scholarly journals The Road to Modern Logic—An Interpretation

2001 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Ferreirós
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
Primary Role ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
Core System ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Road

AbstractThis paper aims to outline an analysis and interpretation of the process that led to First-Order Logic and its consolidation as a core system of modern logic. We begin with an historical overview of landmarks along the road to modern logic, and proceed to a philosophical discussion casting doubt on the possibility of a purely rational justification of the actual delimitation of First-Order Logic. On this basis, we advance the thesis that a certain historical tradition was essential to the emergence of modern logic; this traditional context is analyzed as consisting in some guiding principles and, particularly, a set of exemplars (i.e., paradigmatic instances). Then, we proceed to interpret the historical course of development reviewed in section 1, which can broadly be described as a two-phased movement of expansion and then restriction of the scope of logical theory. We shall try to pinpoint ambivalencies in the process, and the main motives for subsequent changes. Among the latter, one may emphasize the spirit of modern axiomatics, the situation of foundational insecurity in the 1920s, the resulting desire to find systems well-behaved from a proof-theoretical point of view, and the metatheoretical results of the 1930s. Not surprisingly, the mathematical and, more specifically, the foundational context in which First-Order Logic matured will be seen to have played a primary role in its shaping.Mathematical logic is what logic, through twenty-five centuries and a few transformations, has become today. (Jean van Heijenoort)

Logical Methods for Self-Configuration of Network Devices

2011 ◽  
pp. 189-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvain Hallé ◽  
Roger Villemaire ◽  
Omar Cherkaoui
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Declarative Languages ◽  
First Order ◽  
User Intervention

The goal of self-configuration consists of providing appropriate values for parameters that modulate the behaviour of a device. In this chapter, self-configuration is studied from a mathematical logic point of view. In contrast with imperative means of generating configurations, characterized by scripts and templates, the use of declarative languages such as propositional or first-order logic is argued. In that setting, device configurations become models of particular logical formulæ, which can be generated using constraint solvers without any rigid scripting or user intervention.

Predicate calculus

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Smiley
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Complex Predicates ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
Form Complex ◽  
First Order ◽  
Second Order Logic

The predicate calculus is the dominant system of modern logic, having displaced the traditional Aristotelian syllogistic logic that had been the previous paradigm. Like Aristotle’s, it is a logic of quantifiers – words like ‘every’, ‘some’ and ‘no’ that are used to express that a predicate applies universally or with some other distinctive kind of generality, for example ‘everyone is mortal’, ‘someone is mortal’, ‘no one is mortal’. The weakness of syllogistic logic was its inability to represent the structure of complex predicates. Thus it could not cope with argument patterns like ‘everything Fs and Gs, so everything Fs’. Nor could it cope with relations, because a logic of relations must be able to analyse cases where a quantifier is applied to a predicate that already contains one, as in ‘someone loves everyone’. Remedying the weakness required two major innovations. One was a logic of connectives – words like ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘if’ that form complex sentences out of simpler ones. It is often studied as a distinct system: the propositional calculus. A proposition here is a true-or-false sentence and the guiding principle of propositional calculus is truth-functionality, meaning that the truth-value (truth or falsity) of a compound proposition is uniquely determined by the truth-values of its components. Its principal connectives are negation, conjunction, disjunction and a ‘material’ (that is, truth-functional) conditional. Truth-functionality makes it possible to compute the truth-values of propositions of arbitrary complexity in terms of their basic propositional constituents, and so develop the logic of tautology and tautological consequence (logical truth and consequence in virtue of the connectives). The other invention was the quantifier-variable notation. Variables are letters used to indicate things in an unspecific way; thus ‘x is mortal’ is read as predicating of an unspecified thing x what ‘Socrates is mortal’ predicates of Socrates. The connectives can now be used to form complex predicates as well as propositions, for example ‘x is human and x is mortal’; while different variables can be used in different places to express relational predicates, for example ‘x loves y’. The quantifier goes in front of the predicate it governs, with the relevant variable repeated beside it to indicate which positions are being generalized. These radical departures from the idiom of quantification in natural languages are needed to solve the further problem of ambiguity of scope. Compare, for example, the ambiguity of ‘someone loves everyone’ with the unambiguous alternative renderings ‘there is an x such that for every y, x loves y’ and ‘for every y, there is an x such that x loves y’. The result is a pattern of formal language based on a non-logical vocabulary of names of things and primitive predicates expressing properties and relations of things. The logical constants are the truth-functional connectives and the universal and existential quantifiers, plus a stock of variables construed as ranging over things. This is ‘the’ predicate calculus. A common option is to add the identity sign as a further logical constant, producing the predicate calculus with identity. The first modern logic of quantification, Frege’s of 1879, was designed to express generalizations not only about individual things but also about properties of individuals. It would nowadays be classified as a second-order logic, to distinguish it from the first-order logic described above. Second-order logic is much richer in expressive power than first-order logic, but at a price: first-order logic can be axiomatized, second-order logic cannot.

