The Market Pricing of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 811-838 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad A. Badertscher ◽  
Jeffrey J. Burks ◽  
Peter D. Easton
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Standard Setting ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Net Income ◽  
Market Pricing ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT When the fair value of an investment security falls below amortized cost and there is significant doubt that the firm can hold the security until the fair value recovers, an other-than-temporary impairment (OTTI) is recognized in net income. Thus, an OTTI is a disclosure about the prospect of recovering an unrealized loss. Our findings suggest that investors priced banks' OTTI recognition during and after the financial crisis. Investors were unable to fully anticipate reported OTTIs, and priced OTTIs incrementally to reported unrealized gains/losses. After banks were required to bifurcate OTTIs, investors priced only the portion of OTTI recognized in earnings. Our results suggest that reporting unrealized losses in earnings via an OTTI changes how investors price the losses. The results inform recent standard-setting initiatives to expand disclosure about changes in fair value. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M44. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Risk-Relevance of Fair-Value Income Measures for Commercial Banks

2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie D. Hodder ◽  
Patrick E. Hopkins ◽  
James M. Wahlen
Keyword(s):  
Standard Deviation ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Net Income ◽  
Income Volatility ◽  
Expected Return ◽  
Market Pricing ◽  
Share Prices ◽  
Comprehensive Income

We investigate the risk relevance of the standard deviation of three performance measures: net income, comprehensive income, and a constructed measure of full-fair-value income for a sample of 202 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2004. We find that, for the average sample bank, the volatility of full-fair-value income is more than three times that of comprehensive income and more than five times that of net income. We find that the incremental volatility in full-fair-value income (beyond the volatility of net income and comprehensive income) is positively related to marketmodel beta, the standard deviation in stock returns, and long-term interest-rate beta. Further, we predict and find that the incremental volatility in full-fair-value income (1) negatively moderates the relation between abnormal earnings and banks' share prices and (2) positively affects the expected return implicit in bank share prices. Our findings suggest full-fair-value income volatility reflects elements of risk that are not captured by volatility in net income or comprehensive income, and relates more closely to capital-market pricing of that risk than either net-income volatility or comprehensiveincome volatility.

Compensation Disclosures and Corporate Governance through Shareholder Voting

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Richard Carrizosa ◽  
Xiaoxia Peng
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
The Public ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT There are several measures of equity compensation that may provide shareholders with distinct and useful information for evaluating CEO pay. We examine whether shareholders consider additional disclosures of equity compensation measures beyond the grant date fair value when participating in corporate governance. We find that CEO equity compensation expense, a distinct measure of equity compensation, is a determinant of shareholder voting for management sponsored equity plans and voting for directors that serve on the compensation committee. After controlling for ISS recommendations, we find that voting outcomes remain significantly related to abnormal equity compensation expense. Consistent with shareholders considering the equity compensation expense, we document that firms shorten equity compensation vesting periods when they are no longer required to disclose the equity compensation expense. Our findings suggest that shareholders rely on multiple, distinct measures of equity compensation when participating in corporate governance. JEL Classifications: M12; M52; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

A Convenient Scapegoat: Fair Value Accounting by Commercial Banks during the Financial Crisis

2011 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad A. Badertscher ◽  
Jeffrey J. Burks ◽  
Peter D. Easton
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Commercial Banking ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Asset Sales ◽  
Fair Value Accounting ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Level Increase ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT Critics argue that fair value provisions in U.S. accounting rules exacerbated the recent financial crisis by depleting banks' regulatory capital, which curtailed lending and triggered asset sales, leading to further economic turmoil. Defenders counter-argue that the fair value provisions were insufficient to lead to the pro-cyclical effects alleged by the critics. Our evidence indicates that these provisions did not affect the commercial banking industry in the ways commonly alleged by critics. First, we show that fair value accounting losses had minimal effect on regulatory capital. Then, we examine sales of securities during the crisis, finding mixed evidence that banks sold securities in response to capital-depleting charges. However, the sales that potentially resulted from the charges appear to be economically insignificant, as there was no industry- or firm-level increase in sales of securities during the crisis. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M44. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the article.

Extreme Estimation Uncertainty in Fair Value Estimates: Implications for Audit Assurance

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brant E. Christensen ◽  
Steven M. Glover ◽  
David A. Wood
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Net Income ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Estimation Uncertainty ◽  
Income Statement ◽  
Auditing Standards

SUMMARY The overall complexity and estimation uncertainty inherent in financial statements have increased in recent decades; however, the related reports and services have changed very little, including the format of the balance sheet and income statement, the content in the auditor's report, and the level and nature of assurance provided on estimates. We examine estimates reported by public companies and find that fair value and other estimates based on management's subjective models and inputs contain estimation uncertainty or imprecision that is many times greater than materiality. Importantly, changes in the estimates often impact net income; consequently, the extreme estimation uncertainty also resides in measures such as earnings per share. We do not question the value audits provide to the marketplace, the importance of fair value reporting, or the ability of auditors to deploy up-to-date valuation and auditing techniques. Rather, we suggest that the convergence of relatively recent events is placing an increasingly difficult, and perhaps in some cases unrealistic, burden on auditors. We consider whether the convergence of events in regulation and standard setting may have outstripped auditors' ability to provide the level and nature of assurance currently required on estimates with extreme estimation uncertainty by auditing standards and regulators. We discuss potential changes to financial reporting and auditing standards that may improve the information provided to users and also address the concerns we raise. Finally, we suggest avenues for future research that may be fruitful in addressing how changes to standards would influence the behavior of preparers, auditors, and users. JEL Classifications: M4; M40; M41; M42. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dambra ◽  
Matthew Gustafson ◽  
Phillip J. Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Estate Taxes ◽  
Price Appreciation ◽  
One Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices. JEL Classifications: D14; G12; G32; M21; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts' Information Production

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Driskill ◽  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Sample Firm ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analysts have another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a “concurrent announcement”), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm's subsequent quarter than analysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, the thoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analysts are more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference calls as their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements, they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behind firms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as information specialists, are subject to limited attention. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Come on Over: Analyst/Investor Days as a Disclosure Medium

2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (6) ◽  
pp. 1725-1750 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Stanimir Markov
Keyword(s):  
Information Content ◽  
Short Duration ◽  
Price Impact ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Temporal Proximity ◽  
Conference Presentations ◽  
Close Temporal Proximity ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Our study introduces analyst/investor days, a new disclosure medium that allows for private interactions with influential market participants. We also highlight interdependencies in the choice and information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations, a well-researched disclosure medium that similarly allows for private interactions. Analyst/investor days are less frequent, but with longer duration and greater price impact than conference presentations. They are mostly hosted by firms that already have opportunities to interact with investors at conferences, but whose complex and diverse activities make the short duration and rigid format of a conference presentation an imperfect solution to these firms' information problems. Analyst/investor days and conference presentations tend to occur in different quarters, consistent with their competing for the time and attention of senior management. When these two mediums are scheduled in close temporal proximity to each other, analyst/investor days diminish the information content of conference presentations, but not vice versa, consistent with managers' favoring analyst/investor days over conference presentations as a disclosure medium. JEL Classifications: D82; M41; G11; G12; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family Controlled Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.

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