Management’s Undue Influence over Audit Committee Members: Evidence from Auditor Reporting and Opinion Shopping

Author(s):  
Nathan R. Berglund ◽  
Michelle Draeger ◽  
Mikhail Sterin

Audit committee members must be independent of management to protect shareholder interests. While current regulations restrict audit committee members from holding management positions (i.e., affiliations), studies find that management’s preferences continue to impact audit committee decisions. This motivates analysis of independence threats beyond affiliations. We apply the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ conceptual approach to independence and examine the threat of management’s undue influence over audit committee members. Examining the relative tenure of executives and audit committee members, we find that greater management influence is associated with a lower propensity of the auditor to issue a modified going concern opinion to a distressed client. We also find that greater management influence is associated with increased opinion shopping behavior. These findings are consistent with an undue influence threat to audit committee independence. Our results extend the academic literature and inform regulatory concerns on audit committee independence.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen H. Fuller ◽  
Jennifer R. Joe ◽  
Benjamin L. Luippold

We investigate the joint effects of auditor's reporting choice and audit committee effectiveness on management disclosures about complex estimates. A new PCAOB standard requires auditors to report on Critical Audit Matters (CAMs): issues "communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee" about accounts or disclosures that (1) "are material to the financial statements" and (2) "involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment" (PCAOB 2017a, 11). Consistent with investor arguments, we find that audit committee effectiveness and more detailed CAM reporting encourage managers' disclosures of the risk underlying complex estimates. When the auditor's report is more informative about a complex estimate and the audit committee is more effective, management's related financial disclosures are more forthcoming. However, less informative auditor disclosures or more effective audit committees alone do not prompt greater management disclosure. Thus, expanded auditor reporting and more effective audit committees, together, can enhance the disclosures investors value.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-539
Author(s):  
Hongkang Xu ◽  
Mai Dao ◽  
Jia Wu

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of real activities manipulation (RAM) on auditors’ decision of issuing going concern (GC) opinions for distressed companies. Design/methodology/approach This study estimates and examines three types of RAM: reduction of discretionary expenses, sales manipulation and overproduction. It investigates the effect of RAM on auditor reporting conservatism by including the three measures of RAM methods in logistic regressions that explain the issuance of going concern opinions. The authors perform the analysis specifically on distressed firms for 2004-2013 period. Findings This study finds a significant and positive association between RAM and the likelihood of receiving going concern opinion in the financial distressed firm sample, suggesting that client’s abnormal business activity affects the auditor reporting conservatism. Practical implications This study provides evidence that auditors make going concern reporting decisions in consideration of the client’s abnormal operating decisions and management’s opportunism. Originality/value Recent literature argues that auditors have little recourse other than to resign if a client uses RAM to impact earnings or the financial statements, and hence the enhanced audit quality in the post-SOX period is due to the shift from using accruals management to RAM (Cohen et al., 2008; Chi et al., 2011; Kim and Park, 2014). The evidence provided in this study indicates that auditors report more conservatively (rather than simply resign) in response to the aggressive RAM.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Panggah Wira Angkasa ◽  
Dewi Indriasih ◽  
Baihaqi Fanani

The Impact of Good Governance, Opinion Shopping, Quality Audit and Audit Client Tenure Application towards Going Concern Opinion Audit Acceptance (Empirical Studies on Infrastructure Services Company, Utility, and Transportation which Registered at Indonesian Stock Exchange (ISE) during 2013 – 2017 Period). Essay. Tegal: Economic & Business Faculty, Pancasakti University Tegal. 2018. The aim of this research is to finding out the impact of institutional ownership, independent commissioner, committee audit, opinion shopping, quality audit, audit client tenure towards going concern’s opinion audit on infrastructure services company, utility, and transportation which registered at ISE during 2013 – 2017 period. The population in this research are infrastructure services company, utility, and transportation which registered at ISE during 2013 – 2017 period and the sample determination by using purposive sampling method, so within the result obtained 15 company’s samples. The data analysis method used is logistic regression analysis. Based on logistic regression analytic, the research result concluded that institutional ownership (0,109), audit committee (0,429), opinion shopping (0,607), and quality audit (0,998) are not affecting the going concern opinion audit. Meanwhile, the independent commissioner (0,006), and audit client tenure (0,004) are affecting the going concern opinion audit. Keywords: going concern, opinion audit, institutional ownership, independent commissioner, committee audit, opinion shopping, quality audit, audit client tenure


