Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of- Power Politics or a Game to Win All?

1995 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 95-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tang Tsou
Keyword(s):  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Informal Politics

After Victory

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Politics ◽  
World Order ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Big Bang ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Napoleonic Wars ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
The Cold War

The end of the Cold War was a “big bang” reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the world wars in 1919 and 1945. But what do states that win wars do with their newfound power, and how do they use it to build order? This book examines postwar settlements in modern history, arguing that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power. The book explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions—both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power—has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit “constitutional” characteristics. Blending comparative politics with international relations, and history with theory, the book will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today.

From Bandwagon to Balance of Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949-1978.

1992 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 400
Author(s):  
David Bachman ◽  
Avery Goldstein
Keyword(s):  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Structural Constraints ◽  
Power Politics

scholarly journals The Modernization of Factionalism in Chinese Politics

1995 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lowell Dittmer ◽  
Yu-Shan Wu
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Business Cycles ◽  
Political Business Cycle ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Reform Era ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Informal Politics ◽  
Material Interests ◽  
Personal Qualities ◽  
Altered Form

The informal dimension has always been important in Chinese politics, due to a traditional bias against legalism and favoring the sentimentalization of personal qualities. We contend that it remains so still, albeit in altered form. Rather than being oriented solely to personal or in-group security, factionalism in the context of the more secure bureaucratic environment of the reform era has come to embrace policy goals and material interests as well. Thus, informal politics proliferates, and factional fortunes tend tofluctuateaccording to the patterns of China's political business cycle.In the post-Mao era the radical reformers led by Deng Xiaoping have favored rapid growth, even at the expense of stability. The conservatives surrounding Chen Yun consider stability the paramount goal, believing that it should override considerations of growth. The synchronization of reform and business cycles, plus the appearance of periodic social movements whenever the growth rate slumps, makes reformers and conservatives vulnerable to charges of mismanaging the economy for their respective policy preferences. As long as the business, reform, and movement cycles coincide, wide policyfluctuationsdriven by a politics of blame are inevitable.

National Preferences, International Structures and Balance-of-Power Politics

1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeev Maoz
Keyword(s):  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Power Politics

Leibniz’s Political Vision for Europe

2015 ◽  
pp. 663-683
Author(s):  
Friedrich Beiderbeck
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Roman Empire ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Holy Roman Empire ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Louis Xiv ◽  
Church Politics ◽  
Cultural Structures

This chapter examines Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s political vision for Europe, beginning with his views on the Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia. It considers how Leibniz viewed Germany’s political and cultural structures and his support for the Reich, along with his thoughts on order, security, and law. It also discusses Leibniz’s modern notion of state and his ideas of territorial power, diplomacy, and international politics; his views on France’s foreign policy under Louis XIV and the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1713/14); and his dispute with Abbé de Saint Pierre over peace and balance of power in Europe. Finally, the chapter looks at Leibniz’s pronouncements on denominational issues and church politics, particularly the presence of Protestants and Catholics in Germany, and his arguments with regards to the House of Hanover and the role played by Great Britain in power politics as a counterbalance to French hegemony.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 120-132
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Nuclear Age

This chapter summarizes key findings in the proponents of the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” which contend that nuclear weapons are transformative because they greatly reduce the need for countries to engage in intense security competition. It emphasizes that although nuclear weapons are the greatest tools of deterrence ever created, they do not automatically confer national security benefits on their owners, much less guarantee enduring safety from foreign threats. The chapter looks into the unfortunate reality of international politics in the shadow of nuclear weapons, in which countries must still pay close attention to the balance of power, search for ways to change the balance when they find themselves at a disadvantage and contemplate and plan for war in order to protect vital national interests. It explains how fears that tragically drove international politics for centuries still exist and how those fears are justified. The nuclear age remains an age of power politics.

David Hume’s Balancing Act: The Political Discourses and the Sinews of War

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
DANIELLE CHARETTE
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
David Hume ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Political Discourses ◽  
Balance Of Trade

Both champions and critics of “neorealism” in contemporary international relations misinterpret David Hume as an early spokesman for a universal and scientific balance-of-power theory. This article instead treats Hume’s “Of the Balance of Power,” alongside the other essays in his Political Discourses (1752), as conceptual resources for a historically inflected analysis of state balancing. Hume’s defense of the balance of power cannot be divorced from his critique of commercial warfare in “Of the Balance of Trade” and “Of the Jealousy of Trade.” To better appreciate Hume’s historical and economic approach to foreign policy, this article places Hume in conversation with Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Andrew Fletcher, and Montesquieu. International relations scholars suspicious of static paradigms should reconsider Hume’s genealogy of the balance of power, which differs from the standard liberal and neorealist accounts. Well before International Political Economy developed as a formal subdiscipline, Hume was conceptually treating economics and power politics in tandem.

The Balance of Power in World Politics

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall L. Schweller
Keyword(s):  
Power System ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Material Forces ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Core Theory ◽  
Minimum Requirements

The balance of power—a notoriously slippery, murky, and protean term, endlessly debated and variously defined—is the core theory of international politics within the realist perspective. A “balance of power” system is one in which the power held and exercised by states within the system is checked and balanced by the power of others. Thus, as a nation’s power grows to the point that it menaces other powerful states, a counter-balancing coalition emerges to restrain the rising power, such that any bid for world hegemony will be self-defeating. The minimum requirements for a balance of power system include the existence of at least two or more actors of roughly equal strength, states seeking to survive and preserve their autonomy, alliance flexibility, and the ability to resort to war if need be. At its essence, balance of power is a type of international order. Theorists disagree, however, about the normal operation of the balance of power. Structural realists describe an “automatic version” of the theory, whereby system balance is a spontaneously generated, self-regulating, and entirely unintended outcome of states pursuing their narrow self-interests. Earlier versions of balance of power were more consistent with a “semi-automatic” version of the theory, which requires a “balancer” state throwing its weight on one side of the scale or the other, depending on which is lighter, to regulate the system. The British School’s discussion of balance of power depicts a “manually operated” system, wherein the process of equilibrium is a function of human contrivance, with emphasis on the skill of diplomats and statesmen, a sense of community of nations, of shared responsibility, and a desire and need to preserve the balance of power system. As one would expect of a theory that made its appearance in the mid-16th century, balance of power is not without its critics. Liberals claim that globalization, democratic peace, and international institutions have fundamentally transformed international relations, moving it out of the realm of power politics. Constructivists claim that balance of power theory’s focus on material forces misses the central role played by ideational factors such as norms and identities in the construction of threats and alliances. Realists, themselves, wonder why no global balance of power has materialized since the end of the Cold War.

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