Logic in the early 20th century

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory H. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Algebraic Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Axiomatic Method ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
Genetic Method ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modern Development

The creation of modern logic is one of the most stunning achievements of mathematics and philosophy in the twentieth century. Modern logic – sometimes called logistic, symbolic logic or mathematical logic – makes essential use of artificial symbolic languages. Since Aristotle, logic has been a part of philosophy. Around 1850 the mathematician Boole began the modern development of symbolic logic. During the twentieth century, logic continued in philosophy departments, but it began to be seriously investigated and taught in mathematics departments as well. The most important examples of the latter were, from 1905 on, Hilbert at Göttingen and then, during the 1920s, Church at Princeton. As the twentieth century began, there were several distinct logical traditions. Besides Aristotelian logic, there was an active tradition in algebraic logic initiated by Boole in the UK and continued by C.S. Peirce in the USA and Schröder in Germany. In Italy, Peano began in the Boolean tradition, but soon aimed higher: to express all major mathematical theorems in his symbolic logic. Finally, from 1879 to 1903, Frege consciously deviated from the Boolean tradition by creating a logic strong enough to construct the natural and real numbers. The Boole–Schröder tradition culminated in the work of Löwenheim (1915) and Skolem (1920) on the existence of a countable model for any first-order axiom system having a model. Meanwhile, in 1900, Russell was strongly influenced by Peano’s logical symbolism. Russell used this as the basis for his own logic of relations, which led to his logicism: pure mathematics is a part of logic. But his discovery of Russell’s paradox in 1901 required him to build a new basis for logic. This culminated in his masterwork, Principia Mathematica, written with Whitehead, which offered the theory of types as a solution. Hilbert came to logic from geometry, where models were used to prove consistency and independence results. He brought a strong concern with the axiomatic method and a rejection of the metaphysical goal of determining what numbers ‘really’ are. In his view, any objects that satisfied the axioms for numbers were numbers. He rejected the genetic method, favoured by Frege and Russell, which emphasized constructing numbers rather than giving axioms for them. In his 1917 lectures Hilbert was the first to introduce first-order logic as an explicit subsystem of all of logic (which, for him, was the theory of types) without the infinitely long formulas found in Löwenheim. In 1923 Skolem, directly influenced by Löwenheim, also abandoned those formulas, and argued that first-order logic is all of logic. Influenced by Hilbert and Ackermann (1928), Gödel proved the completeness theorem for first-order logic (1929) as well as incompleteness theorems for arithmetic in first-order and higher-order logics (1931). These results were the true beginning of modern logic.

scholarly journals Conservative Intensional Extension of Tarski's Semantics

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Zoran Majkić
Keyword(s):  
Free Algebra ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Relational Algebra ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Cylindric Algebras ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Logic Formula ◽  
First Order

We considered an extension of the first-order logic (FOL) by Bealer's intensional abstraction operator. Contemporary use of the term “intension” derives from the traditional logical Frege-Russell doctrine that an idea (logic formula) has both an extension and an intension. Although there is divergence in formulation, it is accepted that the “extension” of an idea consists of the subjects to which the idea applies, and the “intension” consists of the attributes implied by the idea. From the Montague's point of view, the meaning of an idea can be considered as particular extensions in different possible worlds. In the case of standard FOL, we obtain a commutative homomorphic diagram, which is valid in each given possible world of an intensional FOL: from a free algebra of the FOL syntax, into its intensional algebra of concepts, and, successively, into an extensional relational algebra (different from Cylindric algebras). Then we show that this composition corresponds to the Tarski's interpretation of the standard extensional FOL in this possible world.

scholarly journals SOME MODEL-THEORETIC RESULTS ON THE 3-VALUED PARACONSISTENT FIRST-ORDER LOGIC QCIORE

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
MARCELO E. CONIGLIO ◽  
G.T. GOMEZ-PEREIRA ◽  
MARTÍN FIGALLO
Keyword(s):  
Classical Model ◽  
Paraconsistent Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Inconsistent Databases ◽  
Partial Structures ◽  
Classical Negation ◽  
Semantic Notion