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huw Macartney ◽  
David Howarth ◽  
Scott James

AbstractDespite much commentary in the media and the popular assumption that the banking industry exerts undue influence on government policy-making, the academic literature on the role of the banks since the 2008 financial crisis remains theoretically and empirically under-specified. In particular, we argue that different forms of financial power are often conflated, while favorable policy outcomes are too-readily assumed to be evidence of regulatory capture. In short, we still know relatively little about how bank influence varies over time and in different national contexts, the extent to which banking interests are unified or divided, and the conditions under which banks are capable of producing meaningful variation in policy outcomes. This article has three objectives: 1) to explain why the debate on bank influence matters; 2) to examine the evidence of bank influence since the international financial crisis; and 3) to set out a range of conceptual tools for thinking about bank power.


2019 ◽  
Vol 93 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 5-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gold ◽  
Melina Heilmann

Recent years have witnessed a change in the auditor reporting model. One of these developments is the auditor’s issuance of so-called Key Audit Matters in the auditor’s report, where they disclose “those matters that, in the auditor’s professional judgment, were of most significance in the audit of the financial statements of the current period”. In this paper, we review the emerging body of academic research which examines the effects of KAM disclosures in the auditor’s report. We investigate research that has examined the effect of KAM disclosures on (1) investor behavior and market reaction, (2) auditor responses, (3) auditor liability, and (4) client management responses. The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of the existing literature and to summarize the preliminary findings and implications of 22 studies.


2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama

The SEC and legislators have expressed concerns that independence may be negatively impacted if auditors perform significant nonaudit services for their audit clients, and that providing lucrative nonaudit services to clients may make it more likely that auditors will “see things the client's way.” Such concerns are particularly salient in the context of issues that involve significant auditor judgment, as in the case of reporting decisions related to going-concern uncertainties for financially stressed clients. In this study we examine the association between the magnitude of audit and nonaudit fees and auditor report modification decisions for financially stressed manufacturing companies. In our analysis we control for financial stress, company size, reporting lag, default status, audit committee effectiveness, and management plans. The results indicate a significant positive association between the magnitude of audit fees and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modified audit opinion, but we find no significant association between nonaudit fees and audit opinions. Additional analyses also find no significant relationship between the ratio of nonaudit service fees to audit fees and reporting decisions, and indicate that our results are robust across alternative model, variable, and sample specifications. We also control for the potential endogeneity of audit opinions, audit fees, and nonaudit fees, and find the same positive association of audit fees with opinions, but no association between nonaudit fees and audit opinions. Overall, we find no evidence of a significant adverse effect of nonaudit fees on auditor reporting judgments for our sample of distressed companies.


Author(s):  
Keval Amin ◽  
John Daniel Eshleman ◽  
Peng Guo

The purpose of this study is to examine whether investor sentiment influences clients’ propensity to engage in audit opinion shopping. Using the opinion shopping framework of Lennox (2000), we document that internal control opinion shopping is more prevalent when investor sentiment is high. This effect is concentrated among firms with low institutional ownership. We also find that clients are more likely to undertake downward switches (i.e., Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditor) when sentiment is high. Additional tests reveal that clients who engage in opinion shopping during high sentiment periods have a higher risk of material restatements and higher audit fees. As well, the market-penalty associated with opinion shopping is reduced when sentiment is high. Overall, the results suggest that firms’ opinion shopping behavior during high sentiment periods is more prevalent and opportunistic.


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