospital defendant for want of personal jurisdiction over the hospital. The Court of Appeals found it unreasonable to hale hospitals into an out-of-state court merely because they accept out-of-state patients.Plaintiff Danielle Harlow is a Maine resident who suffered a stroke at the age of six while undergoing a medical procedure at Children's Hospital of Boston, Massachusetts (“Children's Hospital”). The stroke, allegedly caused by the Hospital's negligence, led to brain damage resulting in partial paralysis and cognitive and behavioral impairments. The procedure was supposed to treat Harlow's rapid heartbeat, a condition related to her Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome. Harlow's pediatrician in Maine recommended that she visit Children's Hospital in Boston to treat her arrhythmia.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 826-828
Author(s):  
Erika Wilkinson

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (NRRMDD) under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


1978 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-92

Rio Algom Corporation appeals from an order adjudging it, and its president , George R. Albino , to be in will ful and in excusable civil contempt of court for failing to comply with a discovery order of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division. Rio Algom was ordered to pay into the registry of the court the sum of $10,000, per day, until such time as Rio Algom complied with the order. It was further provided that should Rio Algom fail to pay the ordered fine, the United States Marshal was authorized and directed to enter upon the property of Rio Algom at La Sal, Utah and seize "any and all property of Rio Algom of sufficient value to satisfy the above sums." Our study of the matter leads us to conclude that the trial court erred in holding Rio Algom in contempt and in imposing the severe sanction in connection therewith. We therefore reverse.


1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quincy Wright

In the case of Sei Fujii v. The State, the District Court of Appeals of California held that a State statute which prohibited aliens ineligible to citizenship from acquiring land within the State was “in direct conflict with the plain terms” of provisions concerning human rights in the United Nations Charter, a treaty binding upon the United States. Consequently, land granted to a Japanese in 1948 did not escheat to the State. The case involves important questions of United States constitutional law, of international law, and of legal policy.On the issue of constitutional law the opinion follows a long and unbroken tradition that if State legislation conflicts with obligations undertaken by the United States in a treaty, the legislation will not be applied by the courts. The terms of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Constitution are unambiguous: … all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.


1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-272
Author(s):  
B.P.M

The United States District Court of Kansas, in Gudenkauf v. Stauffer, Znc.(922 F. Supp. 465 (D. Kan. 1996), granted the defendants motion for summary judgment for the plaintiff's claims of pregnancy-related discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), but the court denied a similar motion for the plaintiff's claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). The court found summary judgment to be appropriate for the ADA claim based on its finding that the plaintiff's pregnancy did not constitute an impairment as required by the statute; as for the FMLA claim, it determined that the defendants failure to grant the plaintiff's leave request did not violate the statute. However, the court determined that summary judgment was inappropriate for the PDA claim because of material questions of fact about whether the defendant had acted with discriminatory intent.In considering the motions for summary judgment, the court accepted the following facts as incontrovertible. Plaintiff Michaela Gudenkauf worked for the defendant Stauffer, Inc.


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-396
Author(s):  
Thomas F. King

AbstractTwo court decisions highlight divergent opinions as to what constitutes a “substantial burden” on the practice of traditional indigenous religions in the United States. One decision, in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, effectively defines the term in such a way as to discriminate against indigenous religious practices; the other, by a district court in the 10th Circuit based on other holdings by that circuit court, gives much more latitude for protecting such practices and the landscapes they often involve.


2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer E. Gladieux ◽  
Michael Basile

In Jimmo v. Sebelius, the plaintiffs alleged that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) regularly and improperly denied Medicare reimbursement for outpatient therapy treatment when the beneficiary did not show a likelihood of improvement. These denials, based on policy manuals and other guidance, appear to contradict the government's own regulations, which specifically prohibit coverage denials based solely on the so-called “Improvement Standard.” In Jimmo, the United States District Court for the District of Vermont found that CMS' use of the Improvement Standard may have violated the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and denied CMS' motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, the parties settled out of court.In the settlement, CMS agreed to revise its policy manuals to clarify that the Improvement Standard was not an acceptable basis on which to deny Medicare coverage. CMS declined to defend its policies even though courts often grant deference to agency interpretations. The settlement implies that the agency feared that it would not have received such deference. It also implies that future Supreme Court decisions may give less deference to agency interpretations.


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