Auditor Fees and Auditor Independence—Evidence from Going Concern Reporting Decisions in Germany

2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 129-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole V. S. Ratzinger-Sakel
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Auditor Fees

SUMMARY This study examines the potential for non-audit services to impair auditor independence using going concern modifications as a proxy for audit quality. While prior research has focused primarily on Anglo-Saxon environments, this study focuses on Germany because of the country's unique reporting attributes and lower litigation risk when compared to Anglo-Saxon settings. Based on a sample of financially stressed manufacturing companies during the period 2005–2009, the results do not suggest that German auditors are less independent when the level of non-audit fees is high. However, there is some evidence that Big 4 audit firms are less likely than their non-Big 4 counterparts to issue a going concern emphasis-of-matter paragraph for engagements characterized by both relatively high levels of non-audit fees and financial stress.

scholarly journals Auditor Fees and Going-Concern Reporting Decisions on Bankrupt Companies: Additional Evidence

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. A13-A27 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Read
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Auditor Fees

SUMMARY The recent growth in non-audit services (NAS) at the major audit firms has the attention of auditing regulators. On several occasions recently, board members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have indicated that the rise in NAS may place auditor independence at risk (Harris 2014; Tysiac 2014). Impaired independence can result in audit failure, which includes situations when auditors fail to issue going-concern (GC) audit opinions to soon-to-be bankrupt companies. In this paper, I examine the association between the propensity of auditors to issue GC opinions and NAS fees (and audit fees) to 203 bankrupt companies during 2002–2013. In analysis, I find no significant relation between GC decisions and NAS fees and audit fees. My results may interest U.S. regulators, who recently expressed concerns about the threat to auditor independence from the spike in NAS at the major firms. Data Availability: Publicly available from sources identified in the paper.

Going-Concern Audit Opinions and the Provision of Nonaudit Services: Implications for Auditor Independence of Bankrupt Firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Callaghan ◽  
Mohinder Parkash ◽  
Rajeev Singhal
Keyword(s):  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Auditor Fees ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

SUMMARY: Researchers in the area of auditor independence have examined the relationship between auditors' opinions and auditor-provided services. While DeFond et al. (2002) and Geiger and Rama (2003) fail to find auditor impairment for distressed U.S. companies, Sharma (2001) and Sharma and Sidhu (2001) find a negative relationship between the likelihood of a going-concern (GC) opinion and nonaudit fees paid to auditors for bankrupt Australian companies. These conflicting results may arise from jurisdictional differences between Australia and the U.S. or differential managerial incentives and firm costs between distressed and bankrupt firms. In light of these differences, an empirical question exists as to whether the results of the Australian studies will obtain in the U.S. We examine the relationship between the propensity of auditors to render GC opinions and nonaudit fees (and other auditor fees) for a sample of bankrupt U.S. firms. We do not observe any association between GC opinions and nonaudit fees, audit fees, total fees, or the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees.

Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Auditor Reporting on Stressed Companies

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Significant Positive Association ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Audit Opinions ◽  
Auditor Reporting

The SEC and legislators have expressed concerns that independence may be negatively impacted if auditors perform significant nonaudit services for their audit clients, and that providing lucrative nonaudit services to clients may make it more likely that auditors will “see things the client's way.” Such concerns are particularly salient in the context of issues that involve significant auditor judgment, as in the case of reporting decisions related to going-concern uncertainties for financially stressed clients. In this study we examine the association between the magnitude of audit and nonaudit fees and auditor report modification decisions for financially stressed manufacturing companies. In our analysis we control for financial stress, company size, reporting lag, default status, audit committee effectiveness, and management plans. The results indicate a significant positive association between the magnitude of audit fees and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modified audit opinion, but we find no significant association between nonaudit fees and audit opinions. Additional analyses also find no significant relationship between the ratio of nonaudit service fees to audit fees and reporting decisions, and indicate that our results are robust across alternative model, variable, and sample specifications. We also control for the potential endogeneity of audit opinions, audit fees, and nonaudit fees, and find the same positive association of audit fees with opinions, but no association between nonaudit fees and audit opinions. Overall, we find no evidence of a significant adverse effect of nonaudit fees on auditor reporting judgments for our sample of distressed companies.

scholarly journals Disproportionate Insider Control and the Demand for Audit Quality

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arno Forst ◽  
Barry R. Hettler
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
The Relationship

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between disproportionate insider control, enabled through dual-class share structures, and the demand for audit quality. Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms, we find that, consistent with outside shareholders' increased demand for external monitoring, as well as self-bonding by entrenched insiders, disproportionate insider control is positively associated with the propensity to hire a Big 4 or industry specialist auditor, auditor independence, and audit fees. Corroborating a self-bonding explanation, additional analyses show that audit quality mitigates the negative association of disproportionate insider control and firm value. In expanded analyses, we also investigate the separate effects of insider voting and cash flow rights on the demand for audit quality in dual-class firms. Consistent with general agency theory, we find a decreased (increased) demand for audit quality from incentive-alignment (entrenchment) effects of ownership.

