Are Short Sellers Informed? Evidence from the Bond Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 611-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ambrus Kecskés ◽  
Sattar A. Mansi ◽  
Andrew (Jianzhong Zhang

ABSTRACT We examine whether short sellers in the equity market provide valuable information to investors in the bond market. Using a sample of publicly traded bond data covering the period from 1988 to 2011, we find that firms with high short interest have lower credit ratings and are more likely to have their ratings downgraded. We also find that firms with highly shorted stocks are associated with higher bond yield spreads (about 24 basis points). Evidence of causality from short interest spikes and a natural experiment based on the SEC's Regulation SHO pilot program confirms our findings. Overall, our results suggest that equity short sellers provide predictive information to creditors in the bond market. JEL Classifications: G12; G14. Data Availability:  Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the study with the exception of the bond data from Lehman Brothers, which is a proprietary dataset.

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (12) ◽  
pp. 2858-2878
Author(s):  
M.I. Emets

Subject. The article addresses the green bond pricing as compared to bonds other than green ones. Objectives. The aims are to determine how the fact that a bond is identified as a green one, the issue amount, and the availability of third-party verification, influence the yield to maturity; to make recommendations on effective green bond pricing. Methods. The study employs econometric testing of hypotheses, using the multiple linear regression. The sample includes 318 green and 1695 conventional bonds. Results. Green bonds have a lower yield to maturity in comparison with conventional bonds. The yield to maturity of green bonds with third-party verification is lower, as contrasted with green bonds without verification. Conclusions. The next step in the green bond market development is creating a benchmark yield curve for sovereign green bonds, with parallel issuance of conventional, non-green bonds. The yield curve is crucial for effective bond pricing. Two yield curves, i.e. for green and non-green bonds, will enable investors to estimate the fair price on issuance, as well as to define, if there is a difference in pricing.


Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Vetzal ◽  
Alan V. S. Douglas ◽  
Alan Guoming Huang

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suchismita Mishra ◽  
Özde Öztekin ◽  
Anisur Rahman

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dichu Bao ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
G. Mujtaba Mian ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su

ABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe the negative private information that managers possess. We tackle this challenge by constructing a proxy for managers' private bad news (residual short interest) and then perform a series of tests to validate this proxy. Using management earnings guidance and 8-K filings as measures of voluntary disclosure, we find a negative relation between bad-news disclosure and residual short interest, suggesting that managers withhold bad news in general. This tendency is tempered when firms are exposed to higher litigation risk, and it is strengthened when managers have greater incentives to support the stock price. Based on a novel approach to identifying the presence of bad news, our study adds to the debate on whether managers tend to withhold or release bad news. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Bédard ◽  
Carl Brousseau ◽  
Ann Vanstraelen

SUMMARY Using a “natural experiment” provided by a change in Canadian auditing standards requiring an emphasis of matter paragraph in the auditor's report (GC-EOM) when the financial statements include a going concern uncertainty disclosure (GC-FS), this paper examines the incremental investor reaction to the auditor's report over the related GC-FS. Conditioning on the linguistic severity of the GC-FS (weak and severe), we first document a negative price response to severe but not to weak GC-FS before the regulatory change. This implies that investors react to financial statement disclosures and account for their degree of interpretability in the absence of a GC-EOM. When the uncertainty disclosure is accompanied by a GC-EOM, we find incremental negative abnormal returns and lower abnormal trading volume only for weak GC-FS. Collectively, these findings imply that an emphasis of matter paragraph in the auditor's report can have incremental value to investors. JEL Classifications: M42; G12; G14. Data Availability: Data used are available from public sources identified in the study.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1471082X2110229
Author(s):  
D. Stasinopoulos Mikis ◽  
A. Rigby Robert ◽  
Georgikopoulos Nikolaos ◽  
De Bastiani Fernanda

A solution to the problem of having to deal with a large number of interrelated explanatory variables within a generalized additive model for location, scale and shape (GAMLSS) is given here using as an example the Greek–German government bond yield spreads from 25 April 2005 to 31 March 2010. Those were turbulent financial years, and in order to capture the spreads behaviour, a model has to be able to deal with the complex nature of the financial indicators used to predict the spreads. Fitting a model, using principal components regression of both main and first order interaction terms, for all the parameters of the assumed distribution of the response variable seems to produce promising results.


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