The First “Great Leap Forward” Reconsidered: Lessons of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago

Slavic Review ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Rosefielde
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Economic Order ◽  
Closed Model ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Great Leap ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Leap Forward ◽  
Gulag Archipelago

From 1928 to 1933, the Soviet Union underwent a radical metamorphosis. Almost overnight the economic order of N E P was abandoned in favor of an untested system of economic relations commonly referred to today as command planning. The magnitude of this transformation, the ideological passions it aroused, and the questionable character of official Soviet statistics during the First Five-Year Plan have all made it exceedingly difficult to conceptualize the process of Soviet industrialization in its entirety. As a consequence, most analyses of Soviet industrialization have been highly eclectic, predicated on assumptions which only appear plausible because they have not been interpreted from the standpoint of a closed model, or of an encompassing theory.

China's “New Economic Policy”—Transition or Beginning

1964 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 65-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Schurmann
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
New Economic Policy ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
Great Leap ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Voluntary Response ◽  
Great Leap Forward ◽  
Traditional Patterns ◽  
The Great Leap Forward

Until a short time ago, it appeared that much of what was going on in China could be characterised by the cynical aphorism plus ça change plus c'est la même chose. Many things became manifest in the country that were reminiscent of themes centuries old. China had gone through two radical phases, one during the First Five-Year Plan period when the Chinese Communists tried to repeat the Soviet experience of industrialisation, and the second during the Great Leap Forward when they used their own mobilisational means to try to achieve economic break-through. The ninth Plenum in January 1961 called a dramatic halt to the extreme policies of the Great Leap Forward, and launched a period that bears strong similarities to the N.E.P. (New Economic Policy) period of the early 1920s in the Soviet Union. Many traditional patterns that were effaced during the years of radicalism began to reappear. There was talk of the need “to study very well traditional economic relationships.” It seemed that for a while the leadership had decided that only a truly voluntary response from below, and not coercion of any sort, could rescue China from the morass in which it found itself. But as of the time of the writing of this article, there are ominous signs that China may be approaching another “1928.” The Party drums are rolling once again, and the themes are not those of the N.E.P., but more like those which preceded the great Soviet collectivisation drive of 1928. During the last few years, the leadership made no attempt to hide the facts of China's poverty and isolation. But now a new note of defiance, of toughness has crept out. Where it will lead is hard to say.

scholarly journals Causes, Consequences and Impact of the Great Leap Forward in China

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Hsiung-Shen Jung ◽  
Jui-Lung Chen
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Struggle ◽  
Forward Movement ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Great Leap ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The People ◽  
Great Leap Forward ◽  
The Great Leap Forward ◽  
The Impact

The founding of the People’s Republic of China did not put an end to the political struggle of the Communist Party of China (CPC), whose policies on economic development still featured political motivation. China launched the Great Leap Forward Movement from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, in hope of modernizing its economy. Why this movement was initiated and how it evolved subsequently were affected by manifold reasons, such as the aspiration to rapid revolutionary victory, the mistakes caused by highly centralized decision-making, and the impact exerted by the Soviet Union. However, the movement was plagued by the nationwide famine that claimed tens of millions of lives. Thus, fueled by the Forging Ahead Strategy advocated by Mao Zedong, the Great Leap Forward that was influenced by political factors not only ended up with utter failure, but also deteriorated the previously sluggish economy to such an extent that the future economic, political and social development was severely damaged. This study will explore the causes, consequences and impact of the Great Leap Forward in China.

Between Truth and Lies

2021 ◽  
pp. 82-95
Author(s):  
Peter Martin
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Great Leap ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Leap Forward ◽  
The Great Leap Forward ◽  
Chinese Diplomacy

By the late 1950s, signs of strain in Chinese diplomacy were evident as Mao Zedong pushed the further radicalization of Chinese politics and society, culminating in the devastating famine during the Great Leap Forward. During the Great Leap Forward, China’s envoys undercut their country’s credibility with allies and foes alike by insisting that the tragedy was the result of ‘natural disasters,’ even as diplomats themselves went hungry and their loved ones starved. China’s relationship with the Soviet Union also deteriorated rapidly, resulting in the Sino-Soviet split and a decades-long polemical war between the two powers which set the stage for eventual Sino-American rapprochement.

scholarly journals INDIA-RUSSIA ENERGY COOPERATION BLOOMING TIES BEYOND THE HORIZON

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 705-709
Author(s):  
Bhagyadhar Sethy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Natural Gas ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Policy Framework ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
History Of ◽  
Economic Ties ◽  
Rates Of Growth