To be or not to be – auditors’ ability to signal going concern problems

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torbjörn Tagesson ◽  
Peter Öhman
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Research Opportunity ◽  
Audit Reports ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – This paper aims to chart Swedish auditors’ likelihood of issuing going concern warnings (GCWs), and to investigate the relationship between formal auditor competence, audit fees and audit firm, respectively, and the likelihood of issuing GCWs. Design/methodology/approach – The empirical data are based on annual reports and audit reports for 2,547 limited companies that went bankrupt in 2010 in the wake of the financial crisis and had filed a financial statement in the year before the bankruptcy. Findings – The findings indicate that Swedish auditors seldom issue GCWs. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between audit fee level and the likelihood of issuing GCWs, and Big 4 auditors being more likely to issue such warnings than other auditors. However, the analyses identify differences between audit firms (within the group of Big 4 firms and within the group of other audit firms) in terms of their predictions of client bankruptcies. This suggests a need for further investigation of firm-specific differences. Contrary to what was predicted, authorized auditors are not more likely to issue GCWs than approved auditors. Research limitations/implications – This paper did not investigate the impact of audit experience and tenure or the possibility that auditors may signal survival problems by resigning. Practical implications – Levying appropriate audit fees creates opportunities for thorough audits, but auditors’ formal competence based on training and qualification is not a factor that enforces audit quality. Based on the findings, the authors also suggest some clarifications of existing standards to reduce ambiguity regarding the reporting of survival problems. Originality/value – The Swedish setting is a context in which most companies are small, creditor interest in accounting and auditing is strong and auditors must issue a modified audit opinion if half of the shareholders’ equity is spent. This setting offers a unique research opportunity because the formal competence differs between Sweden’s two categories of certified auditors, and it allows exploration beyond the dichotomy of Big 4 versus other audit firms.

Auditor Independence and Auditor-Provided Tax Service: Evidence from Going-Concern Audit Opinions Prior to Bankruptcy Filings

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dahlia Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
The Public ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Information Spillover

SUMMARY: This study examines whether auditors’ provision of tax services impairs auditor independence by focusing on auditors’ going-concern opinions among a sample of bankruptcy filing firms. The evidence from the bankruptcy setting is particularly salient given that the bankruptcy of corporations such as Enron motivated several provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. More recently, auditors’ provision of tax service to their audit clients has been the focus of new rules by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Consistent with improved audit quality from information spillover, the study documents a significant positive correlation between the level of tax services fees and the likelihood of correctly issuing a going-concern opinion prior to the bankruptcy filing. One implication of this result is that restricting tax services by auditors of poorly performing firms may diminish the quality of auditors’ reporting decisions without leading to an improvement in auditor independence.

Spatial Competition in Local Audit Markets and the Fallout on Deloitte from the 2007 PCAOB Censure

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Face ◽  
Market Leader

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.

Consequences of Going-Concern Opinion Inaccuracy at the Audit Office Level

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 185-208
Author(s):  
Qiao Xu ◽  
Rachana Kalelkar
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type I Errors ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Office Market ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Office Level

SUMMARY This paper examines whether inaccurate going-concern opinions negatively affect the audit office's reputation. Assuming that clients perceive the incidence of going-concern opinion errors as a systematic audit quality concern within the entire audit office, we expect these inaccuracies to impact the audit office market share and dismissal rate. We find that going-concern opinion inaccuracy is negatively associated with the audit office market share and is positively associated with the audit office dismissal rate. Furthermore, we find that the decline in market share and the increase in dismissal rate are primarily associated with Type I errors. Additional analyses reveal that the negative consequence of going-concern opinion inaccuracy is lower for Big 4 audit offices. Finally, we find that the decrease in the audit office market share is explained by the distressed clients' reactions to Type I errors and audit offices' lack of ability to attract new clients.

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