The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following

2000 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomoji Shogenji
2014 ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Sabino de Juan López

RESUMEN En el artículo se ofrece una reflexión en torno a la educación y valores. Tras una referencia a los diferentes sentidos en que se puede plantear el problema en función de la forma como se puede entender la relación entre los dos sustantivos “educación” y “valores”, la reflexión se centra en algunos problemas relacionados con los valores en cuanto contenidos de la educación. Primeramente se refiere al problema del criterio en función del cual determinar los valores de la educación, concluyendo en que el criterio no podía ser ni de carácter a priori, ni empírico, sino “sintético”. A continuación, se afronta el problema del principio, de la fuente de los valores, o la concreción del criterio de los valores de la educación, entendiendo que éstos deberían ser determinados a partir del sujeto de la educación. Se concluye con la referencia a una exigencia de los valores de la educación, la configuración de una totalidad unitaria e interactiva. Palabras clave: educación, valores, fuente de valores, integración, cultura EDUCATION AND VALUES ABSTRACT The article offers a reflection on education and values. After a reference to the different senses in which one can pose the problem in terms of how you can understand the relationship between the two nouns “education” and “values”, reflection focuses on some problems related to the values in the contents of education. First, it concerns the problem of the criterion against which to determine the values of education, concluding that the criterion could be neither a priori in nature, not empirical, but “synthetic”. Herein, the problem of principle is faced, the source of values, or the realization of the criterion of the values of education, understanding that these should be determined from the subject of education. It concludes with the reference of a requirement of the values in education, setting up a unitary and interactive whole. Key Words: education, values , power values , integration, culture


Author(s):  
Marie McGinn

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein raises difficulties for the idea that what comes before my mind when I hear, or suddenly understand, a word can impose any normative constraint on what I go on to do. The conclusion his reflections seem to force on us gives rise to a paradox: there is no such thing as going on to apply an expression in a way that accords with what is meant by it. The paradox can be seen as one horn of a dilemma, the other horn of which is Platonism about meaning. It is generally agreed that resolving the paradox means finding a middle course between the two horns of the dilemma. This chapter looks at three attempts to find the middle course: communitarianism, naturalized Platonism, and quietism. It then considers whether Charles Travis offers a way out of the dilemma which avoids the problems of the other views discussed.


Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-181
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Huemer

AbstractI address the question of whether naturalism can provide adequate means for the scientific study of rules and rule-following behavior. As the term “naturalism” is used in many different ways in the contemporary debate, I will first spell out which version of naturalism I am targeting. Then I will recall a classical argument against naturalism in a version presented by Husserl. In the main part of the paper, I will sketch a conception of rule-following behavior that is influenced by Sellars and Haugeland. I will argue that rule-following is an essential part of human nature and insist in the social dimension of rules. Moreover, I will focus on the often overlooked fact that genuine rule-following behavior requires resilience and presupposes an inclination to calibrate one’s own behavior to that of the other members of the community. Rule-following, I will argue, is possible only for social creatures who follow shared rules, which in turn presupposes a shared (first-person plural) perspective. This implies, however, that our scientific understanding of human nature has to remain incomplete as long as it does not take this perspective, which prima facie seems alien to it, into account.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-96
Author(s):  
Hartmut Kliemt

AbstractClassifying accounts of institutionalized social norms that rely on individual rule-following as ‘sociological’ and accounts based on individual opportunity-seeking behavior as ‘economic’, the paper rejects purely economic accounts on theoretical grounds. Explaining the realworkings of institutionalized social norms and social order exclusively in terms of self-regarding opportunityseeking individual behavior is impossible. An integrated sociological approach to the so-called Hobbesian problem of social order that incorporates opportunityseeking along with rule-following behavior is necessary. Such an approach emerges on the horizon if economic methods are put to good sociological use on the basis of recent experimental economic findings on rule-following behavior.


Public Choice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Hamlin

AbstractRules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement.


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