Do Big 4 Auditors Provide Higher Audit Quality after Controlling for the Endogenous Choice of Auditor?

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Daniel Eshleman ◽  
Peng Guo
Keyword(s):  
Propensity Score ◽  
Propensity Score Matching ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Accounting Restatements ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
Matching Procedure ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY: Recent research suggests that Big 4 auditors do not provide higher audit quality than other auditors, after controlling for the endogenous choice of auditor. We re-examine this issue using the incidence of accounting restatements as a measure of audit quality. Using a propensity-score matching procedure similar to that used by recent research to control for clients' endogenous choice of auditor, we find that clients of Big 4 audit firms are less likely to subsequently issue an accounting restatement than are clients of other auditors. In additional tests, we find weak evidence that clients of Big 4 auditors are less likely to issue accounting restatements than are clients of Mid-tier auditors (Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman). Taken together, the evidence suggests that Big 4 auditors do perform higher quality audits. JEL Classifications: M41, M42 Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Audit Quality and Specialist Tenure

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 113-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer J. Gaver ◽  
Steven Utke
Keyword(s):  
Propensity Score ◽  
Propensity Score Matching ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Client Characteristics ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We argue that the association between auditor industry specialization and audit quality depends on how long the auditor has been a specialist. We measure audit quality using absolute discretionary accruals, income-increasing discretionary accruals, and book-tax differences. Our results, based on a sample of Big 4 audit clients from 2003–2015, indicate that auditors who have only recently gained the specialist designation produce a level of audit quality that does not surpass that produced by non-specialist auditors, and is generally lower than the audit quality produced by seasoned specialists. We estimate that the seasoning process takes two to three years. In contrast to prior research that finds no effect of specialization after propensity score matching, we find that seasoned specialists generally produce higher-quality audits than other auditors even after matching. This suggests that the audit quality effect associated with seasoned industry specialist auditors is not due to differences in client characteristics. JEL Classifications: M42. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the text.

Office-Client Balance and Metro Area Audit Market Competition

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 113-141
Author(s):  
Michael L. Ettredge ◽  
Matthew G. Sherwood ◽  
Lili Sun
Keyword(s):  
Relative Abundance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Metro Area ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY We propose a new audit supplier competition construct, the Office-Client Balance (OCB), which consists of the relative abundance of competing audit offices and audit clients in a metropolitan (metro) area. From this construct, we derive a metro level audit competition proxy reflecting surpluses or shortfalls of total metro audit office numbers relative to the national metro OCB norm: the OCB_TOT. Consistent with the predictions of Porter's Five Forces theory, we find that OCB_TOT is associated with lower fees, more auditor turnover, and more (less) office exits (entrances) in metro audit markets. These findings validate OCB_TOT as a proxy for audit market competition. Our results indicate that greater metro level competition among auditors (more positive OCB_TOT) is associated with higher audit quality, proxied by fewer financial statement misstatements. Several additional analyses suggest that OCB_TOT is useful in explaining clients' choices of local (versus remote) audit offices and Big 4 (versus non-Big 4) offices. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: G18; L10; M42.

Further Evidence on the Effect of Regulation on the Exit of Small Auditors from the Audit Market and Resulting Audit Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-115
Author(s):  
Neil L. Fargher ◽  
Alicia Jiang ◽  
Yangxin Yu
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY Following the introduction of SOX in 2002 and the introduction of PCAOB inspections starting from 2003, DeFond and Lennox (2011) found that a large number of small auditors exited the SEC client audit market during the 2002–2004 period and that these exiting auditors were of lower quality relative to non-exiting auditors. This paper seeks to verify whether SOX and the introduction of PCAOB inspections improved audit quality through incentivizing small auditors providing lower audit quality to exit the market. Using client discretionary accruals and the likelihood of the clients restating financial statements as proxies for audit quality, we do not find that the small auditors that exited the market for SEC client audits were of lower quality than successor small audit firms that did not exit the market. JEL Classifications: G18; L51. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Non-CPAs and Office Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew G. Sherwood ◽  
Albert L. Nagy ◽  
Aleksandra B. Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Human Resources ◽  
Growth Regulators ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS During the time surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Big 4 firms either spun-off or downsized their consulting practices. However, in recent years, consulting service lines of the large accounting firms have seen a dramatic resurgence and growth. Regulators have taken notice of, and expressed concern over, this renewed focus on consulting. The accounting firms claim that such services enhance audit quality, mainly due to the prominent role of non-accounting specialists in today's external audit function. This study examines whether the availability of non-CPAs in U.S. Big 4 firm offices is associated with audit quality. We find that greater access to non-CPAs in the office is associated with higher audit quality and conclude that office audit quality is not just a function of audit-specific human resources but also the availability of non-CPAs to support audit engagement teams. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the study.

scholarly journals Information Technology in an Audit Context: Have the Big 4 Lost Their Advantage?