Abstract The 3-valued paraconsistent logic Ciore was developed by Carnielli, Marcos and de Amo under the name LFI2, in the study of inconsistent databases from the point of view of logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs). They also considered a first-order version of Ciore called LFI2*. The logic Ciore enjoys extreme features concerning propagation and retropropagation of the consistency operator: a formula is consistent if and only if some of its subformulas is consistent. In addition, Ciore is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi. On the other hand, the logic LFI2* satisfies a somewhat counter-intuitive property: the universal and the existential quantifier are inter-definable by means of the paraconsistent negation, as it happens in classical first-order logic with respect to the classical negation. This feature seems to be unnatural, given that both quantifiers have the classical meaning in LFI2*, and that this logic does not satisfy the De Morgan laws with respect to its paraconsistent negation. The first goal of the present article is to introduce a first-order version of Ciore (which we call QCiore) preserving the spirit of Ciore, that is, without introducing unexpected relationships between the quantifiers. The second goal of the article is to adapt to QCiore the partial structures semantics for the first-order paraconsistent logic LPT1 introduced by Coniglio and Silvestrini, which generalizes the semantic notion of quasi-truth considered by Mikeberg, da Costa and Chuaqui. Finally, some important results of classical Model Theory are obtained for this logic, such as Robinson’s joint consistency theorem, amalgamation and interpolation. Although we focus on QCiore, this framework can be adapted to other 3-valued first-order LFIs.

A Note on Hjorth's oscillation theorem

2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 1359-1365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julien Melleray
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Continuous Logic ◽  
Oscillation Theorem ◽  
First Order

AbstractWe reformulate, in the context of continuous logic, an oscillation theorem proved by G. Hjorth and give a proof of the theorem in that setting which is similar to, but simpler than, Hjorth's original one. The point of view presented here clarifies the relation between Hjorth's theorem and first-order logic.

scholarly journals Logicality of second-order logic: A critical inquiry on the related debatesİkinci seviye mantığın mantıksallığı: İlgili tartışmalar üzerine eleştirel bir değerlendirme

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Bilge Öztürk
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
History Of Logic ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
Central System ◽  
Quantification Theory ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
First Order ◽  
Second Order Logic

<p>Being the pioneer of modern logic, Frege, with his quantification theory, was the pioneer of not only first-order logic, but also second-order logic. But today, as it may be seen from the recent pedagogical works clearly, learning modern logic has become almost equivalent to learning first-order logic. In the other words, first-order logic appears as the most natural, paradigmatic and central system of logic. However second-order logic either doesn’t appear in recent pedagogical works or appears as an interesting detail of the history of logic. Moreover, today even the logicality of second-order logic has become controversial. In this controversy, two of the criticisms against the logicality of second-order logic have become more apparent than the others: (1) the logical incompleteness criticism, and (2) the ontological commitments criticism. In this study, these two criticisms, which was put forward as a justification of the claim that second order logic is not a purely-logical system, and several responses to these criticisms are tried to be clarified in a simple and untechnical manner. Additionally it is argued that, while these two criticisms are strong and justified, several responses to these criticisms are weak.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Özet</strong></p><p>Modern mantığın öncüsü Frege niceleme kuramıyla, yalnızca birinci seviye mantığın değil, aynı zamanda ikinci seviye mantığın da öncüsüydü. Ancak günümüz pedagojik yapıtlarında da açıkça görülebileceği gibi bugün modern mantığı öğrenmek bunlardan birinci seviye mantığı öğrenmekle eşdeğer hale gelmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle birinci seviye mantık, mantığın en doğal, paradigmatik ve merkezi sistemi olarak kendini göstermektedir. Diğer taraftan ikinci seviye mantık ise günümüz pedagojik yapıtlarında ya yer almamakta ya da bu yapıtlarda mantık tarihinin ilginç bir ayrıntısı olarak yer almaktadır. Dahası bugün ikinci seviye mantığın mantıksallığı dahi tartışmalı hale gelmiştir. Bu tartışmalarda ikinci seviye mantığın mantıksallığına getirilen eleştirilerden ikisi diğerlerine göre daha belirgin hale gelmiştir. (1) Mantık sistemsel eksiklik eleştirisi ve (2) gizli ontolojik kabuller eleştirisi. Bu çalışmada ikinci seviye mantığın saf-mantıksal bir sistem olmadığı iddiasına gerekçe olarak ileri sürülen bu iki eleştiri ve bu eleştirilere getirilen çeşitli yanıtlar, basit ve teknik olmayan bir dille açık kılınmaya çalışılmıştır. Ek olarak bu iki eleştirinin güçlü ve haklı eleştiriler olduğu ve bu eleştirilere getirilen çeşitli yanıtların ise güçsüz olduğu savunulmuştur.</p>

First-Order Logic Reasoning Support for the Semantic Web

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logic Reasoning

Boolean-valued structures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
First Order ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Boolean Valued Model ◽  
Semantic Values

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.

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