Russia and India have a long history of cooperation in the energy sector. The prospects for the development of the energy dialogue are as promising now as they were during the period of friendship between the Soviet Union and India. Since the late 2000s, the Russia–India energy partnership has been enjoying a renaissance. So why is now the time for Russia to think seriously about giving a new impetus to the energy dialogue with India? India is the worlds third largest energy consumer and a major energy importer with steadily growing demand. Russia is a key global producer and exporter of petroleum and natural gas. The two countries needs naturally complement each other. The current energy bilateral cooperation, already strong, can significantly extend to new sources such as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Building on these can be an industry in natural gas vehicles and renewable energy, enabling economic instruments, such as energy benchmarks, and a policy framework, including labour mobility, to develop a skills corridor in energy. This paper examines the current state of Energy and economic relations between India and Russia. It flags the major issues that hinder development of economic ties between the two countries and discusses future prospects for growth. India and Russia have a long-standing relationship and securing an economic and energy partnership is important from both the diplomatic and geopolitical perspectives. Russia has a vital role in ensuring Indias energy security in the coming decade. India imports oil, mostly from the volatile region of the Middle East. However, to sustain current high rates of growth, India needs to secure and diversify its energy sources. How Russia is an obvious choice in this respect?

Communism in China, 1900–2010

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Kuisong ◽  
Stephen A. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
May Fourth Movement ◽  
Fourth Movement ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Leap Forward ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Great Leap Forward

The article examines the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from its foundation in the May Fourth Movement, through the first and second united fronts with the Guomindang to victory following the Sino-Japanese War in 1945. It examines land reform and the campaigns against counter-revolutionaries and the attempt of Mao Zedong to leap into communism through the Great Leap Forward. It shows how Mao concluded from the ‘revisionism’ in the Soviet Union that advance from ‘undeveloped’ to ‘developed’ socialism depends on continuous class struggle against those who would take the capitalist road. The postscript traces China’s rise to the world’s second largest economic power, via policies of export-led and investment- led growth initiated by Deng Xiaoping. It shows that this has bought unprecedented prosperity but also unprecedented inequality. It concludes that rising social conflict does not at present threaten the stability of the CCP.

scholarly journals The 1958-62 Chinese Famine and Its Impact on Ethnic Minorities

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-191
Author(s):  
Lucien Bianco
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Ethnic Minorities ◽  
Development Strategy ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Northern India ◽  
National Minorities ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Leap Forward ◽  
The Great Leap Forward ◽  
The Impact

China underwent its most murderous famine between 1958 and 1962. Although a demographic transition from the countryside to the cities was in its early stage and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was among the lowest in the world, objective conditions were far less decisive than Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies in bringing about the famine. A development strategy copied on the Soviet model favoured quick industrialization at the expense of rural dwellers. Such novelties as people’s communes, communal canteens, and backyard furnaces further aggravated the famine. Though ethnic minorities represented only 6 percent of China’s population, compared to forty-seven percent in the Soviet Union, Soviet nationality policies heavily influenced those of China. Initially mild, especially for Tibetans, Chinese nationality policies became more authoritarian with the advent of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. Qinghai Tibetans resisted the closure of many monasteries; then the same policies, and famine itself, caused a more important rebellion in 1959 in Xizang (Tibet). Repression and the flight of the Dalai Lama to northern India coincided with the end of Tibet’s special status in China. Internal colonialism did not, however, aggravate the impact of famine on national minorities in China. Their rate of population growth between the first two censuses (1953 and 1982) exceeded that of Han Chinese. Among the provinces most severely affected by famine, only Qinghai was largely inhabited by ethnic minorities. Within Qinghai the same pattern prevailed as in Han populated provinces: the highest toll in famine deaths was concentrated in easily accessible grain surplus areas. The overwhelming majority of victims of the Chinese famine were Han peasants. At most, 5 percent were members of ethnic minorities, compared to eighty percent of victims in the Soviet Union in the period between 1930 and 1933.

scholarly journals Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 1)

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-64
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Klimiuk
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
Mutual Trade ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Trade ◽  
Credit Agreement ◽  
Dynamic Exchange ◽  
Economic Agreement

The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germanyand the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations withGermany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany beforeWorld War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed specialconditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normalexchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based from the very beginningon a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission to Berlin under which the Soviet Union wasgranted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with Soviet Union, promotedby the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached itshighest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as regime assertedpower and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versaillesdecreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s ascent to powerincreased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Unionmade repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chieflysought to repay, with raw materials, the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, whileGermany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The saidagreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937, the loans amountingto 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle,liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss inmid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new periodin the development of Soviet–German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–MolotovAgreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document