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Jordan Lowe ◽  
James L. Bierstaker ◽  
Diane J. Janvrin ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
It Adoption ◽  
The Past ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Adoption And Implementation ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Perceived Importance ◽  
Communication Modes

ABSTRACT Audit firms use information technology (IT) to improve audit quality, effectiveness, and efficiency. While audit IT has evolved over the past decade, limited guidance is available to assist practitioners in determining how IT can be used. Our research objectives are fourfold. First, we examine to what extent auditors use and assess the perceived importance of IT in their audits. Second, we look at different-sized firms to determine whether IT adoption and implementation decisions differ by firm size. Third, we investigate changes in auditors' use and perceived importance of IT over the past decade. Fourth, we examine whether IT has impacted the communication modes used by auditors when reviewing workpapers and fraud brainstorming. Overall, Big 4 auditors were not significantly more likely to use IT than non-Big 4 auditors, suggesting that the dominance of the Big 4 firms' use of IT has lessened. In fact, there are a few applications where non-Big 4 auditors appear to have taken the lead. In addition, our findings indicate that auditors have increased the use of all the IT applications we examined ten years ago. However, we find evidence that auditors may prefer to use even more IT in their audits than they are currently using. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available for download, see Appendix B.

The Association between Audit Manager and Auditor-In-Charge Experience, Effort, and Risk Responsiveness

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Contessotto ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Robyn A. Moroney
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Core ◽  
Specific Experience ◽  
Primary Core ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Audit Team ◽  
Industry Experience ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Core Role

SUMMARY Audit quality is dependent on the experience and effort of the audit team to identify and respond to client risks (risk responsiveness). Central to each team are the core role holders who plan and execute the audit. While many studies treat the partner as the primary core role holder, the manager and auditor-in-charge (AIC) are also important. Using data for engagements from two midtier firms, we analyze the association between the experience and relative effort of the manager and AIC and risk responsiveness. We find a manager's client-specific experience is associated with risk responsiveness for non-listed clients but find no evidence that the general or industry experience of a manager, or the experience of the AIC, is associated with risk responsiveness. The client-specific experience and relative effort of the partner is associated with risk responsiveness. These results suggests that managers can provide an important, albeit limited, contribution to the audit. JEL Classifications: M2. Data Availability: The data were made available to the researchers on the understanding that they will remain confidential.

Audit Firms as Networks of Offices

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott E. Seavey ◽  
Michael J Imhof ◽  
Tiffany J. Westfall
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Network Connectedness ◽  
Partner Knowledge ◽  
Office Level

SUMMARY Prior audit research suggests that most, if not all, audit quality can be explained at the office level. However, the question remains of whether office-level audit quality is contingent on how individual offices relate to the firm as a whole. Motivated by theories of knowledge management, organizational learning, and networks, we posit that individual offices are connected to their audit network through partner knowledge sharing and oversight, which impact office-level audit quality. We interview Big 4 audit partners and learn that knowledge sharing between partners in different offices is common and intended to aid in the provision of audit services. Using network connectedness to proxy for knowledge sharing and oversight between offices of the same firm, we document that more connected offices are associated with fewer client restatements and lower discretionary accruals. We additionally find that network effects are magnified when accounting treatments are more complex and require greater auditor judgement.

Did the 2005 Deferred Prosecution Agreement Adversely Impact KPMG's Audit Practice?

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Baugh ◽  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Service Provider ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Tax Shelters

SUMMARY We examine the consequences of misconduct in a Big 4 firm's nonaudit practice for its audit practice. Specifically, we examine whether KPMG's audit practice suffered a loss of audit fees and clients and/or a decline in factual audit quality following the 2005 deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the Department of Justice for marketing questionable tax shelters. We find little evidence that the DPA adversely impacted KPMG's audit practice by way of either audit fees or the likelihood of client gains/losses, suggesting little or no harm to KPMG's audit reputation. We also find that the DPA had no effect on the firm's factual audit quality, even for those audit clients that dropped KPMG as their tax service provider. Collectively, our findings suggest that there was no spillover effect from the DPA to KPMG's audit practice. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

PCAOB Inspections and Large Accounting Firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
Lori B. Shefchik
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Linear Trend ◽  
Dominant Role ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
Over Time

SYNOPSIS The purpose of this paper is to analyze the PCAOB's inspection reports of large, annually inspected accounting firms. The inspection reports identify audit deficiencies that have implications for audit quality. By examining the inspection reports in detail, we can identify the nature and severity of audit deficiencies; we can track the total number of deficiencies over time; and we can pinpoint common, recurring audit deficiencies. We focus on large accounting firms because they play a dominant role in the marketplace (i.e., they audit public companies that comprise approximately 99 percent of U.S.-based issuer market capitalization). We document a significant, downward linear trend in the number of deficiencies from 2004 to 2009. We also identify common, recurring audit deficiencies, determine the financial statement accounts most often impacted by audit deficiencies, and isolate the primary emphasis of the financial statement impacted. Our findings generally are consistent comparing Big 4 and second-tier accounting firms, though a few differences emerge. In addition, we make comparisons with findings that have been documented for small, triennially inspected firms. Data Availability: The data are available from public sources.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

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